

# Evaluating the EITI’s Impact on the Transparency of Natural Resource Revenues

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## 1. Executive Summary

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) stands at a crucial point in its short history. Several of its candidate countries are now on the cusp of “validation,” marking their compliance with the EITI’s policies and procedures. It is in this context that Rainbow Insight was requested by the EITI Secretariat in November 2008 to perform an evaluation of the initiative’s impact, both as a tool of public policy and as a mechanism for promoting multi-stakeholder engagement on natural resource revenues, with the objective of presenting the evaluation’s findings at the EITI’s International Conference in Doha in February 2009.

We find that the EITI is making a number of direct and indirect contributions to “good governance” with respect to natural resource revenues. First, it is establishing an emerging standard for the reporting of natural resource revenues by both corporations and governments. Second, within candidate countries it is providing a model of multi-stakeholder dialogue on a critical issue of public policy. Third, at the international level it is similarly forging a network composed of civil servants, corporate executives, and representatives of global civil society who share a commitment to revenue transparency in the hope of promoting economic development and poverty reduction.

At the same time, the EITI continues to face a number of challenges. Most important of these is that while several countries are expected to undergo the validation process by early 2010, not one has yet been “validated.” Ensuring that candidate countries achieve validation while maintaining the legitimacy and credibility of the process must be the first priority of the EITI Secretariat and Board. The EITI must also be prepared to respond to the global financial crisis that has led to lower commodity—including oil—prices, and to a sharp reduction in financing for new natural resource projects. In that context, governments may feel less pressure to stay on the path toward EITI validation, or they may lack the internal financial resources needed to achieve that objective. If the EITI Secretariat and Board sense a lessening commitment to the initiative given the financial challenges now facing governments, they will need to respond quickly with not only appropriate arguments, but perhaps also with a renewed set of incentives.

## 2. Background to this Report

In November 2008 the Secretariat of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) requested Rainbow Insight to conduct an “evaluation of its impact,” to be presented at its international conference in Doha in February 2009. We have understood by the term “impact” not only the extent to which the EITI has emerged as a “global standard” for natural resource revenue transparency, but also the initiative’s role in promoting multi-stakeholder dialogue on a critical issue for public policy. This evaluation is largely qualitative and has been based on: a review of published material; a written questionnaire and series of interviews with many EITI stakeholders (including Board members, industry executives, public officials, and members of global civil society); and an on-site visit to an EITI Candidate Country (Cameroon).

In contrast, the EITI Secretariat discouraged Rainbow Insight from conducting for present purposes a “content analysis” of media reporting on the initiative, which many organizations have used in conjunction with their impact evaluations, as a way of assessing public perceptions of an organization over time. As a future exercise, this could prove particularly valuable given the EITI Secretariat’s concern with the initiative’s role as a “global standard.” (We note that among the Secretariat’s “indicative” Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) one finds “Awareness Raising,” which includes “References to EITI in *The Financial Times*.” The Secretariat also states that it “monitors references to EITI in a broad range of publications” but we do not know whether that monitoring exercise includes content analysis). Further, we were unable to conduct any statistical or econometric testing of the EITI’s independent impact on budget transparency owing to the paucity of empirical data or “observations” (no countries have yet been validated as EITI compliant); in the event, statistical or econometric testing of the EITI “residual” would likely prove challenging in the face of other, complementary initiatives which have supporting objectives (e.g. the IMF’s ongoing efforts to promote Resource Revenue Transparency), and would likely require more time and resources than were available for the present report.

**The evaluation provided here is the product of Rainbow Insight and the EITI Board and Secretariat take no responsibility for any of its findings or conclusions.**

### 3. Introduction

Social scientists once described the natural resource endowment of a country as a “blessing.” In recent years, however, it has instead been called a “curse.” The “natural resource curse” has two components, one economic, the other political. The economic component, often called the “Dutch Disease,” refers to the detrimental effects of natural resource exploitation on the traditional sectors within an economy. When a country develops and sells its natural resources, this can drive up its exchange rate, making the traditional, traded sectors of the economy less competitive. Economic policy tools must be used to counter the exchange rate appreciation if the traditional sectors are to be maintained.

