

The Lobito Corridor: A frontier for transition mineral partnerships in Africa

Governance, investment and opportunities
for value capture in Angola, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Zambia

REPORT





This study, commissioned by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in collaboration with ITIE Angola, ITIE-RDC and Zambia EITI, was undertaken by CrossBoundary Advisory.

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Key messages

- **Strategic mineral partnerships are reshaping how critical minerals are financed, transported and traded.** Rising demand for transition minerals is driving new forms of cooperation between governments, development partners and companies, with a growing focus on integrated supply chains rather than isolated mining investments.
- **The Lobito Corridor illustrates both the potential and complexity of these new supply chain models.** While the Corridor offers a strategic alternative route for copper and cobalt exports, its development remains uneven and dependent on coordination across countries, institutions and financing arrangements.
- **Diversification and value addition are possible, but not guaranteed.**
The Corridor could support local content, supplier development and downstream processing, but outcomes will depend on governance and policy decisions, as well as addressing constraints such as power supply, infrastructure gaps, financing and industrial capacity.
- **Governance gaps, rather than geology or finance alone, present key risks to achieving development outcomes.** Weak transparency, limited coordination and unclear rules across mining, transport and infrastructure can undermine investment, delay implementation and reduce domestic value capture.
- **Transparency and multi-stakeholder oversight are critical to de-risking the Corridor and strengthening cross-country coordination.** Improving EITI disclosures on transport, infrastructure and value addition – and leveraging multi-stakeholder processes across corridors through the EITI and other frameworks such as the Africa Mining Vision and national mechanisms – can strengthen accountability and set up corridors for long-term success.

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Abbreviations

AFC	Africa Finance Corporation
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGL	Africa Global Logistics
ARSP	DRC Regulatory Authority for Subcontracting in the Private Sector
ASM	Artisanal and small-scale mining
AZOP	Angola-Zambia Oil Products Pipeline
CCTTFA	Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency
CCR	Central Copper Resources
CFB	Caminho de Ferro de Benguela
CMOC	China Molybdenum Company
CNMC	China Nonferrous Metal Mining Corporation
CO₂	Carbon dioxide
CRM	Critical raw materials
DFC	United States Development Finance Corporation
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ERG	Eurasian Resources Group
ESG	Environmental and social governance
ESIA	Environmental and social impact assessment
EV	Electric vehicle
EW	Electrowinning
FQM	First Quantum Minerals
FPIC	Free, prior and informed consent
GDP	Gross domestic product
HS	Harmonised system (trade classification)
IRH	UAE Investment Company
JV	Joint venture
KCC	Kamoto Copper Company
KFM	Kisanfu Mining

LAR	Lobito Atlantic Railway
LCIPA	Lobito Corridor Investment Promotion Authority
LCTTFA	Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency
MCLI	Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MMG	Joint venture majority-owned by China Minmetals Corporation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSG	Multi-stakeholder group
NCTTCA	Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Coordination Authority
NFCA	China Nonferrous Corporation Africa
NSC	North-South Corridor
PGII	Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
PPP	Public-private partnership
RAP	Resettlement action plan
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SARL	Société à responsabilité limitée (private limited liability company)
SGR	Standard Gauge Railway
SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
SNCC	Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Congo
SOE	State-owned enterprise
SX	Solvent extraction
TAZARA	Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority
TFM	Tenke Fungurume Mining
TKCMC	Trans-Kalahari Corridor Management Committee
WBCG	Walvis Bay Corridor Group
ZCCM-IH	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines – Investment Holdings
ZRL	Zambia Railways Limited

Executive summary

This report examines the emergence of the Lobito Corridor within a rapidly evolving landscape of strategic mineral partnerships, analysing its infrastructure, investment dynamics, value addition potential and the governance and transparency priorities critical to its success. Accelerating demand for critical minerals – motivated by the energy transition, industrial policy and geopolitical competition – has triggered a surge in strategic mineral partnerships (SMPs) across Africa. Governments, development finance institutions and private actors are increasingly pursuing investments, offtake agreements and infrastructure-for-minerals arrangements to secure diversified supply chains in the Lobito Corridor. Between 2008 and 2025, at least 16 such partnerships involving Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Zambia have been signed. Of these, 13 (81%) were recently concluded in just four years (2022–2025).

The Lobito Corridor is emerging as an emblematic anchor of these partnerships in Africa, illustrating both the opportunities and complexities of linking mining expansion, infrastructure financing and geopolitical interests. It reflects a broader ambition to shift from isolated mining investments to integrated, multi-country supply chain strategies, while also exposing challenges around coordination, disclosures, uneven implementation and governance of large-scale projects.

The Lobito Corridor is a cross-border, multi-purpose corridor whose potential will depend not only on geology and infrastructure, but also on governance decisions made now. At its core, the 1,300-kilometre Corridor comprises three rail investments at different stages of development, anchored by an operational port-rail system in Angola. Linking the Atlantic port of Lobito, Angola to mining regions in the DRC (and potentially Zambia), the Corridor traverses one of the world's most significant concentrations of copper and cobalt resources. With cumulative investment commitments exceeding USD 1 billion, and total financing needs estimated at over USD 6 billion, the Corridor ranks among the most ambitious transnational infrastructure initiatives currently under way on the continent.

The Lobito Corridor is a cross-border, multi-purpose corridor whose potential will depend not only on geology and infrastructure, but also on governance decisions made now.



A train near the Carrinho's industrial complex in Angola.

PHOTO CREDIT: CROSSBOUNDARY

While infrastructure investment is progressing, it is not equal across the three countries. The Angolan port-rail system is operational and has demonstrated technical viability through early shipments, whereas the DRC rail rehabilitation and Zambia's proposed greenfield link remain at pre-investment and feasibility stages, requiring substantial financing, institutional coordination and regulatory clarity. This asymmetry and uneven sequencing means that the Corridor's feasibility is credible in parts, but its overall competitiveness will depend on reliability across the entire route. Ultimately, Lobito's success will be determined less by infrastructure and more by whether governance, transparency and coordination keep up with investment commitments and mineral expansion ambitions.

Rather than a standalone transport route, the Lobito Corridor is best understood as a diversified complementary corridor – enhancing supply chain resilience for consumer countries while enabling multi-modal development pathways for producer countries. Rising demand for copper, cobalt and related minerals has sharpened geopolitical interest in African supply chains, particularly as the United States and the European Union seek to reduce reliance on highly concentrated processing capacity elsewhere. Despite rising demand, production and processing remain highly concentrated, increasing exposure to geopolitical shocks and supply disruptions. China accounts for around 60–70% of global copper smelting and refining. In 2023, Chinese-linked firms produced around 78% of the DRC's copper and about 65% of its cobalt, as well as roughly 13% of Zambia's copper output. China also imported over half of the DRC and Zambia's combined copper exports and around 80–85% of their combined cobalt exports.

This concentration of mineral exports is a core risk the Lobito Corridor seeks to address. For consumer countries, diversification and resilience through alternative routes such as Lobito are becoming increasingly important priorities in a fragmented geopolitical landscape. For producer countries such as Angola, the DRC and Zambia, the Corridor is not primarily about speed of delivery, but rather about diversifying export routes and enabling greater domestic value capture. In this context, Lobito is best understood as a complementary resilience and developmental corridor, rather than a standalone transport strategy or an immediate replacement for eastern and southern export routes.

The development potential is high, but it is contingent on enabling investments and realistic value addition pathways. The Corridor has strong potential to support economic diversification, local content, supplier development and downstream value addition, particularly given projected growth in Copperbelt copper and cobalt production. It also offers opportunities to anchor broader investments in logistics platforms, power transmission, agro-processing and industrial zones. However, the extent to which value addition can be realised remains uncertain and will depend on country-specific conditions. Further beneficiation is feasible in both the DRC and Zambia, particularly in the short-to-medium term, including expansion of smelting, refining and basic fabrication. The Corridor could help deepen the DRC's relatively higher value addition - already exporting about 83% of its copper as refined cathodes in 2023 - while supporting Zambia to move up from a profile where roughly 75% of copper export value comes from unrefined anodes. More advanced downstream activities, such as battery manufacturing, are likely to require a longer-term, phased approach.

While value addition ambitions are rising in Angola, the DRC and Zambia, implementation gaps, weak monitoring and limited industrial readiness risk constraining domestic participation and limiting the scale of local economic spillovers. More broadly, translating this potential into tangible benefits will depend on addressing structural constraints, including power reliability, infrastructure gaps, financing, skills and market access.

Governance gaps, rather than geology or finance alone, represent a primary risk to Corridor outcomes. The expansion of mining and transport flows along the Corridor is likely to amplify socio-economic and environmental governance risks. Opaque licensing, ownership and contracting can amplify environmental and social risks; unclear transport charges can enable informal payments; and weak coordination among institutions can delay implementation even where infrastructure exists. Weak monitoring of local content and value addition targets, limited access to procurement information for domestic firms, and opaque Corridor financing structures risk deterring investment, constraining access to finance, and limiting domestic value capture. These governance challenges create a distinct risk profile in which failures can cascade across investment, mining, transport and public finance.

Transparency and good governance can de-risk the Corridor, but they must expand beyond upstream mining into transport, local content and Corridor governance.

Managing these interconnected risks requires transparency systems that are operational, not merely descriptive. Transparency and governance, through global standards such as the EITI Standard and regional frameworks such as the Africa Mining Vision can play a practical role in reducing information asymmetries and strengthening investor confidence across the Corridor value chain. Improving existing disclosures across the three countries on licenses, contracts, beneficial ownership, production, exports, revenues and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can improve predictability and fiscal credibility in upstream mining. However, key transparency gaps remain in transport tariffs; rail and port finances; Corridor public-private partnerships (PPPs); supplier development plans; local procurement data; and environmental and social documentation. Expanding disclosures into these midstream and Corridor segments would enable better oversight of mineral flows, domestic participation, environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks and Corridor-related revenues, thereby strengthening project bankability and public accountability.

Action should focus on operational transparency, coordinated governance and sequenced implementation. Transparency alone is insufficient without complementary institutional and policy actions. To maximise the Corridor's developmental impact, governments could leverage multi-stakeholder groups (MSGs) to embed transparency into Corridor governance alongside infrastructure investment. Deepening disclosure and multi-stakeholder oversight can help strengthen transparency of license registers, contracts, beneficial ownership, local content spending, procurement forecasts, and SOE participation in transport and logistics. National EITI MSGs can expand EITI reporting to cover Corridor-related payments, supplier development outcomes and transport value chains, while using multi-stakeholder dialogue to align mining, industrial and transport policies. Development partners should support the development of robust digital cadastres, supplier registries, Corridor authorities and project-level transparency systems to ensure disclosed data informs real decision-making. Ultimately, the Corridor's success will depend on whether transparency, coordination and accountability keep up with mineral expansion and investment flows.

This report provides practical guidance for governments, the EITI community and partners on how transparency and multi-stakeholder processes can strengthen accountability across mining, infrastructure and investments in the Lobito Corridor. It addresses its objectives through a structured analysis across four sections. Sections 1 and 2 set the geopolitical context within which the Lobito Corridor is emerging. Section 3 assesses the current state of the Corridor, describing its infrastructure, financing status, institutional arrangements and emerging performance signals, and outlining the path ahead. Sections 4 and 5 examine how Angola, the DRC and Zambia can use the Corridor to capture greater value from mineral production, including through expanded processing, local content and supplier development. Finally, Sections 6, 7 and 8 focus on governance, transparency and risk management, identifying where improved access to information for local stakeholders and companies can enable meaningful participation in Corridor-related investments, and outlining policy considerations for balancing investment attraction with development objectives.

1. Introduction

The Lobito Corridor has emerged at the intersection of three powerful dynamics: accelerating global demand for critical minerals; intensifying geopolitical competition over supply chains; and renewed interest in African regional integration as a platform for economic transformation. Given the Corridor's complexity and transformative potential, good governance, transparency and stakeholder engagement are each crucial to better ascertaining its feasibility and projected benefit on communities, economy and environment. However, limited public information hinders credible public debate and reforms. To address this, EITI representatives in Angola, the DRC and Zambia resolved to increase transparency on the Corridor through a regional thematic report.

By offering a balanced insight into the opportunities and risks, this report aims to enhance credible public debate as well as support policymakers and stakeholders in making informed decisions that maximise benefits and ensure the long-term success of these transition mineral partnerships. Understanding the Lobito Corridor requires situating it within the broader global and regional forces shaping critical-mineral development today. This section examines the geopolitical and economic context driving renewed interest in the Corridor; the strategic partnerships forming around it; and the governance considerations that arise when mineral supply chains, infrastructure investment and public-private cooperation converge. It also sets out why these dynamics are directly relevant to the EITI's mandate and the transparency challenges addressed in Section 6.

Given the Corridor's complexity and transformative potential, good governance, transparency and stakeholder engagement are crucial to better ascertaining its feasibility and projected benefit on communities, economy and environment.

1.1 Strategic context: Geopolitics of critical minerals

The global energy transition, defence priorities, digitalisation and the adoption of artificial intelligence are driving a structural surge in demand for a narrow set of critical minerals, reshaping investment priorities and the geopolitics of supply chains. Copper, cobalt, lithium and nickel are essential inputs for renewable power generation, electric vehicles (EVs), battery storage and electricity networks, and demand for these minerals is expected to rise sharply as countries pursue decarbonisation under alternative policy pathways.


Projections developed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicate that demand for these minerals increases substantially across all scenarios through 2040, including under currently stated policies. More ambitious climate and energy transition pathways result in significantly higher demand, particularly for battery-related minerals such as lithium, graphite, nickel and cobalt. Across scenarios, clean energy technologies account for the majority of incremental demand growth, underscoring the central role of the energy transition in shaping future mineral markets.

For mineral-rich countries such as Angola, the DRC and Zambia, this shift presents major opportunities to expand production and attract capital, while also intensifying scrutiny over how value, risks and responsibilities are distributed along increasingly complex global supply chains.

FIGURE 1

Projected demand of selected critical minerals under alternative scenarios*

In thousand tonnes



The IEA scenarios are: (1) SPS (Stated Policies Scenario), which reflects current energy policies; (2) APS (Announced Pledges Scenario), which assumes governments deliver on announced climate and energy commitments; and (3) NZE (Net Zero Emissions Scenario), which models a pathway to net zero emissions by 2050.


Source: Based on IEA, [Critical Minerals Dataset](#).

Despite growing global demand, both mining and especially processing of critical minerals remain highly concentrated, creating systemic supply-chain vulnerabilities. Upstream production for several critical minerals is dominated by a small number of countries, exposing global markets to outsized disruption from political instability, regulatory shifts or infrastructure constraints in a limited set of jurisdictions. Concentration is even more pronounced downstream, where processing and refining capacity for key minerals (often located in China) far exceeds that of any other country or region. This amplifies supply risks precisely as demand accelerates, and it has heightened concerns among major consuming economies about security of supply.

FIGURE 2

Geographical distribution of raw material production for key minerals

2024




Source: Based on IEA, [Critical Minerals Dataset](#).

FIGURE 3

Geographical distribution of refined material production for key minerals

2024



Source: Based on IEA, [Critical Minerals Dataset](#).

These concentration-driven risks are reshaping international strategies, creating new opportunities for diversification in mineral-rich regions such as the Lobito Corridor countries. In response to dependence on highly concentrated supply chains, the United States, the European Union and other partners have prioritised diversification of sourcing, processing and transport routes. This shift opens space not only for expanded upstream production in Angola, the DRC and Zambia, but also for deeper integration into processing, logistics and Corridor-based infrastructure as global supply chains reconfigure. The strategic relevance of these countries therefore lies in their potential role across multiple stages of the value chain, rather than in mining alone.

A surge in strategic mineral partnerships

Africa has become a focal point of this diversification agenda, marked by a rapid expansion of critical-mineral partnerships linking extraction, infrastructure and downstream ambitions. Bilateral and multilateral arrangements increasingly combine mining investment with processing objectives and transport infrastructure, often framed as integrated “mine-to-market” strategies. While these partnerships can unlock capital, technology and market access, they are frequently negotiated under conditions of urgency that prioritise speed and strategic positioning over comprehensive public scrutiny.

Angola, the DRC and Zambia exemplify this trend through a dense web of strategic agreements that increasingly link critical minerals to transport and infrastructure development, including the Lobito Corridor. Over the past decade, Zambia alone has entered cooperation frameworks with China, India, the United States, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in December 2022 between the United States, the DRC and Zambia focuses on developing an electric vehicle (EV) battery value chain, while the European Union followed in October 2023 with separate agreements with the DRC and Zambia to promote sustainable copper and cobalt supply chains. More recently, the United States and the DRC signed a bilateral strategic partnership agreement linking security and investment cooperation to mineral-supply commitments, while negotiations between the United States and Zambia over a health-for-minerals arrangement have signalled a further broadening of the transactional frameworks through which critical-mineral access is being secured. These political commitments have been accompanied by a growing number of announcements signalling support for large-scale transport and logistics infrastructure (most notably rail and port investments associated with the Lobito Corridor), positioning it as a strategic conduit for diversified mineral supply chains.

TABLE 1

Strategic mineral partnerships involving Angola, the DRC and Zambia, by partner and year of agreement

	Partner	Declaration	Year	Is the full agreement publicly available? ¹
	United States	US-DRC-Zambia MoU on EV Battery Value Chain	2022	✓
		Minerals Security Partnership (MSP)	2022	✓
		US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement	2025	✓
	European Union	EU-DRC MoU on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains	2023	✓
		EU-Zambia MoU on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains	2023	✓
	China	DRC-China mining and cooperation arrangements	2008	✓
		Zambia-China Critical Raw Materials cooperation frameworks	2010	✗
	India	Zambia-India MoU on Mineral Exploration	2019	✓
	Japan	DRC-Japan MoU on Critical Minerals	2023	✓
		Zambia-Japan MoU on Critical Minerals	2023	✗
	UAE	Zambia-UAE MoU on Mineral Resources	2023	✗
	Saudi Arabia	DRC-Saudi Arabia MoU on Mineral Cooperation	2024	✗
		Zambia-Saudi Arabia MoU on Critical Minerals	2025	✗
	United Kingdom	Zambia-UK MoU on Critical Minerals	2023	✗

¹ See Annexe 1 for links to publicly available agreements.

Despite their scale and strategic significance, both mineral partnerships and associated infrastructure commitments often remain only partially visible to the public, heightening governance and accountability risks. Limited disclosure of contract terms, financing structures, production commitments and Corridor-related operational arrangements can create conditions conducive to regulatory shortcuts, corruption risks and elite capture. In fast-moving geopolitical environments, where infrastructure and supply-chain decisions are taken under compressed timelines, the absence of accessible information increases the risk that long-term development, fiscal and social considerations are subordinated to short-term supply and strategic objectives.

The case for transparency

Transparency is a practical prerequisite for ensuring that mineral extraction and related infrastructure investments deliver durable economic and social benefits. Without accessible and reliable information, citizens, parliaments and local communities are poorly equipped to assess trade-offs, monitor commitments or hold institutions accountable, particularly where mining, transport and PPPs intersect.

The EITI's mandate is directly relevant to this context, offering a framework to anchor transparency amid accelerating geopolitical and commercial pressures. The urgency surrounding critical mineral supply chains heightens the importance of EITI requirements on license allocation, contract disclosure, beneficial ownership and revenue reporting. As a transnational initiative spanning three EITI implementing countries, the Lobito Corridor also illustrates the need for coherence across jurisdictions, since governance weaknesses in one segment of the value chain can undermine the integrity of the whole.

Applying EITI principles to Corridor-linked mining and infrastructure development provides a concrete pathway to strengthen oversight, improve economic planning and support credible development outcomes. By embedding transparency across mining, processing and transport, EITI implementation can help ensure that the strategic reconfiguration of global supply chains translates into lasting value for producing countries and communities. This report is grounded in that objective.




TABLE 2

Global critical-mineral trends and their implications for Angola, the DRC and Zambia

GLOBAL TRENDS SHAPING CRITICAL MINERALS

IMPLICATIONS



Rapid growth in demand for transition minerals:
Global deployment of renewables, EVs and grids is driving sustained demand growth for copper, cobalt and related minerals.

Production expansion pressure:
Strong incentives to accelerate mining output, licensing and approvals – increasing fiscal, environmental and social risk if governance lags.



High supply-chain concentration:
Mining, refining and processing of key minerals are geographically concentrated, exposing markets to disruption and political risk.

Strategic leverage and exposure:
Copperbelt countries gain geopolitical relevance but face pressure to deliver reliable volumes under intense scrutiny.



Geopoliticisation of mineral trade:
Governments increasingly intervene to secure supply, diversify sources and reduce strategic dependencies.

Corridors become strategic assets:
Transport routes like the Lobito Corridor are no longer neutral infrastructure, but part of geopolitical competition and partnership frameworks.



Shift from “just mining” to “value chains”:
Policy focus is moving from extraction alone to processing, local value addition and industrial ecosystems.

Rising expectations for local value:
Strong political pressure is placed to deliver jobs, local content and downstream activity – often faster than enabling conditions allow.



Greater scrutiny of ESG and transparency:
Investors, regulators and consumers demand traceability, disclosure and responsible sourcing.

Governance as a competitiveness factor:
Transparent licensing, revenues, transport and local content become decisive for investment, financing and social license.

2. Lobito as an emblematic corridor

The Lobito Corridor has become one of the most prominent examples of a strategic mineral corridor in Africa, traversing one of the world's most significant concentrations of copper and cobalt. With cumulative investment commitments exceeding USD 1 billion and total financing needs estimated at over USD 6 billion, the Corridor ranks among the most ambitious transnational infrastructure initiatives currently under way on the continent.

Still under development, the Corridor is explicitly designed to serve multiple objectives. In addition to facilitating mineral exports, it is intended to catalyse investment across a wider set of sectors, including logistics, energy, agriculture and industrial services. The route is also expected to lower the cost of importing fertilisers, chemicals and agricultural inputs into producer countries, reinforcing the Corridor's relevance to broader economic development. Governments and partners have emphasised job creation, skills development and regional integration, while acknowledging that realising these outcomes will depend heavily on implementation choices and governance arrangements.

The strategic potential of the Lobito Corridor

By offering an alternative westward export route, the Corridor also has strategic significance. It has the potential to reduce reliance on existing logistics networks and trade partners, strengthening bargaining power for Angola, the DRC and Zambia. At the same time, it illustrates the complexity of supply-chain diversification: infrastructure, trade facilitation and governance reforms must advance together if such initiatives are to deliver measurable benefits beyond increased throughput.

The strategic relevance of the Lobito Corridor is rooted in the mineral profiles of the countries it connects. Angola, the DRC and Zambia all have export structures heavily concentrated in extractive commodities. In 2023, the extractive industries accounted for around 86% of exports in Angola (largely petroleum), nearly all exports in the DRC (about 99.6%, predominantly mining), and roughly two-thirds in Zambia (around 68%, mainly mining). While Angola's exports remain dominated by fossil fuels and diamonds, the DRC and Zambia are among the world's most important producers of copper and cobalt, minerals which sit at the core of global energy transition supply chains.

Production and exports are geographically concentrated at the Copperbelt end of the Corridor, particularly in the Lualaba and Haut-Katanga provinces in the DRC and in Zambia's Copperbelt. This concentration anchors the Corridor's commercial logic and explains its prioritisation by governments and external partners. Other critical minerals, such as tin and tantalum, remain economically significant but are largely produced outside the Corridor's immediate catchment area.

Angola's role in the Lobito Corridor is shifting from that of a transit country to a potential upstream contributor to the mineral supply base. Mineral exploration has expanded into the eastern provinces bordering the DRC and Zambia, signalling the country's potential emergence as a future copper and base-metals producer.

The Lobito Corridor has become one of the most prominent examples of a strategic mineral corridor in Africa, traversing one of the world's most significant concentrations of copper and cobalt.

Exploration programmes launched by major international companies since 2020 suggest that new projects could, over time, broaden the Corridor's mineral base and generate additional demand for transport, energy and logistics services.

Nevertheless, the Lobito Corridor's strategic promise ultimately depends on whether its most ambitious components are grounded in robust, transparent and credible feasibility assessments. While the Angolan rail and port segment is already operational, the proposed greenfield railway linking Zambia to the Corridor would represent a step change in scale, cost and fiscal exposure, with financing requirements and risk profiles that remain uncertain. In this context, it is critical that governments and development partners ensure that feasibility studies, cost-benefit analyses and demand assumptions are rigorous, publicly accessible and insulated from geopolitical or commercial pressure to accelerate delivery. A transparent assessment process should also consider alternative and potentially lower-risk pathways to Corridor integration, including improved connectivity through existing rail infrastructure in the DRC or incremental road and logistics upgrades within Zambia. Treating feasibility as a governance issue rather than a purely technical exercise helps reduce the risk that Corridor ambitions translate into unsustainable commitments, while preserving flexibility to pursue options aligned with economic fundamentals and long-term development objectives.



Port of Lobito in Angola.

PHOTO CREDIT: JOYFULL / SHUTTERSTOCK

3. The Lobito Corridor in practice: Infrastructure, investment and emerging performance

To better understand the Corridor, it is necessary to examine four interlinked dimensions:

- The strategic ambition and development objectives it seeks to achieve
- The current state of financing and investment mobilisation
- The status and sequencing of infrastructure development
- The institutional and governance arrangements underpinning implementation, alongside a comparison with alternative export routes pursuing similar objectives

Taken together, these indicators provide a structured basis for a balanced summary assessment of the Corridor's competitiveness.

3.1 What the Lobito Corridor is – and what it aims to achieve

The Lobito Corridor is a transnational transport and development initiative linking the mineral-producing regions of Angola, the DRC and Zambia to global markets through the Port of Lobito on Angola's Atlantic coast. At its core, the Corridor is anchored in a continuous rail connection between the Copperbelt and the Atlantic, complemented by port infrastructure, logistics facilities and a growing set of associated investments in energy, agriculture and industrial services.

The Corridor's primary objective is to provide a shorter, more reliable and competitive export route for copper, cobalt and other strategic minerals, while also supporting broader regional trade and economic integration. For the DRC and Zambia, this westward outlet to European and American markets is intended to complement – rather than replace – established eastern and southern routes via Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Beira, Mozambique; Walvis Bay, Namibia; and Durban, South Africa, strengthening resilience against congestion, operational disruptions and political-economy risks along any single corridor.

Beyond transport, the governments of Angola, the DRC and Zambia – together with private investors and development partners – have articulated ambitions to leverage the Corridor to support expanded mining production, downstream processing and wider economic diversification. Planned and emerging investments include port upgrades, oil and gas pipelines, electricity transmission and generation, telecommunications infrastructure, logistics platforms and agricultural value chains.

Whether these stated ambitions translate into measurable outcomes for national economies and local communities will depend not only on infrastructure delivery, but also on institutional coordination, financing structures and governance arrangements. The following sections describe the Corridor's physical components, investment status and early operational signals, providing the factual context for the governance analysis in Section 6.

FIGURE 4

The Lobito rail lines and alternative transport corridors

A 1,300 km multi-country corridor linking the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola to the mineral-rich regions of the DRC and Zambia, the Lobito Corridor is one of Africa’s most ambitious integrated infrastructure initiatives.

Major transport projects and investment requirements

INVESTMENTS FULLY DISBURSED

LOBITO-LUAU RAILWAY, ANGOLA USD 753 MILLION

Status: Operational; 30-year private concession (LAR)
Estimated investment required: USD 753 million (fully disbursed)
Partners: Angola government, LAR consortium, BFB, MIGA, DRC, AGL

LOBITO PORT MINERAL TERMINAL, ANGOLA

Status: Operational
Estimated investment required: Included in LAR Lobito-Luau railway investment
Partners: Angola government, LAR, AGL, Port of Lobito Authority, key shippers (Ivanhoe, Trafigura)

LOBITO MULTIPURPOSE TERMINAL, ANGOLA USD 100 MILLION

Status: Upgrade ongoing
Estimated investment required: USD 100 million (fully disbursed)
Partners: Angola government, AGL, Port of Lobito Authority, private logistics operators

INVESTMENTS NOT DISBURSED

CHINGOLA-JIMBE GREENFIELD RAILWAY, ZAMBIA USD 5 BILLION

Status: Feasibility study ongoing
Estimated investment required: USD 5 billion (none disbursed)
Partners: Zambia government, Zambia Railways, AFC, AfDB, DFC, EU, potential private concessionaires

LUAU-KOLWEZI RAILWAY, DRC USD 200-700 MILLION

Status: Operational but degraded; requires upgrading
Estimated investment required: USD 200-700 million (none disbursed)
Partners: DRC government, SNCC, EIB, DFC, World Bank, LAR consortium, Ivanhoe, Trafigura

INVESTMENT LANDSCAPE



USD 6-8 billion
total investment needed



USD 1.2-2 billion
in investment committed to date



USD 4-7 billion
investment gap (65-85%)

WHY THE LOBITO CORRIDOR MATTERS

For producer countries

- Attracts investment and enables infrastructure-led industrial growth
- Can support diversification, jobs and local value addition

For consumer countries

- Diversifies export routes and reduces reliance on concentrated supply chains
- Strengthens resilience and security of critical mineral supply

For Africa and global markets

- A potential model for responsible, sustainable mineral partnerships and cross-border mineral corridors

GOVERNANCE RISK PROFILE



Limited disclosure across license, contracts, ownership, SOEs and corridor deals



Revenue leakages, informal payments and fiscal challenges



Weak cross-country and multi-stakeholder coordination and implementation




Ambitious local content and value addition policies, and weak sequencing, monitoring and implementation



ESG, subnational and community related risks

This risk profile can cascade across investment, mining, transport and public finance.



WHAT TRANSPARENCY CAN DELIVER



De-risk investment, strengthen investor confidence and unlock project bankability



Enhance mineral flows oversight, reduce corruption and revenue leakages



Inform and monitor domestic participation and value capture



Strengthen accountability and community trust



Coordinate cross-border governance and public trust

3.2 Core infrastructure: Rail, port and logistics assets

The Lobito Corridor comprises three interconnected rail components that together form a continuous transport link between Angola, the DRC and Zambia:

1. The Lobito-Luau railway in Angola, operated under concession
2. The Luau-Kolwezi line in the DRC, operated by the state-owned Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Congo (SNCC) and requiring rehabilitation
3. A proposed greenfield railway linking Zambia's Copperbelt to eastern Angola

These rail assets are integrated with port infrastructure in Lobito and supported by logistics facilities along the route.


Angola: The Lobito-Luau railway and port infrastructure

The Lobito-Luau railway, historically known as the Benguela Railway, stretches approximately 1,300 kilometres from the Port of Lobito to Luau near the Angola-DRC border. First completed in 1931, the line was once a major export route for Copperbelt minerals, peaking in 1973 with approximately 3.3 million tonnes of cargo. The railway was severely damaged during Angola's civil war (1975–2002) and was subsequently rehabilitated between 2006 and 2014 through a USD 2 billion Chinese rail-for-oil programme.

Since January 2024, the line has been operated under a 30-year concession by Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR), a joint venture (JV) between Trafigura, Mota-Engil and Vecturis. Under the concession, LAR has committed to an extensive investment programme to upgrade track, rolling stock, workshops and safety systems, as well as to modernise the mineral export terminal at the Port of Lobito. These investments are supported by guarantees from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and financing commitments from the United States Development Finance Corporation (DFC) (USD 553 million) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (USD 200 million).

The Port of Lobito's Minerals Terminal, operated as part of the LAR concession, has been upgraded into a modern bulk export hub directly integrated with the railway. In July 2024, the terminal received its first bulk vessel – a 40,500-tonne shipment of sulphur – marking the start of integrated port-rail freight operations. Ongoing investments have focused on modern mineral-handling systems; expanded container capacity; harbour deepening; and the acquisition of new wagons to accommodate large-scale copper and cobalt exports. According to senior officials from Angola's Ministry of Transport, traffic on the Lobito rail line is being progressively scaled up, with operations moving from roughly two freight trains per week historically towards a targeted range of six to eight trains per week as rehabilitation, rolling stock availability and commercial demand improve.

In parallel, the Lobito Multipurpose Terminal was concessioned to Africa Global Logistics (AGL) in December 2023. Under the concession, AGL is investing approximately USD 100 million to deepen quays, expand storage capacity and modernise cargo-handling facilities, enabling the port to serve general cargo and containerised trade alongside mineral exports. Together, these investments position Lobito as a multimodal gateway for regional trade.



The multipurpose terminal in Lobito, Angola.

PHOTO CREDIT: CROSSBOUNDARY

DRC: Rehabilitation of the Luau-Kolwezi line

The DRC component of the Corridor consists of the approximately 450-kilometre railway linking Luau, Angola to Kolwezi, DRC, owned by SNCC. This segment is operational under a track-access arrangement with LAR but is in poor technical condition, characterised by low operating speeds, frequent derailments and outdated signalling and telecommunications systems.