But even more pernicious are the alleged effects of natural resources on a country’s politics. Again, several different effects have been analyzed. First, it is said that when a country’s economy becomes dependent on its natural resource wealth, the government tends to reduce or eliminate income taxes, breaking a fundamental bond between the state and its citizens. Because citizens are no longer taxed, governments feel less pressure to report on how oil revenues are being used. Second, in countries with high levels of natural resource wealth, all politics revolves around efforts to get one’s hands on the “spigot,” and power becomes centralized. This leads governments towards authoritarianism, making it difficult to establish democratic institutions and checks-and-balances. Finally, governments which enjoy high levels of natural resource income tend to be corrupt, given the enormous wealth that is at stake. As a result of this political “curse,” economies that depend upon their natural resources have tended not to enjoy sustained development and poverty reduction, as funds have flowed away from projects that would support widespread growth.

The EITI was born to help address some of the challenges facing countries that, despite having a wealth of natural resources, have failed to enjoy the fruits of that potential bounty. Its fundamental method for addressing the problems of these economies is to introduce greater transparency into natural resource revenues and government budgets. Quite simply, the aim of the EITI is to ensure that citizens can reconcile what comes into their economy (the revenue side) with government accounts (the expenditure side), so that both industry and the state become more accountable to those who should ultimately benefit from the nation’s resource endowment.

The EITI seeks to advance its transparency objective in large part by requiring “candidate countries” to go through a “validation process.” To date, no candidate countries have been validated, which is one of the major concerns that stakeholders have expressed about EITI; more on this below. The validation process requires a “validator” to respond to a set of 18 questions about the country’s governance of its natural resources, which goes well beyond reconciling the flow of funds and which incorporates as well, for example, the dissemination of information to “civil society” about these flows.

In what follows, we will describe what a wide-range of stakeholders think about the EITI and its impact at the present time. We will then turn to a case study of a candidate country, Cameroon, to present a more detailed analysis of some issues that are being raised “on the ground.” We conclude with recommendations to the EITI Board and Secretariat.

#### **4. EITI Today: What Stakeholders are Saying**

We would summarize the views that we have collected as follows: *EITI is seen as a success simply by the fact that it exists, with its infrastructure, processes, policies and procedures having now been established. Ensuring that countries now progress from being Candidates through the validation pipeline is regarded by stakeholders as being of prime importance. It is also generally felt that the EITI Secretariat needs to formalize and commit to a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) or benchmarks, so that stakeholders can judge whether it is meeting its stated objectives. Indeed, many stakeholders—including some EITI Board Members—were unaware of the (indicative) KPIs that the Secretariat has already published!*

##### **EITI winning confidence**

More specifically, we find that EITI has won the confidence of the international financial institutions (IFIs), the United Nations, the corporate sector, representatives of civil society, and of course that of many governments around the world. *In particular, the EITI must be applauded for its role in promoting dialogue between governments and civil society in many countries where that had never happened before.* By promoting such a dialogue, EITI has opened a pathway for similar, multi-stakeholder discussions in other issue-areas.

The EITI has also been effective in raising awareness of the importance of transparency and its links to sustained development. The existence of EITI as a multi-stakeholder organisation, in which transparency can now be discussed openly, is itself a success story. Indeed, in many countries natural resource revenues were previously classified as “state secrets” and were placed “off-budget,” and so the introduction of EITI has made a major impact on the capacity of the public to analyze fiscal policy.

##### **Validation pipeline and engagement - a fine balance**

At the same time, there is a general feeling among EITI stakeholders that the validation pipeline is moving slowly, and that validation is critically important as a measure of compliance. Clearly, the implication is that countries aren’t moving fast enough towards compliance. But stakeholders also recognize that placing too much pressure on governments to engage in validation could be a mistake, as the process might then lack legitimacy and ownership.