Major rehabilitation works are required to restore safe and reliable operations, including reconstruction of metal bridges, renewal of passing loops, track strengthening and modernisation of control systems. Preliminary cost estimates range from USD 200 to 700 million, reflecting both the early pre-feasibility stage of project development and uncertainty over the scope of upgrade required.

A feasibility study and an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) were completed in late 2025.²

SNCC's limited financial and operational capacity presents a significant constraint due to its notable social and commercial debt. To address these challenges, partners are exploring alternative PPP models. The European Investment Bank, World Bank, DFC and European Union have all expressed interest in supporting the project through a blended financing structure.


² Zambia Environmental Management Agency (nd). ESIA Zambia Lobito railway project – Zambia section. Retrieved from <https://www.zema.org.zm/docs/esia-zambia-lobito-railway-project-zambia-section/>.

Zambia: Proposed greenfield railway to the Copperbelt

The Zambian segment of the Lobito Corridor involves a proposed greenfield railway of 830 kilometres, linking the Copperbelt (around Chingola and Solwezi) to Luacano in eastern Angola. The project is estimated to cost in the range of USD 5 billion. It would connect eastward to Kapiri Mposhi, linking with the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) railway and forming part of a trans-African east-west corridor.

The project is led by the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), which was selected as lead developer following a 2023 MoU between Angola, the DRC, Zambia, the United States, the European Union and the African Development Bank (AfDB). AFC is overseeing feasibility as well as environmental and social studies, with selection of an engineering, procurement and construction contractor and with debt and equity raising targeted for 2026.

The railway is expected to be developed under a PPP model, relying on a blended financing structure which combines commercial debt, equity and concessional support to address viability gaps. AFC anticipates an 80:20 debt-to-equity ratio, complemented by subsidies equivalent to around 15% of the total project cost.



The Lobito port minerals terminal in Angola.


PHOTO CREDIT: CROSSBOUNDARY

Zambia's constrained fiscal capacity – shaped by its 2020 debt default, high public debt levels and the economic impact of recent drought – means the project will depend heavily on international partners to reach financial close.

An alternative and potentially more feasible approach may be to integrate Zambia into the Lobito Corridor through incremental improvements rather than immediate construction of the proposed greenfield railway. One option would be to use existing rail infrastructure in the DRC: strengthening the Luau-Kolwezi segment and improving cross-border interoperability could allow Zambian mineral exports to access the Corridor via established routes, offering a lower-capital, phased pathway to integration. Another option would be to prioritise road connectivity, upgrading links from Zambia's Copperbelt and North-Western Province to the Lobito railway in eastern Angola. Improved road corridors could enable trucking of minerals and other goods to Angolan railheads, providing a lower-cost and faster route for Zambia to access the Lobito Corridor.

FIGURE 5

Proposed timeline of Zambia greenfield rail line project³



3 Based on information from the Africa Finance Corporation.

TABLE 3

Overview of major transport projects related to the Lobito Corridor

Segment/ Component	Status	Estimated investment requirement	Total disbursed financing	Needs	Partners
Angola Lobito-Luau (Angola Railway)	Operational; 30-year private concession (LAR)	USD 753 million	USD 753 million	Rolling stock, terminal upgrades	LAR consortium (Trafigura, Mota- Engil, Vecturis); Angolan Gov't; CFB (passenger ops); MIGA (guarantees); DFC (proposed financing); AGL (port integration)
DRC Luau-Kolwezi (Railway)	Operational but severely degraded; requires full rehabilitation	USD 200–700 million	-	Full track financing and rehabilitation	SNCC; DRC Gov't (Min. Transport, Finance); EIB, DFC, World Bank (exploring financing); LAR (track access); Ivanhoe, Trafigura (anchor shippers)
Zambia Chingola- Jimbe (Greenfield Railway)	Feasibility study ongoing	USD 5 billion	-	PPP financing and construction	Zambia Railways; Zambia Gov't; Africa Finance Corporation (AFC); DFIs (AfDB, DFC, EU interest); potential private concessionaires
Angola Lobito Port – Mineral Terminal	Operational; integrated with LAR; first bulk vessel July 2024	Included in LAR investment		Capacity expansion	LAR (rail concessionaire); AGL (port ops partner); Port of Lobito Authority; Angolan Gov't; key shippers (Ivanhoe, Trafigura)
Angola Lobito Multipurpose Terminal	Concessioned Dec 2023; USD 100m upgrade ongoing	USD 100 million	USD 100 million	Cargo handling expansion	Africa Global Logistics (AGL); Port of Lobito Authority; Angolan Gov't; private logistics operators

3.3 Financing, investment and early market signals

Financing for the Lobito Corridor remains partial and uneven. Current estimates suggest that delivering the full corridor – combining rail rehabilitation, upgrades and the greenfield Zambia link – will require around USD 6–8 billion in total investment. To date, only about 15–25% (USD 1.2–2 billion) in financing has been publicly announced or committed by donors, development finance institutions and concessionaires, mainly on the Angolan leg and initial works in the DRC. This leaves a gross investment gap of over USD 4–7 billion (65–85%), with the near-term financing gap of several billion dollars heavily concentrated in the Zambia greenfield segment and DRC rehabilitation.

Public-sector announcements and donor commitments have significantly elevated the international profile of the Lobito Corridor. In each region, large-scale investments are expected to be developed under PPP models, which typically involve lengthy preparation phases, complex risk allocation and competitive tendering before financial close can be achieved. At the same time, the status of financing and investment differs significantly across the Corridor's three countries.

In Angola, the core rail and port infrastructure is already in place and operated under a long-term concession. Since January 2024, LAR has operated the line between the Port of Lobito and Luau under a 30-year concession, backed by a defined investment programme. This programme includes rolling stock acquisition, safety upgrades and port-rail integration, and is supported by a USD 753 million financing package from the DFC and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (signed December 2025), and a USD 180 million guarantee from MIGA.

By contrast, the DRC and Zambian components remain at a pre-investment stage. Both the rehabilitation of the Kolwezi-Luau line in the DRC and the proposed greenfield railway in Zambia are intended to be developed as PPP projects, but key preparatory steps are still under way. Feasibility studies, ESIs and institutional reforms are ongoing, and no tenders for concessionaires or investors have yet been launched.

As a result, neither project has entered a competitive market-testing phase, and key commercial parameters are yet to be defined. While development partners and governments have signalled strong interest, the mobilisation of private capital will depend on the completion of these processes and the design of viable risk-sharing structures. In this context, some stakeholders have pointed to phased integration of Zambia into the Corridor through existing DRC rail infrastructure and a direct new road as a lower-capital alternative to a standalone greenfield railway.

At the international level, several frameworks aim to support this next phase. Under the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the European Union has pledged up to EUR 500 million in grants under its Global Gateway initiative. Its objective is to mobilise approximately EUR 1.3 billion for rail, port and energy projects linked to the Corridor. These commitments provide important political backing and project-preparation support, but do not yet translate into secured financing for the Zambian or DRC rail segments.

Early commercial signals have emerged primarily along the operational Angolan corridor. In December 2023, Ivanhoe Mines completed the first trial shipment of copper concentrate (1,110 tonnes) from its Kamoakakula project to Lobito in approximately eight days. In early 2024, Trafigura and Ivanhoe signed reserved-capacity agreements for up to 450,000 tonnes and 120,000–240,000 tonnes per year respectively starting from 2025. Actual 2025 throughput fell short of these ceilings: LAR transported approximately 200,000 tonnes of international cargo and 65,000 tonnes of domestic cargo, roughly doubling 2024 volumes.

Taken together, these developments suggest growing momentum, while underscoring the complexity and sequencing challenges inherent in delivering large, cross-border infrastructure through PPP structures. Experience from comparable projects illustrates that moving from political commitment to financial close typically requires sustained technical preparation, donor support and institutional capacity.

CASE STUDY

Malawi: Designing bankable PPP infrastructure – lessons from the Mpatamanga hydropower project

Mpatamanga is a 356.8 MW dispatchable hydropower project on the Shire River, developed under an innovative PPP between the Government of Malawi, the International Finance Corporation Électricité de France and SN Power, with an estimated total investment of approximately USD 1.5 billion. The project's viability is grounded in this unique, blended finance package, combining public, concessional and private capital. A carefully structured competitive tender process, preceded by extensive risk mitigation, also enabled the selection of private sponsors on competitive terms.

Sustained and independent transaction advisory support has been critical throughout the project lifecycle – funding began in 2018, and the project is only expected to reach financial close in the second half of 2026. While the Lobito Corridor involves a different sector and a more complex cross-border setting, the Mpatamanga experience illustrates a significant broader point: well-designed PPP infrastructure projects require time, substantial preparatory funding, careful risk allocation and strong public-sector capacity. Similar principles will need to guide the structuring of financing solutions for the Lobito Corridor's rail components, particularly in Zambia and the DRC, where institutional constraints and sovereign risk considerations add further complexity.

3.4 Related investments along the Corridor

Beyond rail and port infrastructure, the Lobito Corridor is increasingly being framed as a broader development axis linking transport investments with productive sectors. However, progress to date has been uneven. Angola has already begun to anchor the Corridor in a wider set of sectoral investments, while several complementary initiatives at the regional level remain at earlier stages of development.

Angola: Anchoring the Corridor in diversified economic development

In Angola, the Lobito Corridor is already being leveraged to support a range of economic activities beyond mineral exports, reflecting a deliberate strategy to use transport infrastructure as a catalyst for diversification.

- **Logistics and trade facilitation:** Along the Benguela Railway, Angola is developing a national network of logistics platforms, notably at Caála (Huambo) and Luau (Moxico). These platforms are intended to provide warehousing, cold storage, aggregation and customs-adjacent services, supporting agriculture, mining services and cross-border trade with the DRC and Zambia. Together with the concession of the Lobito Multipurpose Terminal, these investments reinforce Lobito's role as a regional logistics hub.
- **Agriculture and agro-processing:** Improved connectivity is already supporting agricultural value chains in Angola's central highlands, particularly in Huambo and Bié. Investments in agro-processing, storage and cold-chain logistics are enabling producers to reach domestic and regional markets more efficiently. Firms such as Carrinho Group illustrate how rail and port access can underpin integrated food value chains linking production areas inland to consumption centres and export routes via Lobito.



- **Mining and industrial activity:** While Angola's mining sector remains less developed than those of the DRC and Zambia, the Corridor is expected to facilitate future mineral development and downstream processing over time. The presence of reliable rail and port infrastructure reduces entry barriers for exploration and potential investment in beneficiation.

Regional projects aligned with the Corridor vision

Beyond Angola, a number of regional and cross-border investments are being discussed or developed in parallel with the Lobito Corridor, though most are currently at a planning or early implementation stage.

- **Energy and electrification:** A flagship initiative is the proposed Angola-DRC-Zambia regional power interconnector, designed to deliver up to 2,000 MW of electricity through a high-voltage direct current transmission line linking Angola's surplus hydropower capacity to mining and industrial demand in Zambia and southern DRC. With an estimated investment value of USD 1.1 billion and a project-finance structure under consideration, the interconnector would support mining expansion, industrialisation and regional power-market integration within the Southern African Power Pool.
- **Oil and gas infrastructure:** Angola's planned Lobito Oil Refinery, designed to process up to 200,000 barrels per day, and the proposed 1,400-kilometre Angola-Zambia Oil Products Pipeline (AZOP) would, if realised, strengthen regional fuel security and reduce reliance on long and congested import routes. These projects remain at the development stage but align closely with the Corridor's logistics framework.
- **Telecommunications and digital infrastructure:** Discussions are ongoing around deploying fibre-optic backbones and last-mile connectivity along the Corridor, with future tenders envisaged for distribution concessions. Improved digital connectivity would support trade facilitation, logistics management and service-sector development.
- **Agriculture and regional trade:** Improved transport links also create opportunities for cross-border agricultural trade and agro-processing, particularly between Zambia's underused arable regions, southern DRC and Angola's food-import-dependent markets. Realising this potential will depend on complementary investments in feeder roads, storage and border infrastructure.

These investments highlight differing levels of progress along the Corridor. In Angola, several projects are already under implementation across logistics, agriculture and energy. At the regional level, complementary initiatives – particularly in energy, fuels and digital infrastructure – are at earlier stages of development and will depend on further project preparation, financing and coordination among participating countries.


3.5 Institutional framework and implementation architecture

The Lobito Corridor is underpinned by a growing but still evolving set of legal, institutional and partnership frameworks. Operationally, the Corridor is anchored in a mix of intergovernmental treaties, national legal frameworks and private concession arrangements, supported by relatively structured institutional actors at regional and project levels. These include corridor-specific coordination bodies, national ministries, rail concessionaires and development finance partners (Annexes 1 and 2).

The cornerstone of the regional architecture is the Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency (LCTTFA) Agreement, signed in January 2023 and ratified by all three countries. The LCTTFA establishes a tripartite framework for cooperation on transport facilitation, infrastructure coordination and regional integration. With support from the World Bank, the countries are establishing a coordination mechanism for the Lobito Corridor, with priority actions focused on developing a corridor master plan and establishing a joint investment platform. While this reflects strong political commitment, implementation remains uneven across jurisdictions and corridor segments.

At the national level, Angola, the DRC and Zambia each operate distinct legal and institutional frameworks governing mining, transport infrastructure, concessions and investment promotion. These frameworks play complementary roles in corridor delivery, with differences in institutional capacity, regulatory coordination and implementation pace shaping progress across the three country segments (Annexe 8).

Angola has gone furthest in formalising its corridor planning architecture. Through the *Plano Director do Corredor do Lobito (PDCL)*, the government is developing a three-phase master plan. Phase 1 covers benchmarking and interim governance; Phase 2 covers socioeconomic and transport diagnostics with a geospatial platform; and Phase 3 covers strategic environmental, financing and concession-practice assessments. A dedicated public portal centralises information on corridor investments, anchor companies and indicators, supporting transparency and investor engagement.



The Carrinho agro-processing plant in Lobito, Angola.

PHOTO CREDIT: CROSSBOUNDARY

Civil society engagement is growing, with some cross-border initiatives emerging such as Corridor Voices, an organisation that seeks to strengthen community participation across the Corridor. However, most civil society oversight remains largely national in scope, with limited structured avenues for sustained regional engagement.

Overall, while the institutional architecture for the Lobito Corridor is evolving, cross-country multi-stakeholder coordination across government, the private sector and civil society remains uneven, with limited mechanisms for cross-border transparency and stakeholder oversight. Notably, there is currently no dedicated multi-stakeholder governance platform integrating governments, companies and civil society across the three countries. Given that Angola, the DRC and Zambia operate in distinct institutional and governance contexts, with differences in language, administrative cultures, approaches to implementation and levels of transparency, aligning systems and practices across the Corridor is inherently complex. These factors point to a persistent governance and accountability challenge that could affect the implementation of the Corridor and long-term outcomes.

In the context of alternative routes and in response to emerging constraints, Zambia and the DRC have deepened cooperation across multiple corridor frameworks since 2021 (Table 4). Within this diversification agenda, the Lobito Corridor is emerging as a strategically important westward option to strengthen supply-chain resilience and reduce exposure to bottlenecks along any single route.

3.6 Alternative routes: The Lobito Corridor in a multi-corridor context

The Copperbelt's access to global markets relies on a network of regional transport corridors, each with distinct infrastructure characteristics, institutional arrangements and performance constraints. No single route currently offers a complete solution in terms of cost, reliability and capacity. As a result, the DRC and Zambia have increasingly pursued a deliberate multi-corridor strategy, with the Lobito Corridor emerging as a key westward complement to established eastern and southern routes.

The Central Corridor via Dar es Salaam remains the principal outlet for Zambia and southern DRC. However, it continues to be slow and costly. Truck shipments from Ndola, Zambia to the Tanzanian coast can take nearly three weeks, while the railway operated by TAZARA has long suffered from low-capacity following years of underinvestment. In 2025, a new agreement with China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation was signed to modernise the line, with an anticipated USD 1.4 billion rehabilitation package covering track repairs, new rolling stock and station upgrades.

The Walvis Bay-Ndola-Lubumbashi Corridor provides a western alternative through Namibia's Atlantic port. Road transit currently takes around 13 days, but recent infrastructure investments – notably the 371-kilometre paved toll road between Kalumbila and the Namibian border, co-financed by First Quantum Minerals (FQM) – are expected to reduce transit times to approximately five days, strengthening export logistics from north-western Zambia.