### **Widening participation**

Stakeholders also note that a significant number of oil producing countries are not (yet) participants, including Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is also widely observed that only Norway, among the industrial countries, is a candidate for validation. Many stakeholders expressed the view that former Prime Minister Tony Blair might have “shown the way” back in 2002 by requiring the United Kingdom to adopt the EITI. *This critique, it was noted by some stakeholders, has renewed bite in light of the current global financial crisis, which some observers believe was caused in part by the lack of transparency in the industrial world’s financial sector. In short, the distinction once made between industrial and developing world economic governance seems less sharp than it did in the past.*

On the other hand, the EITI’s ongoing influence in Africa has been widely hailed by stakeholders. While implementation on the African continent is mixed in the eyes of stakeholders, with some countries making continuing good progress while others are stalling, its overall influence has been beneficial. More evidence on this point will be provided below, in the “case study” presentation of a candidate country, Cameroon.

### **Effectiveness of policies and procedures**

With respect to EITI policies and procedures, stakeholders express the view that these are generally effective and appropriate. The different tools and mechanisms established, as incorporated in the Sourcebook and the Validation Guide, make the relationship between EITI and its processes reasonably clear. The criteria are objective and the Validation Guide, for example, provides implementing countries with a useful toolkit. Naturally, problems arise at an operational level within candidate countries where the implementation is not always followed through systematically and with the necessary level of commitment—and stakeholders did emphasize that the incorporation of EITI principles into an economy does require a major commitment on the part of candidate countries.

### **Stakeholder engagement and commitment**

To the extent that the EITI has been a success, much of that is due to the actions of its Board and its Secretariat. The Board has brought together three key constituencies: governments, firms, and civil society. The achievement of maintaining commitment among these stakeholders is *hugely* significant. It is a credit to the Board that it has set high standards in overseeing the development of infrastructure, processes and materials. The Board has also recognized the difficulties inherent in placing too much pressure on candidate countries, while trying to maintain the initiative’s momentum: this is a difficult balancing act. *At the same time, some stakeholders have suggested that candidate countries are under-represented on the Board, and that Board discussions are dominated by debates between civil society and corporate representatives. Further, working relations between the Board and the World Bank—which does not have a formal seat on the Board—could be improved in the*

interest of greater coherence and efficiency, particularly since the Bank plays an important role in the management of technical assistance funds.

The work of the Secretariat is widely praised by EITI stakeholders. Staff-members are seen as being friendly, helpful, professional, and enthusiastic. *Importantly, they are generally viewed as supportive at both Board and in-country levels, balancing their work to serve both as required.* There is wide recognition that the Secretariat has taken the EITI through a difficult, “start-up” phase. It is clear that the Secretariat is fully utilised and that there are capacity issues. Given the need to improve the diversity of the Secretariat in terms of gender, ethnic origin and North/South hemisphere representation, there is an undoubted opportunity to develop an inward, rolling secondment programme for high-flying representatives of the NGO, Government, and Corporate Sectors. This would have the merit of contributing to alleviating capacity issues, providing a short-term contribution to the diversity agenda issue, and offer NGOs, Government and the Corporate Sector a prestigious opportunity within a unique multi-stakeholder framework.

### **Capacity building**

Going forward, there is a view that the Secretariat will need to focus more prominently on capacity-building issues within EITI countries. Very few people within these countries (or indeed within the advanced industrial nations) have the background to review the conciliator and validator reports; analysis of these reports requires fairly detailed knowledge of natural resource accounting and government budgets. While some NGOs like PWYP try to address these capacity shortcomings within developing world nations, it is likely that this is a challenge that EITI will have to face squarely as more people “demand” a greater understanding of the national accounts.