To the southeast, the Beira Corridor offers a shorter route to the Indian Ocean via Mozambique but remains constrained by weak rail connectivity, limited port capacity and congestion along key inland sections. Further north, the Nacala Corridor, supported by Japan's Nacala Corridor Development Initiative and recent port upgrades completed in 2023, has improved maritime handling capacity but continues to face inadequate inland road and rail connections, particularly through Malawi.

The continent's North-South Corridor to Durban remains the oldest and busiest export route for Zambian and Congolese minerals, fuel and industrial inputs. Despite its importance, it faces growing congestion, security risks and deteriorating rail and road infrastructure in South Africa.

Across all these routes, heavy reliance on long-haul trucking inflates logistics costs; accelerates road degradation; and heightens environmental and safety pressures. Emerging concepts such as the proposed Kinshasa-Banana highway in the DRC remain at an early stage and have limited relevance for the Copperbelt in the absence of a functional transport spine linking Haut-Katanga and Lualaba to the Atlantic coast.

TABLE 4

Summary status of institutional arrangements in major transport corridors from the Copperbelt

Corridor	Direction/ Port access	Partner countries (incl. Zambia)	Status (as of 2026)	Type of framework or agreement
1. Lobito Corridor	Westward → Atlantic Ocean (Port of Lobito, Angola)	Angola, DRC, Zambia	LCTTFA Agreement signed January 2023 and ratified by all three parliaments. Establishes a tripartite secretariat to coordinate rail operations, infrastructure investment, customs harmonisation and trade facilitation along the Corridor.	Tripartite treaty – operational corridor agency established
2. Walvis Bay-Ndola-Lubumbashi Development Corridor	Southwest → Atlantic Ocean (Port of Walvis Bay, Namibia)	Namibia, DRC, Zambia	Tripartite Agreement ratified by Zambia in January 2024 (Namibia 2021, DRC 2015). Corridor authority operational through the Walvis Bay Corridor Group, supporting customs simplification and logistics modernisation between Walvis Bay, Ndola and Lubumbashi, DRC.	Formal ratified treaty with corridor authority
3. Beira Development Corridor	Southeast → Indian Ocean (Port of Beira, Mozambique)	Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, DRC, Zambia	Zambia's Cabinet approved in May 2024 the signature and ratification of the Beira Development Corridor Agreement. The framework aims to harmonise transit regulations and coordinate investment in rail, road and border infrastructure across the five member states. Formal ratification by all parties pending.	Regional corridor agreement pending ratification
4. Nacala Corridor	Northeast → Indian Ocean (Port of Nacala, Mozambique)	Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia	Supported by Japan's Nacala Corridor Development Initiative. The Nacala Port Development Project was completed in October 2023, increasing handling capacity. Work continues on rehabilitating the Nacala Rail and Malawi-Zambia road links. No formal intergovernmental treaty to date.	Project-based cooperation and investment framework
5. Central Corridor (Dar es Salaam Corridor)	East → Indian Ocean (Port of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania)	Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Uganda, Zambia	Zambia approved accession in April 2024 to the CCTTFA, joining other member states to coordinate multimodal connectivity and reduce border delays. The Corridor remains one of the most important routes for Copperbelt exports to the Indian Ocean.	Multilateral treaty with permanent corridor agency
6. North-South Corridor (NSC)	South → Indian Ocean (Port of Durban, South Africa)	South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, DRC	The oldest and busiest southern route for Zambian and Congolese exports, linking through Kasumbalesa, Zambia and Beitbridge, Zimbabwe to Durban and Richards Bay, South Africa. Despite growing congestion and security risks, the NSC remains a critical logistics corridor. No formal intergovernmental agreement yet; negotiations for a legal framework and corridor agency are ongoing.	Pending corridor agreement under development

3.7 Potential benefits, trade-offs and environmental implications

The Lobito Corridor is more than a railway rehabilitation initiative. If implemented as envisaged, and as described in the previous sections, it has the potential to support inclusive economic growth and deeper regional integration across Angola, the DRC and Zambia by improving connectivity between the Copperbelt and the Atlantic coast.

Improved rail and port infrastructure could lower transport costs, shorten export routes and create opportunities for trade diversification beyond bulk mineral exports. Although Angola and Zambia share a 1,110-kilometre border, existing crossings – such as Jimbe and Caripande/Chavuma – remain remote, poorly equipped and constrained by infrastructure limitations and vehicle restrictions. As a result, cross-border trade between the two countries remains modest despite their complementary economic profiles. The development of the Corridor's transport backbone and associated productive infrastructure could therefore unlock new bilateral and regional trade flows, stimulate investment and support economic activity along the route.

Beyond direct economic effects, the Corridor may also generate wider environmental and social benefits. Expanded rail transport could reduce road congestion and pavement deterioration caused by heavy freight traffic, improve road safety and lower transport costs for non-mining users. A shift from road to rail could also reduce greenhouse-gas emissions and local air pollution, particularly for long-distance mineral transport. Reduced reliance on long-haul trucking may also bring ancillary public-health benefits, including lower exposure to road accidents and communicable diseases commonly associated with major transport corridors.

Preliminary estimates also suggest that the Lobito route could offer significant environmental advantages relative to alternative corridors, particularly for Europe- and Gulf-bound cargo. High-level modelling of well-to-wheel emissions indicates that transporting copper via Lobito results in substantially lower total emissions than routes via Beira, Dar es Salaam, Durban or Walvis Bay for destinations such as Rotterdam, Netherlands and Jebel Ali, UAE, largely due to reduced overland distances and greater reliance on rail transport. For Asia-bound cargo, the picture is more nuanced: while the Lobito route still benefits from lower land emissions, the longer Atlantic sea voyage to Shanghai, China means total emissions are broadly comparable to eastern corridor routes via Beira and Dar es Salaam.

TABLE 5

Preliminary estimate of CO₂ emissions from transporting 25 tonnes of copper from Kolwezi along alternative routes⁴

Destination	Route	Land emissions (t CO ₂ e)	Sea emissions (t CO ₂ e)	Total emissions (t CO ₂ e)
Shanghai	via Lobito	0.9	12.2	13.1
	via Beira	4.7	6.8	11.5
	via Dar es Salaam	5.2	6.3	11.5
	via Durban	6.4	7.4	13.8
	via Walvis Bay	7.7	9.0	16.7
Rotterdam	via Lobito	0.9	5.5	6.4
	via Beira	4.7	6.0	10.7
	via Dar es Salaam	5.2	5.8	11.0
	via Durban	6.4	5.5	11.9
	via Walvis Bay	7.7	5.1	12.8
Jebel Ali	via Lobito	0.9	5.2	6.1
	via Beira	4.7	3.3	8.0
	via Dar es Salaam	5.2	2.7	7.9
	via Durban	6.4	3.6	10.0
	via Walvis Bay	7.7	4.8	12.5

4 Figures represent high-level estimates based on: (1) approximate distances from Kolwezi to alternative port destinations; and (2) assumed well-to-wheel emission factors of 84 g CO₂e/t-km for road transport by flatbed diesel truck; 20.4 g CO₂e/t-km for rail transport using diesel locomotives; and 21.9 g CO₂e/t-km for sea transport, derived from the Global Logistics Emissions Council (GLEC) Framework. Land transport for the Lobito route is assumed to be predominantly rail based; other corridors rely primarily on road transport. Maritime distances assume routing via the Suez Canal for Indian Ocean and Atlantic trade flows; actual routing for bulk cargo may vary. Emissions for the Lobito route are estimated assuming a non-electrified rail line; an electrified line could further reduce emissions depending on the energy mix of the power grid. These estimates are illustrative and do not account for load factors, congestion or differences in vehicle efficiency across corridors.



Port of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

PHOTO CREDIT: DRUID007 / SHUTTERSTOCK.COM

While the Lobito Corridor presents significant economic opportunities, it also entails a number of risks and trade-offs that require careful management. Financing and debt exposure represent one of the most significant structural risks facing the DRC and Zambian components of the Corridor. Although both projects are envisaged as PPPs, these structures do not eliminate sovereign exposure. Governments are often required to provide guarantees or other forms of financial support to enable infrastructure projects to reach financial close, particularly where commercial revenues alone cannot cover investment costs. For Zambia, this issue is especially salient. Following its sovereign debt default in 2020 and a lengthy restructuring process completed under the G20 Common Framework in 2024, the country's fiscal position remains constrained. Entering into large contingent liabilities linked to a proposed USD 5 billion greenfield railway could therefore pose risks if traffic volumes or tariff revenues fall short of expectations – an outcome observed in other infrastructure projects, including Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway. Where substantial viability gaps exist, concessional financing or grant support from development partners may therefore play an important role in reducing pressure on sovereign balance sheets while enabling economically justified infrastructure to proceed.

Changes in transport patterns may also affect segments of the regional trucking industry, which currently provides livelihoods for many workers and small enterprises.

A gradual shift of long-distance mineral transport from road to rail could reduce demand for some forms of long-haul trucking. However, given projected growth in mineral production and overall freight demand in the Copperbelt, rail is likely to absorb a significant share of future transport volumes rather than displace existing road freight entirely. In this context, the Corridor's development may create complementary opportunities in short-haul trucking, warehousing, logistics services and other activities linked to expanding trade flows.

Governance risks also warrant attention. While improved rail logistics may support greater formalisation of mineral transport, infrastructure alone cannot address the governance gaps that enable illicit financial flows in mineral supply chains. Finally, the Corridor's export-oriented configuration raises broader questions about how transport infrastructure can support wider economic growth. Realising the Corridor's development potential will depend not only on improved logistics, but also on policies that promote local value addition, domestic supplier participation and stronger governance across mining and transport value chains.

These risks are not unique to the Lobito Corridor, but they are amplified when mining expansion, cross-border infrastructure and public-private financing converge along a single route. The following chapters examine how governance and transparency frameworks can help manage these challenges. Next, Sections 4 and 5 explore the prospects for capturing greater value from mineral production along the Corridor, while Sections 6 and 7 consider the governance and transparency frameworks required to manage corridor-related risks and investments.

Realising the Corridor's development potential will depend not only on improved logistics, but also on policies that promote local value addition, domestic supplier participation and stronger governance across mining and transport value chains.

4. The mining sector in the Lobito countries: Status, growth potential and prospects to promote local value addition

While still under development, the Corridor is explicitly designed to serve multiple objectives. Beyond transport, the Corridor is increasingly framed as a development axis intended to catalyse investment across a wider set of sectors, linking mining, energy, logistics, agriculture and industrial activity. Governments of Angola, the DRC and Zambia, together with private investors and development partners, have articulated ambitions to leverage the Corridor to support expanded mining production, downstream processing, wider economic diversification, job creation, skills development and regional integration. Other planned and emerging investments include port upgrades, oil and gas pipelines, electricity transmission and generation, telecommunications infrastructure, logistics platforms and agricultural value chains. These ambitions are formalised through the Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency (LCTTFA) Agreement, signed in January 2023 and ratified by all three countries. The Agreement establishes a tripartite framework for cooperation on transport facilitation, infrastructure coordination and regional integration.

Realising these outcomes will depend heavily on governance and implementation choices, as well as the pace of coordinated investment across the three countries. This section assesses the Corridor's potential benefits in a sequenced manner, beginning with its core function of supporting mining expansion and mineral exports, then examining opportunities for value addition and local content, and finally considering wider spillovers into energy, logistics, industrial development and regional economic integration.

This approach helps distinguish between immediate, bankable gains and longer-term developmental ambitions, while grounding expectations in realistic assessments of infrastructure readiness, institutional capacity and market demand.

4.1 Current status of the mineral sector in the Lobito countries

The Lobito Corridor connects one of the world's most important regions for copper and cobalt. The DRC accounts for around 70% of global cobalt production and more than 12% of global copper output, while Zambia contributes a further 3% of global copper, making the Copperbelt a critical source of minerals required for global energy transition and industrial demand.

Exports from all three Lobito Corridor countries are heavily concentrated in extractive commodities, underlining the macroeconomic importance of the mining sector. In the DRC and Zambia, export earnings are dominated by copper and cobalt, while Angola's exports remain concentrated in fossil fuels and diamonds.


This high degree of export concentration increases exposure to commodity price cycles and heightens the importance of reliable transport, logistics and governance frameworks to sustain production and export performance.

Mining activity most directly linked to the Corridor is geographically concentrated at the Copperbelt end of the route, with Angola positioned as a potential future contributor. Copper and cobalt production is centred in the Lualaba and Haut-Katanga provinces in the DRC and in Zambia’s Copperbelt, directly anchoring demand for rail, port and energy services. Other critical minerals such as tin and tantalum remain economically important but are largely produced outside the Corridor’s immediate catchment area, while Angola’s expanding exploration in the east could, over time, broaden the Corridor’s mineral base beyond its current focus.

FIGURE 6
Value of extractive exports from Angola, DRC and Zambia

In USD millions (2023)

- Fossil fuels
- Precious metals and stones
- Other minerals
- Copper
- Cobalt
- Other exports




Source: Based on data from UN Comtrade and World Mining Data.

FIGURE 7

Production of critical minerals as a share of global production⁵

In thousand metric tonnes (2023)



Source: Based on data by World Mining Data.

4.2 The copper sector

Copper production in the DRC is highly concentrated among Chinese-linked operators, which control roughly 78% of the DRC's national output, with six of the top ten producers being directly Chinese owned. These include China Molybdenum Company (CMOC) Group; China Nonferrous Metal Mining Corporation (CNMC); China Railway (Sicomines); Zijin Mining; Yingkou Yangzhou Trade (YYT); and China Minmetals Corporation's MMG. Ivanhoe Mines' Kamo-a-Kakula, the DRC's second-largest producer, is itself co-owned by Zijin Mining (39.6%), reinforcing the degree of Chinese integration across major production assets in the country.


Zambia's copper production is led largely by Canadian operators, with a mix of other international and Chinese-owned mines contributing smaller volumes. In 2023, FQM dominated national production through Sentinel (214,000 tonnes) and Kansanshi (134,800 tonnes), together accounting for almost half of output. Barrick Gold's Lumwana contributed an estimated 120,000 tonnes, while Mopani Copper Mines (majority-owned by the UAE's International Resources Holding (IRH) with Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines – Investment Holdings (ZCCM-IH)) produced around 65,000 tonnes. Several Chinese-owned operations, including Lubambe, Chibuluma South, Chambishi (China Nonferrous Corporation Africa, (NFCA)), Muliashi and Mwambashi, also added moderate volumes.

⁵ S&P Global Market Intelligence (no date). *Metals and Mining Industry Research and Data*, retrieved from <https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/industries/metals-mining>

TABLE 6
Top copper production companies in the DRC in 2023⁶

Company	Production in 2023 (t)
CMOC	505,175.0
Ivanhoe Mines	437,314.0
CNMC	302,364.0
Glencore	277,185.0
China Railway	257,077.0
Zijin Mining	129,151.0
Eurasian Resources Group (ERG)	104,676.0
YYT	80,296.0
MMG	75,081.0
Chemaf	66,417.0
Others	607,055.0

The DRC and Zambia export copper at different processing stages, shaping both where value is captured and where further downstream potential remains. The DRC exports most copper as refined cathodes (HS 7403), with 2023 exports of 2.02 million tonnes valued at USD 17 billion, reflecting substantial solvent extraction-electrowinning (SX-EW) capacity enabled by near-surface oxide deposits.



Refined copper cathodes.


6 Ministère des Mines de la République Démocratique du Congo (2024). *Statistiques minières définitive – Exercice 2023*. Retrieved from <https://mines.gouv.cd/fr/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/statistiques/LES-STATISTIQUES-MINIERES-EXERCISE-2023.pdf>.

At the same time, the DRC exported 790,000 tonnes of copper ores and concentrates (HS 2603), worth USD 2.16 billion, indicating an opportunity to expand domestic treatment of sulphide ores through smelting and refining. Zambia's exports were dominated by unrefined copper anodes (HS 7402), 579,600 tonnes worth USD 5.03 billion, reflecting strong smelting capacity but more limited electrorefining, while refined copper exports totalled 199,800 tonnes (worth USD 1.63 billion), signalling scope for investment in downstream refining.

FIGURE 8

China-related production of copper and cobalt in the DRC and Zambia

2023



Source: Based on data by the DRC Ministry of Mines and industry reports.


FIGURE 9

Exports of copper by processing level

2023

■ Copper ores and concentrates (2603) ■ Unrefined, copper anodes for electrolytic refining (7402)
 ■ Refined and copper alloys, unwrought (7403)

By value (USD millions)



By volume (thousand metric tonnes)




Source: Based on data by UN Comtrade.

Copper exports from the Copperbelt have shifted decisively toward Asia, with China now the dominant destination and deeply integrated across the value chain. Between 2013 and 2023, exports from the DRC to China rose from USD 2.1 billion (272,000 tonnes) to USD 16.8 billion (2.47 million tonnes), making China the primary destination for Congolese copper. Other destinations expanded as well, including Singapore (267,000 tonnes worth USD 1.7 billion) and the UAE (107,000 tonnes worth USD 856 million), while exports to Switzerland stayed stable in volume (approximately 570,000 tonnes) but declined in relative importance. From 2019 to 2023, China imported over USD 3.2 billion in copper ores and concentrates (HS 2603), USD 10.05 billion in unrefined copper anodes (HS 7402) and USD 33.6 billion in refined copper (HS 7403) from the DRC and Zambia combined, illustrating China's integration from smelting through refining and its scale of demand for high-purity copper used in electronics, EVs and energy infrastructure.

FIGURE 10

Combined exports of copper from the DRC and Zambia

By destination (2023)




Source: Based on data by UN Comtrade.

FIGURE 11

Cumulative exports of copper from the DRC and Zambia

By form and destination in USD million (2019-2023)




Source: Based on data by UN Comtrade.

China's role as the world's largest copper importer and processor helps explain why Copperbelt trade is increasingly anchored in Asian markets. Between 2019 and 2023, China imported USD 243.3 billion in copper ores and concentrates, USD 38.4 billion in unrefined copper anodes and USD 160.5 billion in refined copper; combined with the rest of Asia, the region imported over USD 350 billion in copper. This concentration reflects Asia's – especially China's – central role in global manufacturing, infrastructure and clean energy supply chains, supported by extensive smelting and refining capacity.

FIGURE 12

Total copper imports

By category and import region in USD millions (2019-2023)




Source: Based on data by UN Comtrade.

FIGURE 13

Copper production capacity by region

In thousand metric tonnes



Source: Adapted from International Copper Study Group (2025), The World Copper Factbook 2025.

4.3 The cobalt sector

The DRC dominates global cobalt mine supply, with Chinese firms accounting for a large share of production and export value concentrated in intermediate products. In 2023, the DRC produced approximately 139,800 tonnes of cobalt, led by CMOC (52,305 tonnes), Glencore (25,521 tonnes) and Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) (14,713 tonnes), alongside other major producers, including CNMC, China Railway and Norinco/Wanbao's JV with Gécamines. Chinese companies accounted for around 65% of production, and cobalt exports – mainly as oxides and hydroxides (HS 2822) – were valued at nearly USD 5 billion in 2023, totalling USD 19.8 billion over 2019–2023.


FIGURE 14

China-related production of cobalt in the DRC

2023

TABLE 7

■ Related to direct Chinese interests ■ Not related




Major exporters of cobalt from the DRC in 2023⁷

Company	Production in 2023 (t)
CMOC	52,305
Glencore	25,521
ERG	14,713
CNMC	9,669
China Railway	6,713
Norinco/Wanbao (JV with Gécamines)	4,802
Chemaf	3,637
Wanbao Mining (75%)	3,143
Chengtun Mining (majority)	2,929
MMG	2,811
Others	13,589

7 Based on data from the DRC Ministry of Mines.

FIGURE 15
Exports of cobalt in DRC and Zambia

In USD millions (2023)



Source: Based on data by UN Comtrade.

Cobalt export patterns underline Africa’s limited refining footprint despite dominant mined supply, with China capturing most downstream value through refining capacity. Between 2014 and 2023, China became the dominant destination for cobalt minerals and products from the DRC, with export volumes reaching 318,000 tonnes in 2023 (equivalent to around 153,000 tonnes of cobalt metal) and nearly 1.3 million tonnes over the decade. This pattern reflects China’s commanding position in global cobalt refining, processing roughly 75–80% of global cobalt into battery-grade chemicals for EVs and electronics. Despite the DRC producing over 70% of global mined cobalt (with additional output from Zambia), Africa hosts only a small share of global refining; South Africa’s reported export volumes over 2014–2023 largely reflect transit through ports such as Durban rather than local refining.

FIGURE 16


Exports of cobalt from the DRC and Zambia

By destination (2023)

China South Africa Mozambique Singapore Zambia
UAE Switzerland Tanzania Finland Others

In USD millions

In thousand metric tonnes




Source: Based on data by UN Comtrade.

FIGURE 17

Combined cobalt exports from the DRC and Zambia

By category and destination (2019-2023)

China South Africa Mozambique Singapore United Arab Emirates
Zambia Finland Tanzania Others



Source: Based on data by UN Comtrade.

4.4 Other minerals

Nickel, manganese and other minerals strengthen the region's longer-term potential for battery materials, even though copper and cobalt remain dominant today. Zambia produced 19,000 tonnes of nickel in 2024, mainly from FQM's Enterprise Mine at Kalumbila, with smaller output from the Munali Nickel Mine. Manganese production in Zambia reached 73,560 tonnes in 2023, largely from small-scale operations in Luapula and Central provinces. In 2023, the DRC recorded 11,321 tonnes of zinc; 18,460 tonnes of tin; 630 tonnes of tantalum; 560 tonnes of niobium; and 418 tonnes of tungsten, while Angola reported 2,300 tonnes of manganese. The combined presence of nickel, manganese and cobalt reinforces the Lobito Corridor countries' positioning for battery precursor and cathode material manufacturing over time.

4.5 Prospects for increased mining production

Rising demand for copper, cobalt and other critical minerals is creating new investment incentives, while improved transport and energy infrastructure – including with the Lobito Corridor – is reducing logistical constraints. The coming decade is expected to bring substantial growth across all three countries, testing the ability of institutions and policies to translate mineral expansion into broad-based development.

Zambia's copper production is expected to grow materially, though official targets appear more ambitious than the current pipeline supports. In 2024, production reached about 783,000 tonnes, and the government aims to reach 3 million tonnes by 2031. Based on the current pipeline – Kansanshi's expansion, Lumwana's Super Pit, Mopani's rehabilitation, Konkola's restart, Mimbula's ramp-up and new exploration by Ivanhoe – a more realistic medium-term outcome is around 1.5 million tonnes by 2030, with additional upside from KoBold Metals' Mingomba discovery potentially lifting output toward 2 million tonnes by 2031. The official 3-million tonne target is likely only achievable in the 2030s, contingent on new discoveries and timely project execution.

The DRC is also set for continued expansion, supported by large-scale developments that could lift output toward 4.5 million tonnes by 2030. Copper production is expected to expand from about 3.3 million tonnes in 2024 to roughly 4.5 million tonnes by 2030, driven by major brownfield and greenfield developments. These include the Kamoa-Kakula expansion (exceeding 500,000 tonnes per year); CMOC's Tenke Fungurume doubling plan; Glencore's Mutanda restart; and additional output from Deziwa and Mutoshi. The government's decision to replace the cobalt export ban with a quota system from October 2025 is intended to stabilise the sector and align incentives for new investment and downstream processing.

Angola's mineral sector is expanding through exploration and new projects that could progressively broaden the commodity base linked to the Corridor. The second phase of the National Geology Plan will extend exploration into eastern provinces, strengthening the feedstock base for the Lobito Corridor. Pensana's Longonjo rare-earth project is nearing construction with USD 268 million in committed financing and a capacity of 20,000 tonnes of mixed rare-earth carbonate per year, while other initiatives – such as Rio Tinto's copper exploration in Moxico, Anglo American's Cornolo and Eastern concessions and Tosyali's iron-ore revival at Kassinga – signal a multi-commodity shift that would leverage rail access to Lobito.

The coming decade is expected to bring substantial growth across all three countries, testing the ability of institutions and policies to translate mineral expansion into broad-based development.

5. Potential to increase local added value in the mineral sector along the Lobito Corridor

The scale and pace of projected mining growth across the Lobito Corridor countries will test the region's capacity to convert mineral wealth into broad-based economic development. As new copper, cobalt, iron ore and rare-earth projects advance towards production, the core question becomes how much of the value generated by these resources will remain within national economies. The answer depends not only on fiscal regimes and revenue management but also on whether local firms, workers and communities can meaningfully participate in the supply chains. This is where local content regimes, supplier development and an enabling environment for value addition become central to the next phase of the Corridor's economic narrative. With billions of dollars in procurement, services and employment flowing through the mining sector each year, even modest increases in domestic participation can yield substantial development dividends.

Value addition in the mining sector is best understood through a broader, more holistic lens that goes beyond downstream processing alone. The figure below outlines a range of policy options that governments can use to promote local value creation in the mining sector, from less interventionist measures to more interventionist approaches. It also highlights that some policy options require more time, institutional capacity and coordination to implement than others.



The Kansanshi copper mine processing plant in Zambia.

PHOTO CREDIT: SHUTTERSTOCK

Policy options to support local value creation across the mineral value chain



Angola, the DRC and Zambia have each developed increasingly detailed local content regimes governing procurement, subcontracting, employment and state participation. In Zambia, the Minerals Regulation Commission Act (2024) and the Geological and Minerals Development (Preference for Zambia Goods and Services) Regulations (2025) establish a progressively binding local procurement regime, with mandatory sourcing thresholds for Zambian suppliers, particularly citizen-owned and citizen-empowered firms, and substantial penalties for non-compliance. Mining rights-holders must allocate at least 20% of annual procurement expenditure to Zambian suppliers within six months of the regulations coming into force, rising to 25% after one year, 35% after two years, and a minimum of 40% within five years. In the DRC, the 2017 Subcontracting Law, enforced through the 2018 Mining Code, reserves subcontracted goods and services for firms that are at least 51% Congolese-owned, a requirement overseen by the Regulatory Authority for Subcontracting in the Private Sector (ARSP). Angola's 2011 Mining Code similarly obliges operators to prefer domestic suppliers when price falls within 10% and delivery within eight business days of competing offers.

Beyond formal regulatory requirements, several large mining operators report substantial levels of procurement from nationally registered suppliers and are developing structured supplier-support initiatives. These efforts – ranging from SME capacity-building to supplier financing mechanisms and industrial park development – suggest that industry practice is evolving alongside regulatory reform. However, disclosure of such initiatives remains fragmented across corporate sustainability reports and press releases, and it is not systematically captured in EITI reporting. As a result, it is difficult to assess their aggregate scale, consistency or developmental impact.

CASE STUDY

Zambia: Supplier development initiatives in the mining sector

- Barrick Gold:** In Zambia, in 2024, Barrick reported approximately USD 906 million in expenditure on goods and services, of which 72% was directed to Zambian suppliers. Since 2019, cumulative local procurement has reached approximately USD 2.8 billion. In advance of the planned Super Pit expansion, Barrick partnered with the Women's Entrepreneurship Access Centre to implement a Business Accelerator Programme targeting local SMEs. The company has also announced plans to establish an industrial supplier park near Lumwana.
- First Quantum Minerals:** In 2023, FQM reported that 88% of its procurement expenditure – approximately USD 1.6 billion – was directed to nationally registered suppliers, working with over 550 Zambian firms. FQM has invested more than USD 110 million in the development of Kalumbila through the Kalumbila Town Development Corporation and promotes the Kalumbila Multi-Facility Economic Zone as a supplier and manufacturing hub. The company is exploring supplier-financing mechanisms for Zambian-owned mining service providers, including reverse factoring, purchase-order-backed finance and industrial term lending structures.
- KoBold Metals:** Although still at early development stage, KoBold Metals has reported engagement with Zambian suppliers, including open tender portals, Supplier Pitch Days and a Supplier and Services Fair held in October 2025. The company has also partnered with Stanford University, the Copperbelt University and the University of Zambia to support postgraduate training in exploration-related disciplines.



5.1 Local content and state participation frameworks

Across the three countries, local content frameworks are also reinforced by high levels of national employment and formalised state participation in the mining sector. Most mining operations already employ a largely national workforce, and existing regulations in all three countries reinforce this pattern through localisation requirements, training programmes and succession planning for expatriate roles. The latest EITI data shows that nationals account for approximately 96% of mining employment in Zambia, 92% in the DRC and 90% in Angola. All three jurisdictions also maintain forms of state participation, including Zambia's ZCCM-IH 10-49% shareholdings, Angola's statutory 10% state interest and the DRC's free-carry provisions. Taken together, regulatory requirements, reported procurement levels and structured supplier-support initiatives indicate a strong policy and commercial emphasis on domestic participation. Their long-term impact, however, will depend on complementary efforts to build supplier capabilities, ease financing constraints and ensure that regulatory obligations remain practical rather than prohibitive for investors.

Beyond local content and state participation, the Lobito Corridor offers significant potential to stimulate horizontal economic linkages by providing shared rail, port, power and digital infrastructure capable of supporting manufacturing, agriculture and logistics. These horizontal spillovers can create multiplier effects across the economy, even where vertical integration into processing remains constrained. However, it is the vertical dimension – movement up the value chain – that offers the most substantial long-term gains.



The Kansanshi copper-gold mine in Zambia.

PHOTO CREDIT: AERIAL VIEWER / SHUTTERSTOCK

FIGURE 19

Copper value chain

Copper production advances through stages of increasing purity. Each stage aligns with specific Harmonised System (HS) codes, reflecting the level of processing and value addition.




FIGURE 20

Cobalt value chain

Cobalt production advances through stages of increasing refinement. Each stage is associated with specific Harmonised System (HS) codes and product uses. Cobalt has two main downstream pathways: conversion into chemicals for batteries and refining into metal for industrial alloys.



5.2 Scope for near term beneficiation

Near-term progress is most realistic in simple fabrication activities such as copper rods, wiring and low-voltage cables that serve regional construction and electrification markets. These segments are less technology-intensive, offer meaningful job creation, and can strengthen industrial capabilities if supported through targeted fiscal incentives, improved credit access and workforce-development programmes. Only a small number of firms in Zambia and the DRC currently produce entry-level copper rods or wiring yet demand across Southern and Central Africa for basic electrical products continues to grow with urbanisation and grid expansion.

There is also scope to expand domestic smelting and refining capacity, particularly as both the DRC and Zambia continue to export significant volumes at intermediate processing stages. Current export patterns highlight where these opportunities remain untapped (see Section 4.2). The DRC exports most of its copper as refined cathodes, reflecting strong SX-EW capacity, but with scope to expand smelting and refining of sulphide ores. In Zambia, exports are still dominated by unrefined copper anodes, indicating strong smelting capacity but more limited electrorefining capacity. Both the DRC's sizeable exports of ores and concentrates and Zambia's substantial anode exports represent foregone value that could be captured domestically. However, these operations are energy-intensive and require reliable electricity, efficient logistics and clear policy incentives. Without parallel progress on power supply, processing expansion will remain constrained regardless of regulatory ambition.

Realising these opportunities will depend on strengthening both hard and soft infrastructure. Hard infrastructure includes not only transport and logistics networks, but also reliable and affordable power systems. Frequent outages, limited grid coverage and high electricity costs continue to constrain industrial development in both the DRC and Zambia, particularly for energy-intensive processes such as refining. Expanding and diversifying energy supply, including through hydropower and renewable sources, will be critical.

Equally important is the development of soft infrastructure, including a skilled workforce, technical expertise and strong institutional frameworks. This will require investment in technical and vocational training, higher education and partnerships with industry to support skills development and technology transfer. A conducive investment environment is also essential, including transparent legal frameworks, streamlined permitting processes, clear environmental and safety regulations, and access to finance. Strengthening governance and regulatory certainty will be key to attracting the investment needed for downstream processing and manufacturing.

International experience shows that downstream development succeeds when regulatory ambition is matched by investments in energy, industrial platforms and institutional capability. By contrast, efforts that impose stringent processing requirements without parallel improvements in the enabling environment tend to stall or deter investment. Below, two case studies illustrate contrasting pathways.

PHOTO CREDIT: BK AWANGGA / SHUTTERSTOCK



Nickel mining in Sulawesi, Indonesia.

CASE STUDY


Indonesia: Governance reforms drive nickel downstreaming



Indonesia demonstrates that downstreaming gains traction when export and processing rules are matched with power and industrial platforms that make investment bankable. After moving from ore exports toward processing through phased export bans and stricter license oversight, Indonesia backed policy changes with targeted infrastructure—especially power generation and industrial parks—attracting tens of billions of dollars in investment. The result: over 40 nickel smelters operational or under construction, and rapid growth into battery precursor and EV materials manufacturing. The lesson for the Lobito countries is that regulatory mandates alone are insufficient; they must be accompanied by the infrastructure that makes compliance economically viable.