### **Validation is the central issue**

Perhaps the central issue facing EITI is the validation process and the stark fact that not a single country has yet been validated. *Further, an overwhelming majority of the stakeholders we spoke to do not believe that validation will be rapid in coming years.* This is for several different reasons, ranging from capacity constraints within candidate countries (technical and financial), a fear that EITI might “lose momentum” especially in light of the financial crisis, and the lack of “demand” for EITI among key stakeholders. *Since several candidate countries are now on the cusp of validation, a key issue for the Board and Secretariat to address is how to ensure that a number of these countries now “get over the hump” and become validated, hopefully creating a “snowball effect” that leads other candidates to seek validation in a timely manner.*

In essence, EITI validation needs to become a “club good” with a sharp distinction drawn between those who are “members” and those who are not. *This raises the issue of whether additional incentives can be provided to candidates to get validated; one concern expressed by many stakeholders is that the long-term incentives for EITI validation (e.g. “greater*

*transparency,” “sustainable development,” “poverty reduction”) are somewhat vague, and that it is difficult to create a causal connection between EITI and these outcomes.*

Stakeholders also raised some questions about the validation process itself. Of greatest concern is the fact that the validators will be paid by candidate country governments, and thus their objectivity may be questioned. Further, since several of the “approved” validators are basically accounting firms, there is a fear that they will be too focused on the numbers and not enough on broader issues of civil society engagement; that they won’t “see the forest for the trees.” Still, a large number of stakeholders are hopeful that the validation process will have a positive impact on the specific issue of transparency of natural resource revenues, which is the central purpose of EITI.

### **EITI’s unique position**

*Overall, the EITI has carved for itself a unique place in what one stakeholder called the international community’s “transparency industry.” It is much better known than, for example, the Partnership Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) of the World Economic Forum, and it is widely supported by such NGOs as Revenue Watch and PWYP. It has helped to place transparency “on the map” of “good governance” and its multi-stakeholder governance structure is operational and effective. Beyond whatever impact EITI may have on transparency of natural resource revenues, many stakeholders view it as a model for dialogue. In short, the majority of stakeholders are optimistic about EITI and its future. Still, validation will ultimately tell the tale. If only a few countries get validated within the next few years, and if those that do get validated once and then drop the process, the EITI’s future will prove grim.*

## **5. The EITI in Cameroon - Country Case study**

In 2008, Cameroon ranked #141 (out of 180) on Transparency International’s *Corruption Perception Index*. A number of factors, however, have led the government in recent years to confront its governance problems. Cameroon’s inclusion in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program, for example, requires it to produce “poverty reduction strategy papers” for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to introduce a host of measures aimed at “good governance” including policies and procedures to address corruption. The IMF (along with the World Bank) has also played a key role in encouraging Cameroon to introduce greater transparency with respect to its natural resource revenues, and the country’s decision in 2005 to implement EITI may be viewed in this broader political-economic context.

One challenge facing all those who seek greater transparency in Cameroon’s reporting of its natural resource—and in particular, its oil—revenues is the complexity of the country’s Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs). It is worth take a moment to sketch the PSA in order to give EITI stakeholders a feeling for the challenge that the initiative faces in shedding light on a very complex industrial sector. Basically, the private oil companies that are operating in Cameroon have to share their production with the government-controlled Societe Nationale des Hydrocarbons (SNH); according to the IMF the split is, on average, 63/37 with the

majority share going to SNH. At the same time, the PSA calls for a split of corporate operating costs, and a guaranteed “minimum income” for the oil companies as an incentive device for high-risk oil exploration. The flow of funds between SNH, the Cameroon government, and the firms is therefore hardly straight-forward.

In addition, according to an International Monetary Fund report, until 2005 the government did not provide regular information on budgetary payments made by SNH. Thus, the government’s decision to implement EITI coincides with pressure from the IMF to provide more detailed information about government revenues. Of course, introducing greater transparency into SNH could be in the government’s interest as well.

As the IMF suggests, “three main issues related to the transfer of oil revenues have been undermining transparency of budgetary operations...First, the government should receive at the end of each month SNH’s collected revenue based on net receipts during the month...In practice, however, SNH makes additional deductions...Second...the payments the government receives from SNH are reduced by the amount of the cash advances made by SNH in response to pressing payment requests by the government...This system of cash advances by SNH distorts the elaboration of the budget law...The third issue about the transfer of oil revenue relates to the lack of clarity in the transfer of dividends received by SNH.”