CASE STUDY

Botswana: Governance and partnership in diamond beneficiation



Botswana illustrates how stable, transparent governance and negotiated partnerships can gradually shift a country up the value chain. By combining predictable institutions with sustained agreements with De Beers, Botswana secured the relocation of diamond aggregation and sales functions to Gaborone in 2013 and progressively built local cutting, polishing and trading capacity. The approach relied less on mandates than on creating conditions that made domestic processing commercially attractive. For the Lobito countries, this suggests that value addition need not depend solely on regulatory force; strategic partnerships and credible long-term policy frameworks can achieve similar outcomes over time.

5.3 Long-term ambitions: battery and EV value chains

Beyond near-term fabrication and refining, the DRC and Zambia have set their sights on a more ambitious prize: positioning the region within global battery and EV value chains. The combination of dominant cobalt production, significant copper output and growing nickel and manganese resources creates a credible long-term case for moving from raw materials supply into precursor manufacturing and, eventually, battery components.

Nevertheless, developing EV value chains in Central Africa is complex and will require coordinated regional action. In this context, the DRC and Zambia have strengthened cooperation through the DRC–Zambia Bilateral Cooperation Agreement on the Battery and Clean Energy Value Chain, which established a joint Battery Council to support regulatory alignment, identify pilot projects and guide infrastructure development, including special economic zones. The Battery Council is supported by Afreximbank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and ARISE Integrated Industrial Platforms, and a pre-feasibility study led by ARISE has been completed, with a full feasibility assessment now under way. This regional cooperation has been complemented by a trilateral MoU between the United States, the DRC and Zambia, aimed at attracting investment, supporting technology transfer and integrating the region into global EV supply chains.

According to a BloombergNEF study, one of the most immediate opportunities lies in establishing precursor manufacturing capacity.⁸ Producing battery precursors locally could reduce costs and increase value retention within the region. By leveraging cobalt resources, the DRC and Zambia could begin to move up the value chain, supporting job creation and industrial development, in line with broader global trends towards more localised and resilient battery supply chains.

Before such ambitions can be realised, several constraints must be addressed. First, locally mined cobalt must be processed into cobalt sulphate, a key input for cathode precursors, requiring hydrometallurgical refining capacity that is currently limited in both countries. In this regard, realisation of the proposed Kobaloni cobalt sulphate facility would represent an important step. Second, precursor production depends on additional minerals – including nickel, lithium and manganese – of which only manganese is produced regionally, primarily in Zambia. Reliance on imported inputs introduces additional cost, logistical and geopolitical risks.

8 BloombergNEF (2021). The cost of producing battery precursors in the DRC. Retrieved from <https://about.bnef.com/insights/clean-energy/producing-battery-materials-in-the-drc-could-lower-supply-chain-emissions-and-add-value-to-the-countrys-cobalt/>.

6. Governance, transparency and risk management along the Lobito Corridor

Rising production, complex value chains and Corridor-linked investments increase the importance of transparent and predictable governance.

Rising production, complex value chains and Corridor-linked investments increase the importance of transparent and predictable governance. Large-scale, interlinked partnerships such as the Lobito Corridor create a distinct risk profile, where governance failures can cascade across sectors. Fast-tracked licensing processes, opaque agreements, ownership concentration, growing revenues, and expanding procurement and infrastructure pipelines increase the need for credible regulation and systematic disclosure of licenses, contracts, payments, state participation and supplier participation.

Weak licensing oversight can amplify environmental and social risks; limited transparency in transport tariffs and concessions can enable rent-seeking; and unclear institutional mandates can delay implementation despite significant infrastructure commitments. Where governance frameworks and information systems remain incomplete, investor uncertainty rises, fiscal outcomes weaken, and the social licence for large-scale mining and infrastructure projects becomes more difficult to sustain. In this context, transparency is not merely a reporting exercise but a practical tool for risk management, coordination and accountability.




PHOTO CREDIT: EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

ASM activities at the Kamilombe mine site in the DRC.

Building on EITI disclosures, public information and stakeholder views across the three countries, this section develops a risk profile of the Lobito Corridor by examining the key economic, social, environmental and governance risks that will shape whether mining expansion and corridor development translate into sustained investment, stronger fiscal performance and inclusive development outcomes.

6.1 Mining sector governance challenges

Disclosure of licenses, contracts and beneficial ownership remains incomplete across the three countries, reducing predictability and limiting public oversight. These risks may become more pronounced as demand for transition minerals accelerates and governments face pressure to shorten licensing timelines, increasing the importance of transparent and well-documented allocation processes.

EITI validation processes highlight the scale of these challenges. In the DRC, beneficial ownership disclosure remains incomplete, and the mining cadastre, while improving, does not yet provide comprehensive and regularly updated license information. In Zambia, a public beneficial ownership register exists but data completeness and enforcement remain uneven. In Angola, extractive contracts are rarely published in full; beneficial ownership information is not systematically disclosed; and the absence of a comprehensive publicly accessible petroleum and diamond cadastre limits external oversight.

State participation in the mining sector is not systematically reported, with limited transparency around quasi-fiscal activities, related-party transactions and the terms of JVs with private operators. Among the major extractive SOEs in the DRC, only Gécamines publishes audited financial statements, and reporting does not systematically link extractive revenues to the national budget or development spending. In Angola, the national budget does not clearly distinguish between petroleum, diamond and other resource revenues, and sub-national transfer mechanisms remain limited. Zambia's reporting frameworks are comparatively stronger, with revenues recorded in the national budget and transferred to sub-national levels, although information on how those funds are ultimately spent remains incomplete. These gaps are particularly significant in a corridor context, where SOE decisions on tariffs, infrastructure access and revenue reinvestment directly shape the commercial environment for private investors.

Coordination within EITI MSGs also varies across the three countries, with limited engagement beyond national capitals. In the DRC, internal governance challenges constrain the effectiveness of the MSG, and outreach beyond Kinshasa remains limited. In Angola, civil society participation is cautious and representation outside Luanda is weak, while capacity constraints slow decision-making. Zambia's MSG is assessed as functioning transparently and inclusively, although maintaining strong sub-national engagement remains an ongoing challenge. Limited provincial participation reduces the relevance of transparency processes for mining regions and affected communities and can contribute to tensions where environmental and social impacts are visible but information on licenses, obligations and revenue flows remains difficult to access.

Despite ongoing efforts, visibility over the Lobito Corridor remains limited, with few formal channels for public engagement or access to information.


As one civil society actor noted, in Angola “Lobito has become more of a slogan than a clearly understood project”, reflecting uncertainty around its concrete benefits, planned joint projects across the three countries and implications for local communities. Information on corridor-related investments, agreements and implementation remains concentrated within a small group of ministries and companies, limiting public oversight and informed participation.

Data on artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is inconsistent, limiting both sector management and credibility of responsible sourcing. Validation findings identify this as a gap in both Angola and the DRC. In the DRC, where ASM provides livelihoods for millions of people, reporting remains incomplete, and environmental and emissions data is not yet incorporated into disclosures. In Angola, artisanal diamond mining is also identified as an area where data coverage remains limited. Weak ASM reporting constrains governments’ ability to manage environmental and social risks and increases the risk of production entering formal supply chains without full traceability. In a corridor context, where new logistics infrastructure is expected to support more traceable mineral exports, incomplete ASM data may complicate efforts to ensure that supply chains remain transparent and responsibly sourced.

Revenue reconciliation and data assurance gaps persist despite generally sound revenue collection systems. Occasional discrepancies, incomplete disclosures and weak verification processes reduce confidence in official revenue figures and limit effective fiscal oversight. Across the Corridor countries, gaps remain in the reconciliation of company payments with government receipts, as well as in disclosures related to transport revenues, barter arrangements and SOE transactions. In a corridor context, where transport revenues and SOE transactions add layers of financial complexity, these assurance gaps may become increasingly significant over time.

Subnational transfers of mining revenues remain opaque, particularly in Angola and the DRC, weakening local accountability. Limited transparency on transfer formulas, amounts and timing can contribute to tensions between communities and authorities, as well as constraining oversight of revenue flows. In Zambia, discrepancies have been identified between company-reported payments and government receipts at the sub-national level. Transparency around environmental funds used for rehabilitation and pollution remediation is also limited, with information on fund balances, withdrawals and interest earnings not routinely disclosed. At the same time, midstream and transport-related disclosures remain among the least-developed areas of reporting across the Corridor countries, with limited systematic data on mineral logistics, transport volumes and Corridor usage.

Taken together, these governance gaps create uncertainty for investors, complicate fiscal oversight and reduce the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms across the extractive sector. They also interact with mining-related social and environmental pressures, including land competition, displacement linked to mine expansion and environmental degradation. Strengthening mining-sector transparency is therefore important both for improving investment conditions and for managing the risks associated with expanding mineral production along the Corridor.



ASM activities at the Kamilombe mine site in the DRC.

PHOTO CREDIT: EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

Potential risks: ASM, youth vulnerability and “hidden harms”

Weak ASM data and limited disclosure can conceal high-risk labour and environmental practices even as demand for critical minerals rises. Where ASM production is significant but poorly measured, governments struggle to enforce safety standards and manage pollution, while supply chains face elevated due-diligence exposure. Improving ASM data, oversight and disclosure supports both human security and market access under tightening international standards.

6.2 Local content governance challenges

Local content frameworks are becoming increasingly ambitious but monitoring and reporting remain limited across the three countries. While policy objectives for local participation in mining and Corridor-related activities have expanded, weak monitoring systems and inconsistent reporting make it difficult to assess compliance, measure outcomes or adjust policies based on evidence. These gaps reduce the effectiveness of local content frameworks and weaken confidence among both domestic suppliers and investors.

Domestic firms often lack access to the information needed to compete effectively, reinforcing information asymmetries in supply chains. The absence of timely and accessible data on procurement opportunities, technical requirements and contracting timelines make it difficult for local suppliers to meet eligibility criteria or form partnerships. This disadvantages domestic firms relative to larger or better-connected actors and limits meaningful participation in supply chains, including Corridor-linked services such as logistics, maintenance, warehousing and construction.

A further challenge concerns the clarity and consistency of local content implementation. Where compliance expectations are unclear or inconsistently applied, companies face higher costs and uncertainty. This can discourage investment or slow project implementation, particularly where local supplier capacity is still developing, and Corridor-linked PPPs depend on bankability, predictable contracting and credible risk allocation.

Transparency around Corridor-related contracting also remains limited, constraining both oversight and supplier participation. In Angola, the operational railway and awarded concessions involve multiple contractors, yet civil-society stakeholders report that public information on contract values, procurement processes and contractor arrangements remains limited. In the DRC and Zambia, publicly available information has largely been confined to feasibility and preparatory studies, with limited disclosure on forthcoming contracting opportunities. This reduces visibility for potential domestic suppliers and weakens external oversight.

6.3 Governance challenges in transport and corridor development

Disclosure related to rehabilitation, greenfield construction and upgrades along the Lobito Corridor remains limited, increasing uncertainty among stakeholders. Publicly accessible information is uneven and fragmented across the three countries, including on railway rehabilitation in the DRC, greenfield construction in Zambia and upgrades in Angola. Key project documents – such as feasibility studies, financing arrangements, cost estimates and implementation plans – are not consistently available, making it difficult to assess project scope, sequencing and risks. In a corridor built on complex partnerships, weak disclosure can also erode trust in project motivations and benefit-sharing.

MoUs and bilateral agreements underpinning the Corridor are not systematically disclosed, limiting public scrutiny of their commitments. The Corridor rests on a layered architecture of intergovernmental, public-private and donor agreements.

MoUs and bilateral agreements underpinning the Corridor are not systematically disclosed, limiting public scrutiny of their commitments.

Many of these instruments share political aims rather than being legally binding, but they frame expectations around mineral access, infrastructure financing and security cooperation. Limited public availability of agreement texts – or even clear summaries of their objectives, duration and key commitments – constrains oversight and makes it difficult for parliaments, civil society and affected communities to assess the terms on which the Corridor is being developed.

The financing structures that will underpin corridor investments may also create transparency and fiscal-risk challenges as projects move from feasibility to financial close. Although the DRC and Zambian components are envisaged as PPPs, the terms under which governments might be required to provide sovereign guarantees, assume contingent liabilities or backstop commercial financing gaps have not yet been publicly defined. For Zambia in particular, still emerging from a sovereign debt default and restructuring completed in 2024, the potential fiscal implications of such commitments warrant careful scrutiny. As financing arrangements are negotiated, transparent disclosure of concession terms, risk-allocation structures and any government financial commitments will be important to enable parliaments, civil society and development partners to assess potential fiscal exposure and monitor whether PPP structures are protecting public balance sheets as intended.

Environmental and social documentation is also often incomplete or not publicly accessible, creating risks for resettlement and community conflict. Few ESIA, resettlement action plans (RAPs) or monitoring reports are publicly available for corridor-related projects, limiting the ability of communities and civil society to assess compliance with national legislation and international standards. Consultation processes are often uneven, and reports of speculative land acquisition along planned rail alignments illustrate how information gaps can contribute to local tensions.

Evidence from Corridor discussions also suggests that people living along parts of the rail alignment in the DRC have received limited information about the Lobito Corridor, indicating weaknesses in communication and engagement. Where consultation is rushed, especially when under pressure to accelerate mineral export routes, there is a heightened risk that free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) principles are not respected, compensation becomes contested and resettlement disputes delay implementation.

Data on mineral transport operations is limited, constraining planning, oversight and evidence-based corridor comparison. Public information on mineral volumes transported by route and mode, applicable tariffs and fees, border delays and operational bottlenecks remains scarce. While national production and export figures are published across the Corridor countries, they are not disaggregated by transport route or mode. This makes it difficult to attribute throughput to specific corridors or track performance over time. Fragmented reporting systems across government agencies further limit the availability of integrated logistics and fiscal data. The absence of such data constrains effective planning and oversight, including road maintenance programming and the calibration of rail investments. It also limits the ability of stakeholders to assess whether rail is absorbing incremental demand, as expected, or displacing livelihoods without mitigation.

Transparency among railway SOEs also remains limited, despite their central role in the Corridor's performance. Caminho de Ferro de Benguela (CFB) in Angola, Zambia Railways Limited (ZRL) in Zambia and SNCC in the DRC publish little information on revenues, expenditures, subsidies, debt, maintenance needs or procurement practices. Weak financial and operational disclosure complicates oversight and undermines long-term sustainability, particularly where SOEs interact with private concessionaires, track-access regimes or blended finance structures.

Political-economy dynamics and fragmented coordination add further governance risks which can slow the Corridor's performance, even when infrastructure exists. Shifting mineral flows toward the Lobito Corridor may encounter resistance from actors with vested interests in existing routes. In the DRC, provinces such as Lualaba and Haut-Katanga depend heavily on transport-related taxes, and uncertainty over future revenue-sharing arrangements increases the likelihood of pushback. Fragmented coordination among ministries, provincial authorities, customs administrations and SOEs heightens the risk of delays and policy incoherence. These challenges point to a common issue: governance gaps tend to emerge at the intersections between mining and transport; national and subnational authorities; and public and private actors.

Potential risks: Displacement, consultation and implementation delays

Weak disclosure of ESIs and RAPs and inconsistent consultation can turn “technical” rail upgrades into political flashpoints that delay delivery and raise costs. Where communities perceive that land impacts are hidden or rushed, disputes over compensation and legitimacy can escalate quickly, delaying implementation and undermining the corridor's social license. The Lobito countries' track record on resettlement – particularly in DRC mining regions – suggests this is not a theoretical risk. Early publication of ESIs and RAPs, combined with accessible grievance mechanisms, can reduce both the likelihood and cost of conflict while giving lenders and investors confidence that safeguarding commitments are being met.

TABLE 8

Snapshot of the Lobito Corridor governance risk profile

	Key issues	Implications
Mining sector governance	• Incomplete license, contract and beneficial ownership disclosure • Weak MSG coordination; limited provincial engagement • Inconsistent ASM data (DRC and Angola) • Revenue reconciliation and data assurance gaps • Opaque subnational transfers	• Reduces investor confidence • Weakens revenue management • Creates community mistrust • Limits effective oversight of SOEs • Increases responsible-sourcing exposure via ASM opacity
Local content and supplier development governance	• Ambitious rules but weak monitoring • No public supplier registries or procurement forecasts • Limited transparency on Corridor-related contracts • Firms lack information to compete • Risk of uninvestable or inconsistently applied thresholds	• Domestic suppliers miss opportunities • Too stringent rules deter investment • Economic spillovers remain limited • Creates uncertainty for companies
Transport and Corridor governance	• Limited disclosure on Lobito rehabilitation, greenfield works and upgrades • Limited transparency on Corridor agreements and MoUs • Limited transparency on Corridor financing structures, including PPP guarantees and contingent liabilities • Few public ESIA, RAPs or feasibility studies • No data on mineral volumes, tariffs and operational bottlenecks • Low transparency of railway SOEs (CFB, ZRL, SNCC) • Political-economy risks and fragmented coordination	• Fuels speculation, mistrust and tensions • Increases project and financing risks • Creates potential sovereign debt and contingent liability risks for governments • Weakens Corridor competitiveness • Heightens displacement and resettlement conflict risks

7. How the EITI Standard can strengthen mining and corridor governance

Given the Corridor's potential risk profile, characterised by large capital inflows, complex public-private arrangements, fast-growing mineral production, and uneven institutional coordination, among others, governance and transparency are not peripheral but central to implementation. Strengthened disclosure of licenses, contracts, state participation, revenues, social, environmental, procurement and transport arrangements can reduce uncertainty for investors, improve coordination across Angola, the DRC and Zambia, and help ensure that corridor-linked investments translate into credible fiscal gains, local content outcomes and broader, resilient development benefits rather than enclave growth.