It is into this breach that the EITI stepped when Cameroon announced its intention to become a compliant country in March 2005. As in other candidate countries, this has required the government to appoint a Technical Secretariat and a multi-stakeholder National Committee, which would provide the required oversight over the process. These steps having been taken, Cameroon had to conduct a number of public meetings regarding the EITI process, and to select a “conciliator” to review the flow-of-funds between the oil companies and the government. As on January 2009, the Technical Secretariat had released two reconciliations of the Cameroon oil sector, one for the period 2001-2004 (released in November 2006) and another extending through 2005; this latter released in March 2007. As this suggests, one concern expressed by the National Committee along with other outside stakeholders is the delay in reporting, which provides “historical numbers” but ongoing questions about the current budget.

In important respects, the situation in Cameroon reflects our larger findings concerning EITI drawn from our stakeholder questionnaire and interviews. What this means specifically is that we encountered high praise for the work of the Technical Secretariat (the Technical Secretary is an individual from the Ministry of Finance with extensive experience of the oil sector) and for EITI’s role in bringing together a multi-stakeholder dialogue concerning oil revenues. EITI was widely praised for bringing oil revenues “on budget” and making it possible to discuss them openly; previously they were basically classified as “state secrets.” Indeed, a view that was widely expressed in interviews is that “EITI has created a model for dialogue between government, industry, and civil society.”

Yet important reservations about the EITI process were also expressed within Cameroon, some of which may, admittedly, reflect confusion about the initiative’s fundamental purpose. Several of these concerns revolved around the reconciliation reports. First, it was alleged that some possible payments from oil companies to the government have gone unreported (for example, payments to win oil leases); to the extent that “off-budget” payments for these leases are largely made “upfront” to government officials, this gap would undermine much of EITI’s very purpose. Second, while the conciliator identified “differences” between SNH and government reporting of oil revenues, it only explained a portion of these differences

(specifically those differences due to “technical” reasons, for example in the calendar years used for reporting or due to exchange rates used). Third, some stakeholders questioned the value of “aggregated” versus “disaggregated” reporting of oil sector revenues, mirroring a wider EITI debate.

Other concerns were expressed with respect to the ability of the public in Cameroon to understand the numbers that have been published, and indeed the EITI National Committee recognizes that a major communication effort is required to introduce EITI to the nation and to help build capacity so that its work can be widely understood. This communication gap is now being addressed, with the introduction of a website and through ongoing discussions with representatives of civil society, including prominently representatives of the different religious groups in Cameroon.

Further, many stakeholders argued that the EITI must work quickly to ensure that *all* natural resources be included in the initiative. The country, for example, has a rich forestry sector and a potentially huge mining sector. With respect to the latter, stakeholders expressed the view that it is important that it be brought into EITI before wide-scale industrial mining begins; today, mining remains largely artisanal.

Of greatest concern to EITI stakeholders in Cameroon, however, was the question of “what is being done with the oil revenues?” As one stakeholder put it, “You can’t speak about oil revenues without asking how the oil revenues get spent.” While this may be a topic that an “EITI ++” could potentially address, the EITI’s current mandate provides no precise guidance on public expenditures at the present time.

Overall, it appears that Cameroon is on-track to achieve validation by March 2010. Its Technical Secretariat is extremely knowledgeable about the oil sector, and the government remains committed to ensuring that it be viewed as EITI compliant. This could serve both domestic and international purposes. Domestically, there is no doubt that corruption has become an increasingly prominent issue in Cameroon, and that this issue is undermining trust in government. Internationally, Cameroon’s oil production has been declining for the past decade, and the country needs fresh investment to develop costly, deepwater oil fields. To the extent that the international oil companies now seek EITI compliance, the EITI becomes part of the deal with respect to major investments. On the other hand, if the EITI fails to address allegations of “missing payments” and if it does not convince its stakeholders that the numbers being reported are valid, it could become a victim of scepticism, losing legitimacy and credibility in the process.

## 6. Recommendations: The Road Ahead

The EITI is at an arguably critical moment in its history; indeed, that might be one reason why an evaluation of its impact was requested at this time. While stakeholders have been “patient” with the initiative and generally understanding of the fact that it has taken the Board and the Secretariat a few years to learn how to operate and to put together the policies and procedures needed for a legitimate and credible validation process, these same stakeholders now want to see action in terms of country compliance. Should only a very few countries undergo a successful validation process in the next two years it could place the EITI in jeopardy.

### Global financial crisis

To be sure, the global financial crisis has now complicated the EITI’s prospects. Countries around the world are now turning to the priority of economic stabilization, placing almost everything else on the back-burner. Low oil prices are placing new oil exploration and production projects on hold given the lack of project financing. These exogenous shocks may well result in less pressure being placed on candidate countries to move ahead and submit to the validation process.

### Incentivising compliance

Given all this, we believe that the EITI’s Board and Secretariat, along with the international financial institutions (IFIs) and other committed stakeholders, must focus their attention on ensuring that a significant group of candidate countries move toward compliance in the years ahead. The objective must be to create a core group of countries, a “club,” that draws a sharp distinction between candidate and compliant countries. The Board, the Secretariat, and the IFIs may have to consider providing some strong (or “high-powered”), short-term incentives to governments that engage in validation, versus the weaker, long-term incentives that must now currently motivate EITI compliance. While we do not have specific views on the nature of those incentives, they could include a commitment on the part of stakeholders to ensure that compliant countries receive widespread publicity with respect to their achievement, to the extent that this is of interest to them. Given the shortage of project finance, perhaps EITI compliant countries could also receive preferred access to World Bank project lending for oil field (and other natural resource) development, or preferential rates for loans. *In sum, ensuring country compliance in the midst of the current crisis must be the core priority that drives the EITI over the coming year.*

### **Assessing EITI performance**

Relatedly, the EITI Board and Secretariat need to put into place a *formal* set of benchmarks or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in order to assess the EITI's performance. Those KPIs need to be carefully thought out beyond the number of countries that have been validated; we are not convinced, however, that all the current KPIs, if only indicative, are really useful for purposes of critical self-evaluation. KPIs should cover both organizational and marketing aspects of the EITI, the former referring to the Initiative's operations (such measures could include gender and country balance among staff-members; training hours, and so forth) and the latter referring to its success in implementation (which should also include attrition meaning countries that leave the EITI). Further, the KPIs need not be purely quantitative but could include longer-range "directional" indicators as well. The EITI will also need to give some thought to indicators that focus on public engagement with the initiative, beyond website visits and newspaper reports. These could include public meetings held on EITI reports, public lectures given on EITI to academic audiences and school groups, case studies written about EITI and other forms of interaction.

## Appendix 1

### Rating analysis

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q11			
Overall assessment	Effectiveness and appropriateness of policies	Evaluate progress vs KPIs	Evaluate Board	Evaluate Secretariat	Hopeful validation rapid	Hopeful validation yields tangible results	Optimism for future	Total	Average score by respondent	Total as a % of max Score
6.5	8.0	6.0	8.0	7.0	7.0	7.5	7.0	57.0	7.1	71.3
6.0	5.0	5.5	7.5	5.0	3.0	5.0	4.0	41.0	5.1	51.3
5.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	9.0	4.0	6.0	5.0	50.0	6.3	62.5
8.0	9.0	4.0	9.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	7.0	57.0	7.1	71.3
9.0	9.0	9.0	8.0	9.0	7.0	6.0	8.0	65.0	8.1	81.3
7.0		5.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	7.0	6.0	43.0	5.4	53.8
6.0	8.0	5.0	6.5	8.0	5.0	7.0	6.0	51.5	6.4	64.4
8.0	7.5	3.5	5.0	7.0	2.5	5.0	6.5	45.0	5.6	56.3
8.0			7.0	9.0		7.0	7.0	38.0	4.8	47.5
7.5	7.0	5.0	5.0	9.0	7.0	6.5	5.0	52.0	6.5	65.0
8.5	8.0	6.0		9.0	5.0	5.0		41.5	5.2	51.9
6.0	8.0	4.0	7.0	6.0	3.0	7.0	6.0	47.0	5.9	58.8
9.0	6.0	9.0	5.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	10.0	66.0	8.3	82.5