The EITI Standard provides a practical framework through which Angola, the DRC and Zambia can strengthen governance across mining, local content and transport. By leveraging established multi-stakeholder processes, the EITI can assist governments in improving transparency, accountability and coordination along the full mining value chain, including the transport systems that link mines to markets. In doing so, EITI implementation can help translate transparency improvements into stronger investment conditions, more credible fiscal outcomes and enhanced public trust, while also reducing corridor-specific risks such as elite capture, resettlement conflict and opaque transport charges.

The EITI Standard provides a practical framework through which Angola, the DRC and Zambia can strengthen governance across mining, local content and transport.



A panel discussion at the EITI Africa regional forum on strategic minerals in November 2025 in Lusaka, Zambia.

While this section focuses on the role of EITI as a practical transparency and governance tool, it is important to situate it within a broader ecosystem where regional frameworks such as the African Mining Vision (AMV), together with national legal, fiscal and institutional reforms provide parallel and complementary pathways to strengthen oversight, coordination and accountability. In this sense, EITI should be seen not as a standalone solution, but as a reinforcing mechanism that helps operationalise existing regional ambitions and national legislation by making corridor-related investments, revenues and obligations more visible, credible and accountable.

7.1 Strengthening mining-sector governance and the investment climate

The EITI can support stronger disclosure of licenses, contracts, beneficial ownership as well as production and export data to reduce discretion and strengthen predictability (Requirements 2.2–2.5). As the Lobito Corridor accelerates mining expansion and strategic mineral partnerships across Angola, the DRC and Zambia, risks related to fast-tracked licensing, opaque agreements and ownership concentration are likely to increase. In this context, systematic publication of license awards, contract terms and ownership information can reduce discretionary practices and limit preferential allocations or hidden fiscal terms linked to large-scale corridor investments.

This is especially relevant given emerging resource-backed arrangements such as the US–DRC security-for-minerals cooperation and the proposed Zambia minerals-for-development/health-type deals, where stakeholders have already flagged concerns around the transparency of terms, long-term offtake implications and fiscal trade-offs.⁹ In addition, disclosure of infrastructure concessions, transport tariffs PPP agreements along the corridor would help clarify contingent liabilities, cost structures and governance risks. Without disclosure, such agreements can create uncertainty over future mineral flows, state obligations and sovereign debt exposure. Transparent publication of these deals, alongside licensing processes and ownership information would enable governments, investors and citizens to better assess fiscal liabilities, market concentration and geopolitical exposure, while ensuring corridor-linked mineral development supports credible value addition, revenue mobilisation and long-term development objectives. In the DRC, public scrutiny and [analysis of resource-backed infrastructure agreement](#) with Chinese consortia, supported by EITI disclosures and analysis, have contributed to contract renegotiations estimated to yield [4 billion dollars in additional fiscal and infrastructure commitments](#). By contrast, Angola's legacy oil- and resource-backed loans, particularly with Chinese lenders, remain only partially disclosed, continuing to constrain full assessment of fiscal risks and long-term obligations.

The EITI can support stronger disclosure of exploration, production and export data to reduce leakages and improve traceability across corridor-linked mineral flows (Requirements 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). As mining output expands along the Lobito axis, risks related to ASM smuggling, under-declaration of production, stockpiling, and exports without corresponding payments or reconciliation are likely to intensify.

⁹ See, for example, US Department of State (2025). Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/strategic-partnership-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo>.

Disaggregated reporting of production and export volumes by commodity, company and destination can help identify discrepancies between what is produced, traded and declared for revenue purposes. This is particularly relevant for high-risk minerals such as copper, cobalt and 3Ts, where informal trade, transit diversion and stockpiling practices can obscure true export values and fiscal returns. Strengthening systematic disclosure and cross-checking of production, export and revenue data can therefore help governments detect illicit flows, reduce transfer mispricing risks, while also enhancing responsible sourcing credibility and investor confidence in supply chain integrity along the Corridor.

The EITI can help improve transparency and reconciliation of all material revenues, including in-kind sales (Requirements 4.1–4.2). Extending reporting to all material revenue streams can strengthen fiscal credibility, improve data assurance and reduce opportunities for revenue leakage or rent capture – particularly where reconciliation gaps and partial disclosures persist. The EITI Standard’s existing requirements provide a framework for a fuller scope of disclosure than is currently being applied across the Corridor countries, encompassing tax and non-tax revenues, transportation payments, sub-national transfers and the identification of all significant payees and payers alongside the oversight mechanisms which govern them. Validation findings suggest that there is room to enhance reporting across several of these dimensions, and the requirements are already in place to support such progression where the institutional capacity exists to do so. Stronger revenue disclosure also helps governments and communities assess whether mineral expansion is translating into public value.

The EITI can assist in enhancing oversight of SOEs and quasi-fiscal activities (Requirements 2.6, 4.5 and 6.2). Disclosure of financial relationships between governments and SOEs – including subsidies, debt obligations, retained earnings and non-commercial mandates – can improve accountability and allow policymakers to better assess fiscal risks, especially where SOEs operate across both mining and transport segments.

The EITI can support clearer reporting on subnational transfers and their integration into national and provincial budgets (Requirement 5.2). Transparent disclosure of transfer formulas, amounts and timings can enhance accountability of subnational authorities, strengthen fiscal coordination and help address community concerns regarding the local use of extractive revenues. This is particularly important where corridor development alters transport patterns and the distribution of corridor-related tax bases.

Supporting local content transparency and supplier development

The EITI can strengthen local content governance by enabling more systematic and comparable reporting on procurement and supplier participation, as encouraged under Requirement 6. Standardised disclosure of local procurement spending – disaggregated by company and, where feasible, category of goods and services – would provide policymakers, companies and civil society with a clearer understanding of how domestic participation is evolving in practice. It would also help distinguish between formal compliance with regulatory thresholds and deeper forms of domestic value creation. As illustrated by recent supplier-development initiatives in Zambia, substantial procurement and capacity-building activity may already be under way,

yet such information remains dispersed across corporate sustainability reports and press releases rather than being consolidated in a common public reporting framework. EITI reporting can help bring greater coherence and comparability to this landscape.

The EITI can also support the publication of supplier registries, forward procurement plans and contract awards, in line with good international practice. Improved access to this information would give domestic firms greater visibility over upcoming opportunities, reduce information asymmetries and lower corruption risks in procurement processes. This is particularly relevant for corridor-linked contracts, such as construction, maintenance, logistics platforms and rail services, where opacity can exclude local suppliers and heighten capture risks. Zambia's MSG is currently working closely with the Mines Ministry to implement its recent local content regulations, with plans for ZEITI to introduce new disclosures in its upcoming report in 2026.


Finally, the EITI multi-stakeholder platform can serve as a forum to calibrate the ambition and feasibility of local content rules (Requirements 1.2 and 7.1). Structured dialogue among governments, companies and domestic suppliers can help align policy objectives with market conditions, supporting the development of local industrial capacity while maintaining an investable and predictable regulatory environment. Together, these measures can help retain more value domestically while reducing uncertainty for both firms and policymakers.

CASE STUDY

Mali: Using the EITI to support local content transparency

Since 2019, Mali's EITI process has supported the disclosure of detailed information on spending by gold mining companies on local suppliers, in line with Requirement 6.3. Mali's 2023 EITI Report revealed that the gold mining sector spent XOF 856 billion (approximately USD 1.42 billion) on Malian goods and services in a single year, and making these figures public had a tangible impact. Civil society organisations and local authorities gained hard evidence to engage companies more effectively, challenge procurement practices where local participation remained low, and advocate for stronger supplier development and capacity-building efforts. The disclosures also encouraged several companies to improve the quality and consistency of their reporting beyond minimum legal requirements.

Mali's experience illustrates how the EITI can be used to strengthen transparency around local content and supplier participation. For Angola, the DRC and Zambia, a similar approach could help domestic firms better prepare for upcoming investment and contracting cycles linked to both mining operations and Corridor development. Publishing supplier registries, procurement forecasts, contract awards and partnership frameworks – where feasible – would improve market visibility, reduce information asymmetries, lower corruption risks in procurement and support the development of local industrial capacity.



7.2 Strengthening transport and corridor governance

Improving visibility on mineral flows by route, mode, volume and value can strengthen midstream transparency and corridor performance management (Requirement 3.3). Requirement 3.3 of the EITI Standard calls for systematic disclosure of production and export data. Applied to the midstream segment, this requirement can support disclosure of mineral flows by corridor, transport mode and destination. Such information is critical for fair performance comparisons between Lobito and alternative routes, and for evidence-based decisions on road maintenance, rail investment sequencing, and border management. Systematic disclosure of production and export volumes also supports efforts to identify commodity-based illicit financial flows: discrepancies between declared exports, corridor throughput data and destination-country import records can signal under-invoicing, smuggling or fraudulent shipments. Integrating corridor-level flow data into EITI reporting frameworks would strengthen the evidentiary basis for detecting and deterring such flows. Validation assessments across the three countries indicate that transport-related disclosures remain at an early-stage relative to the EITI Standard's provisions, suggesting significant room to strengthen reporting on mineral logistics, tariff structures, SOE finances and Corridor-related project documentation. The requirements outlined below therefore represent both the framework for enhanced transparency and a practical agenda for closing existing gaps.

Enhancing transparency of tariffs, fees and transport-related revenues can reduce informal charges and strengthen corridor competitiveness (Requirements 4.1, 4.4 and 4.7). The EITI Standard requires disclosure and reconciliation of material payments to government (Requirement 4.1) and encourages disclosure of revenues associated with the transportation of extractive commodities, including rail tariffs, road levies and concession fees (Requirement 4.4). Requirement 4.7 supports project-level disclosure of payments linked to major infrastructure works. Together, these provisions can reduce discretionary charges, support informed tariff-setting and improve investor confidence.

The EITI can also support transparency around the fiscal risks embedded in the Corridor's financing structures, including sovereign guarantees and contingent liabilities associated with PPP arrangements (Requirement 2.4). Disclosure of concession terms, risk-allocation arrangements and government financial commitments – including guarantees extended to railway SOEs or private concessionaires – would enable parliaments and oversight bodies to monitor sovereign exposure and assess whether PPP structures are protecting public balance sheets as intended. This is particularly relevant for the DRC and Zambia, where fiscal space remains constrained and the terms of the Corridor's financing arrangements remain largely opaque.

Strengthening transparency and oversight of railway SOEs can further improve accountability in entities that sit at the core of the Corridor's sustainability (Requirements 2.6, 4.5 and 6.2). Applying these provisions to railway companies such as CFB, ZRL and SNCC would support publication of audited financial statements, subsidy arrangements, debt obligations and procurement practices. Improved disclosure helps policymakers assess financial sustainability, reduces operational uncertainty and strengthens accountability where SOEs interact with private operators and concessional financing.

Increasing access to project documentation and environmental and social information can reduce speculation and lower the risk of conflict around displacement and resettlement (Requirements 2.4, 6.4, 7.1 and 7.2). The EITI Standard encourages disclosure of contracts and project agreements (Requirement 2.4), as well as environmental and social impact information (Requirement 6.4), while promoting open data and public debate through accessible reporting (Requirements 7.1 and 7.2). Applying these provisions to the Corridor's development supports the publication of feasibility studies, financing structures, concession terms, ESIA's, RAPs and monitoring reports, strengthening community oversight and reinforcing the Corridor's social license.

CASE STUDY

Peru: Bringing the hidden cost of mining roads and railways into the light



When Peru updated its EITI work plan in 2018, one small decision changed the game for the country's Andean mining corridors. The national MSG agreed that companies would disclose every payment they made for using public roads, private haulage routes, ports and the historic state-owned railway that carries copper and zinc from the highlands to the coast. What had previously been an opaque world of "logistics fees" and informal tolls suddenly became visible in the annual EITI report.

The first disclosures, covering 2017–2018, revealed more than USD 180 million a year flowing from mining companies to regional governments, road concessionaires and the railway operator. Suddenly, communities along the Central Highway and the southern corridor to Matarani could see exactly how much money their roads generated. Regional authorities in Ancash, Arequipa and Moquegua – long starved of reliable data – started using the EITI figures to accurately plan their infrastructure budgets. None of this required a new law: Peru simply applied Requirement 4.4 of the EITI Standard to payments that were clearly material, and in a few years, a murky stretch of the mining value chain became one of the most transparent.



A desert road in northern Peru.

PHOTO CREDIT: SHUTTERSTOCK

CASE STUDY

Guinea: Opening the books on the Simandou railway before the first train runs



In Guinea, the world's largest untapped iron-ore deposit at Simandou comes with a 650-kilometre railway that the state will co-own and operate. From day one, rather than waiting for the line to be finished and the revenues to start flowing, Guinea's EITI MSG decided in 2021 to treat the future railway like any other extractive project. This means the national EITI reports publish the tariff per tonne that Rio Tinto and the Winning Consortium will pay once the trains start rolling, together with the schedule of payments and any in-kind infrastructure contributions. They also disclose the financial relationship between the state-owned railway company (Compagnie du TransGuinéen) and the Ministry of Transport, such as loans, subsidies and projected profit transfers, years before the first ore leaves the mountains.

Civil society and parliamentary committees, long suspicious that the railway would burden taxpayers while enriching a few insiders, now have hard numbers to monitor. The disclosures have quieted much of the speculation about hidden costs and have given Guineans a clear benchmark for whether the state will ever recover its investment. By applying EITI Requirements 4.4 and 2.6 from the outset, Guinea has shown that even a greenfield corridor can be born transparent.



A freight train in Guinea.

PHOTO CREDIT: IGOR GROCHEV / SHUTTERSTOCK

TABLE 9

Governance and transparency opportunities for the EITI

	How the EITI can help	Potential benefits
Mining sector governance	- Strengthen disclosure of licenses, contracts and beneficial ownership (Requirements 2.2–2.5) - Improve disclosure of production data and export volumes (Requirement 3.2) - Improve transparency and reconciliation of all material revenues, including in-kind payments (Requirement 4.1–4.2) - Enhance oversight of SOEs and quasi-fiscal activities (Requirements 2.6 and 6.2) - Clarify subnational transfers and their integration into national and provincial budgets (Requirement 5.2) - Consider a cross-country multi-stakeholder forum to track and exercise oversight over corridor implementation (Requirements 1 and 7)	- Boosts investor confidence and lowers perceived sovereign risk - Strengthens fiscal stability, credibility and medium-term planning - Reduces opportunities for revenue leakage, discretionary practices and rent capture - Enhances accountability of SOEs and subnational authorities - Improves public trust in mining-sector governance
Local content and supplier development governance	- Enable systematic reporting on local procurement spending by company and commodity (encouraged under Requirement 6.3) - Support publication of supplier registries, procurement plans and contract awards (encouraged; in line with good practice) - Provide a multi-stakeholder forum to balance ambition and feasibility of local content rules (Requirements 1.2 and 7.1)	- Gives domestic firms visibility on procurement opportunities worth millions of dollars - Helps retain more value in-country through increased domestic participation - Reduces corruption risks and information asymmetries in procurement - Supports development of local industrial and supplier capacity - Reduces uncertainty for investors around compliance expectations
Transport and corridor governance	- Improve visibility on mineral flows by route, mode, volume and value (Requirement 3.3 – critical for midstream transparency) - Increase transparency of tariffs, fees and transport revenues (Requirement 4.1, 4.4, 4.7) - Improve disclosure of PPP financing arrangements, including sovereign guarantees and contingent liabilities (Requirement 2.4) - Strengthen transparency and oversight of railway SOEs, including CFB, ZRL and SNCC (Requirements 2.6 and 6.2) - Support publication of feasibility studies, financing structures, concession terms, ESIA, RAPs and monitoring reports (encouraged under Requirements 2.4, 6.4 and 7.2) - Consider a cross-country multi-stakeholder forum to track and exercise oversight over corridor implementation (Requirements 1 and 7)	- Reduces speculation and political-economy tensions - Allows fair comparison of Lobito vs Dar, Durban, Walvis Bay - Strengthens oversight of sovereign exposure and PPP fiscal risks - Provides evidence for communities to demand compliance with ESIA/land laws - Improves planning, cost control and anti-corruption safeguards for donors/lenders - Strengthens accountability for donors, lenders and public authorities

8. Complementary actions to reinforce the EITI's impact along the Lobito Corridor

While the EITI provides a robust framework for transparency and accountability across the mining value chain, its impact depends on how effectively disclosures are embedded within broader governance systems and decision-making processes. Transparency alone does not change outcomes unless institutions, incentives and information systems enable stakeholders to use disclosed data to improve policies, investments and oversight. Along the Lobito Corridor, where ESG risks are highly concentrated and interlinked, complementary actions are required to ensure that EITI disclosures help mitigate displacement, reduce corruption vulnerabilities and support credible, inclusive development outcomes.