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q11			
Overall assessment	Effectiveness and appropriateness of policies	Evaluate progress vs KPIs	Evaluate Board	Evaluate Secretariat	Hopeful validation rapid	Hopeful validation yields tangible results	Optimism for future	Total	Average score by respondent	Total as a % of max Score
6.0	8.0	5.0	8.0	8.0	3.0	8.0	5.0	51.0	6.4	63.8
7.0	7.0	5.0	5.0	7.0	3.0	6.0	5.0	45.0	5.6	56.3
8.0	8.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	5.0	8.0	8.0	61.0	7.6	76.3
4.0	6.0	5.0	5.0	8.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	39.0	4.9	48.8
7.0	8.0	6.0	7.0	5.0	5.0	8.0	8.0	54.0	6.8	67.5
7.5	8.0	4.0	7.0	7.5	5.0	4.5	7.5	51.0	6.4	63.8
7.0	7.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	5.0	8.0	6.0	53.0	6.6	66.3
6.5	5.0	6.0	6.0	7.0	5.0	7.0	6.0	48.5	6.1	60.6
5.0	5.0	1.0	1.0	9.0	1.0	5.0	5.0	32.0	4.0	40.0
8.0	5.0	7.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	7.0	7.0	48.0	6.0	60.0
7.0	6.5	6.0	5.0	8.0	8.0	8.5	8.0	57.0	7.1	71.3
6.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	5.0	7.0	8.0	54.0	6.8	67.5
7.0	8.0	7.0	8.0	7.5	4.0	8.0	8.0	57.5	7.2	71.9

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q11			
Overall assessment	Effectiveness and appropriateness of policies	Evaluate progress vs KPIs	Evaluate Board	Evaluate Secretariat	Hopeful validation rapid	Hopeful validation yields tangible results	Optimism for future	Total	Average score by respondent	Total as a % of max Score
9.0	9.0	5.0	9.0	6.5	5.0	8.0	3.0	54.5	6.8	68.1
6.0	6.0	6.0	5.0	7.0	4.0	8.0	6.0	48.0	6.0	60.0
4.0	8.0	7.0	5.0	6.0	4.0	3.0	7.0	44.0	5.5	55.0
199.5	194.0	159.0	179.0	216.5	132.5	192.0	179.0	1451.5		

High	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	10.0	9.0	8.5	8.0
Low	4.0	5.0	1.0	1.0	5.0	1.0	4.0	3.0
Average	6.9	7.5	5.5	6.2	7.5	4.6	6.6	6.2

## Appendix 2

### Questionnaire Participants

**Amuan Aka**, Opposition, Paliament, Cameroon  
**Humphrey Assisi Asobie**, Board Member, EITI and Civil Society Representative  
**Graham Baxter**, Responsible, Business Solutions, IBLF  
**Edward Bickham**, Board Member, EITI, and Head of Corporate Affairs, Anglo American  
**Mrs Boukar Kouloumi**, Présidence de la République, Cameroon  
**Stuart Brooks**, International Affairs Advisor, Chevron  
**José Luis Carbajal**, National Coordinator, Peru  
**Sefton Darby**, Independent Consultant to EITI; former member of EITI Secretariat , DfID  
**Paolo De Sa**, World Bank  
**Willy Egset**, Head, Corporate Social Responsibility, Statoil Hydro  
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