8.1 Reinforcing mining-sector governance

Strengthen national systems that underpin EITI disclosures: Governments should prioritise strengthening mining cadastres, contract registries, beneficial ownership registers and production reporting systems to ensure that EITI disclosures are complete, timely and reliable. Weak or fragmented systems increase the risk of opaque licensing, elite capture and regulatory discretion – risks already observed across Angola, the DRC and Zambia. Companies along the Corridor should also exercise leadership in disclosing relevant information. Civil society organisations and oversight bodies should engage and use data. Donor support for digitalisation, data integration and audit capacity can significantly enhance the credibility and usability of EITI data for investors, regulators and civil society.

Improve transparency and accountability around subnational revenue management:

To ensure that EITI disclosures on subnational transfers translate into improved outcomes, governments should strengthen the systems through which mining revenues are allocated, transferred and spent at provincial and local levels. Publishing transfer formulas, execution reports and links to subnational budgets helps address community mistrust and perceptions that Corridor-linked mineral wealth will bypass affected regions. MSGs could work together to develop targeted analytical work on linking revenue payments to permits to enhance oversight of fiscal flows across countries. Development partners can support capacity-building for provincial administrations and oversight bodies to analyse and act on disclosed information.

Support improved governance of ASM: Given the importance of ASM to livelihoods – and its association with environmental damage, child labour and conflict risks – particularly in Angola and the DRC, complementary investments are needed to improve data collection, traceability and environmental and social oversight. Aligning ASM formalisation programmes, traceability initiatives and labour inspections with EITI disclosures helps ensure that transparency supports practical improvements in working conditions, responsible sourcing and environmental protection rather than remaining purely descriptive. MSGs could work together to develop targeted analytical work on ASM, cross-border reconciliation of trade data (imports/exports, volumes, values) to identify discrepancies, informal trade flows and potential leakages.

While the EITI provides a robust framework for transparency and accountability across the mining value chain, its impact depends on how effectively disclosures are embedded within broader governance systems and decision-making processes.

8.2 Reinforcing local content transparency and supplier development

Operationalise local content disclosures through supplier-facing tools: To ensure that published procurement data translates into concrete opportunities for domestic firms, governments and Corridor authorities should convert disclosed information into accessible supplier registries, forward procurement pipelines and demand forecasts. This will help address a common implementation gap: ambitious local content policies often falter because domestic firms lack timely visibility on corridor- and mining-related opportunities, particularly in logistics, maintenance and infrastructure services. While some operators have introduced procurement portals, e-tendering systems and published procurement plans, these initiatives remain company-specific rather than sector-wide. Coordinating such tools across operators – through EITI or corridor governance platforms such as the LCTTFA – could significantly expand their reach and effectiveness.

Link disclosure with supplier development and access to finance: Donors and development finance institutions can reinforce the impact of local content reporting by aligning supplier development programmes, vocational training and SME finance with disclosed procurement opportunities. Targeted support to firms identified through procurement data, but constrained by scale, working capital or technical capacity, can help convert information into actual market participation. Emerging company-led financing approaches in Zambia, including reverse factoring and purchase-order-backed lending designed to reduce the cost of capital for local suppliers, demonstrate how private-sector innovation can complement public policy. At the same time, more standardised reporting would help ensure that such mechanisms are transparent and accessible beyond the supply chains of individual operators.

Use multi-stakeholder platforms to calibrate local content policies: EITI MSGs and corridor governance platforms can provide structured forums to assess the ambition, feasibility and sequencing of local content requirements. Dialogue informed by comparable procurement data can help manage the balance between expanding domestic participation and maintaining an investable regulatory environment. This reduces the risk that rigid or inconsistently applied rules deter investment or delay projects, while supporting gradual and evidence-based strengthening of local supplier capacity.

8.3 Reinforcing transport and Corridor governance

Strengthen Corridor institutions as hubs for transparency and coordination: Corridor-level institutions such as the Lobito Corridor Authority offer an opportunity to anchor transparency and coordination beyond individual projects. Governments should ensure that the Authority has the mandate and capacity to collect, publish and analyse data on the Corridor's performance, including traffic volumes, tariffs, transit times and operational bottlenecks. Angola's Plano Director do Corredor do Lobito (PDCL) offers a relevant reference point: it has established a public portal centralising information on corridor investments, anchor companies and indicators, alongside a geospatial platform supporting corridor management. The DRC and Zambia could develop comparable segment-level information platforms to consolidate publicly available data on corridor investments, concessions and infrastructure performance, with content aligned with EITI disclosures.

Such platforms would help address the current opacity of the midstream segment, reduce uncertainty around Corridor competitiveness and support evidence-based assessment of the relative performance and feasibility of alternative routing and investment options along the Corridor.

Publish key project documentation to support accountability and trust: To reinforce EITI disclosures related to transport revenues and state participation, governments and partners should systematically publish feasibility studies, cost-benefit analyses, concession agreements and financing structures for investments related to the Corridor. Transparent access to this information enables policymakers and stakeholders to assess whether proposed investments are economically viable, and to compare them with alternative pathways, including the use or upgrading of existing cross-border rail links. Making this information publicly accessible reduces speculation, mitigates elite capture risks and allows civil society and parliaments to assess whether projects deliver value for money and comply with national laws.

Provide independent transaction advisory support to governments: Given the complexity and long-term implications of rail and port concessions, donors should support independent transaction advisory services for host governments. Advisors can review financial models, assess risk allocation and ensure that concession terms are transparent, balanced with public-interest objectives, and aligned with EITI Requirement 2.4, which mandates disclosure of full contract texts and annexes, reducing the risk that infrastructure-for-minerals arrangements lock governments into unfavourable commitments or that contingent liabilities such as SOE loan guarantees create hidden sovereign debt. Such support is particularly important where governments face choices between large greenfield investments and lower-capital alternatives, and where early decisions may lock in costs, liabilities or routing patterns for decades. PPP structures should keep sovereign debt off government balance sheets, and where commercial feasibility gaps remain – as in the pre-investment DRC and Zambia segments – donor grant funding rather than additional borrowing is the appropriate instrument to bridge them. EITI reporting can strengthen public oversight of these financing arrangements by requiring disclosure of the terms, risk allocation and fiscal obligations embedded in concession agreements.

Enhance transparency on environmental and social safeguards: Governments and development partners should ensure that ESIA, RAPs and monitoring reports for Corridor projects are published and regularly updated. Linking these disclosures to EITI reporting platforms and Corridor information portals enables communities to track compliance with environmental and land laws, directly addressing risks related to displacement, inadequate consultation and weak enforcement identified earlier in this section.

Consider a cross-border multi-stakeholder coordination and oversight mechanism: Given the transnational nature of the Lobito Corridor, stakeholders could explore a mechanism to address gaps in cross-border transparency and oversight across Angola, the DRC and Zambia. To avoid duplication, this could be anchored in existing EITI multi-stakeholder processes, while engaging with the Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency (LCTTFA) and relevant regional partners (e.g. AMDC, AfDB) as appropriate. Rather than establishing a new formal institution, the mechanism could take the form of periodic, issue-based exchanges, bringing together selected representatives from national EITI MSGs alongside relevant technical actors (e.g. transport authorities, SOEs, civil society organisations, corridor agencies, DFIs and industry operators), depending on the topic.



PHOTO CREDIT: EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

EITI stakeholders from Anglophone and Lusophone African countries gather in September 2024 to discuss opportunities for cross-border collaboration.

Participation should be targeted and expertise-driven, recognising that not all MSG members will have direct relevance to corridor oversight. The focus would be on practical functions, sharing and analysing data on corridor-related flows (e.g. transport, infrastructure, revenues), identifying governance risks, and aligning on priority disclosures, while remaining flexible and fit-for-purpose. By leveraging the EITI's convening power and data, this approach could strengthen cross-border coordination and transparency without creating additional bureaucracy. Over time, it could support more coherent oversight of corridor investments and mineral value chains across the three countries.

Annexe 1: Strategic mineral government-to-government partnerships involving Angola, the DRC and Zambia

Year	Partner(s)	Agreement / MoU / Declaration	Objective and rationale	Public disclosure	Link
2025	DRC, US	US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement	Strengthens bilateral cooperation on critical minerals, investment, and supply chain security between the US and DRC, building on earlier MSP and EV battery commitments.	✓	 https://www.state.gov/strategic-partnership-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo
2025	Saudi Arabia, Zambia	Zambia–Saudi Arabia MoU on Critical Minerals	Promotes Saudi investment in Zambian copper and cobalt mining; supports supply chain diversification for Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 industrial strategy.	✗	—
2024	DRC, Saudi Arabia	DRC–Saudi Arabia MoU on Mineral Cooperation	Facilitates Saudi investment in the DRC mining sector (cobalt, copper, lithium); supports infrastructure development and supply chain partnerships.	✗	—
2023	Angola, DRC, EU, US, Zambia	Lobito Corridor Trade, Transport & Facilitation Authority (LCTTFA) Agreement	Establishes the LCTTFA in Lobito to coordinate cross-border trade; harmonise customs, trade and transport laws; promote SMEs; and strengthen corridor infrastructure for mineral exports (copper, cobalt) via the Benguela Railway and Port of Lobito. Discussions began in 2013.	✗ ¹⁰	 Lobito Corridor MoU (partial)

¹⁰ Only MoU for Lobito Corridor development and the Zambia–Lobito Rail Line disclosed.

Year	Partner(s)	Agreement / MoU / Declaration	Objective and rationale	Public disclosure	Link
2023	DRC, EU	EU–DRC MoU on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains	Develops sustainable CRM value chains (cobalt, copper) between the EU and DRC; promotes funding, ESG standards, research, and capacity-building; aligns with EU Global Gateway and develops a joint roadmap for value-added processing.	✓	 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5303
2023	EU, Zambia	EU–Zambia MoU on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains	Develops sustainable CRM value chains (copper, cobalt) between the EU and Zambia; supports trade, ESG standards, research, and capacity-building; facilitates Zambia's mineral exports via the Lobito Corridor, supporting EU CRM needs and industrialisation.	✓	 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5303
2023	DRC, Japan	DRC–Japan MoU on Critical Minerals	Promotes Japanese investment in the DRC cobalt and copper mining; supports sustainable practices and supply chain security for Japan's green energy and automotive industries.	✗	—
2023	Japan, Zambia	Zambia–Japan MoU on Critical Minerals	Encourages Japanese investment in Zambian copper and cobalt mining; promotes sustainable practices and supply chain security; enhances Zambia's mineral exports potentially via the Lobito Corridor.	✓	 https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2023/08/20230811001/20230811001-2.pdf
2023	UAE, Zambia	Zambia–UAE MoU on Mineral Resources	Promotes UAE investment in mineral exploration and extraction; notably includes the USD 1.1 billion acquisition of Mopani Copper Mines. Supports Zambia's CRM export capacity.	✗	—
2023	UK, Zambia	Zambia–UK MoU on Critical Minerals	Facilitates UK investment in Zambian critical minerals; supports supply chain diversification for UK clean energy and manufacturing industries.	✗	—

Year	Partner(s)	Agreement / MoU / Declaration	Objective and rationale	Public disclosure	Link
2022	DRC, US, Zambia	US–DRC–Zambia Tripartite MoU on EV Battery Value Chain	Develops an integrated EV battery value chain spanning extraction, processing and manufacturing across DRC and Zambia; conducts feasibility studies; ensures transparency and environmental standards. Relies on the Lobito Corridor for transporting critical minerals to global markets.	✓	 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2023.01.13-E-4-Release-MOU-USA-DRC-ZAMBIA-Tripartite-Agreement-Tab-1-MOU-for-U.S.-Assistance-to-Support-DRC-Zambia-EV-Value-Chain-Cooperation-Instrument.pdf
2022	Multiple (MSP members incl. Australia, Canada, EU, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, UK, US)	Minerals Security Partnership (MSP)	Multilateral partnership to accelerate development of diverse, responsible critical mineral supply chains. Supports public and private investment in strategic mineral projects globally, with DRC and Zambia as key focus countries.	✓	 https://2021-2025.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/
2022	DRC, Zambia	DRC–Zambia Bilateral Cooperation Agreement on Battery and Clean Energy Value Chain	Collaborates on battery precursor and EV production; leverages DRC cobalt and Zambian copper for job creation and industrialisation; aligns with the African Mining Vision to move up the value chain from raw extraction.	✗ ¹¹	 https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/images/publication_docs/Ministerial%20Statement%20-%20On%20Zambia-Congo%20DR%20Joint%20Initiative%20on%20Electric%20Battery.pdf
2019	India, Zambia	Zambia–India MoU on Mineral Exploration	Facilitates Indian investment in Zambian copper and cobalt exploration; secures CRM supplies for India's green energy sectors; supports supply chain diversification away from Chinese-dominated sources.	✓	 https://mines.gov.in/admin/storage/app/uploads/6437889f7e2f91681361055.pdf

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Year	Partner(s)	Agreement / MoU / Declaration	Objective and rationale	Public disclosure	Link
2010	China, Zambia	Zambia–China Critical Raw Materials Cooperation Frameworks	Promotes Chinese investment in Zambian copper mining; facilitates extraction and export; supports infrastructure development. Part of broader Sino-African resource diplomacy, reinforcing Chinese dominance in Copperbelt supply chains.	✗	—
2008	China, DRC	DRC–China Mining and Cooperation Arrangements (Sicomines)	Secures Chinese access to DRC copper and cobalt reserves in exchange for infrastructure investment; the foundational ‘minerals-for-infrastructure’ deal that established Chinese dominance in DRC mining. Basis for ongoing CMOC/ Sicomines operations.	✓	 https://www.gis-reseau-asie.org/en/article/sino-drc-mining-contract-century-and-global-constitution-0

Annexe 2: Other declarations and agreements related to the Lobito Corridor

Agreement/MoU/Commitment	Parties	Signing Date
<i>Infrastructure-focused public sector commitments</i>		
Minerals Security Partnership Commitment	Led by United States and EU; 12 participating countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, UK)	Launched June 2022
US-Angola Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) Commitment	US, Angola	Announced October 2022
EU Global Gateway Investment Package for the Lobito Corridor	EU, Angola, DRC, Zambia	Announced October 2023
Seven-Party MoU on Lobito Corridor and Zambia-Lobito Rail Line	US, EU, Angola, DRC, Zambia, AfDB, AFC	26 October 2023
EU-AfDB Financial Framework Partnership Agreement	EU, AfDB	29 January 2024
AFC Financing Commitment for Zambia--Lobito Rail Line	AFC, Zambia	Announced 2024
EU-Angola EUR 76.5m Assistance Package	EU, Angola	Announced January 2025
<i>Infrastructure-focused private sector commitments</i>		
Lobito Concession to LAR	Angola, LAR Consortium (Trafigura, Mota-Engil, Vecturis)	4 November 2022 (transfer completed 4 July 2023)
DFC Loan to LAR Consortium	DFC, LAR Consortium	November 2024 (approved; contracts pending)
Ivanhoe-LRA MoU for Copper Transport	Kamoa Copper S.A. (Ivanhoe Mines), Lobito Atlantic International SARL	18 August 2023
KoBold Metals Commitment to Zambia-Lobito Rail Line	KoBold Metals, AFC	October 2024
Kobaloni Energy Cobalt Sulphate Refinery Commitment	Kobaloni Energy, AFC	Announced 2024

Objectives	Relevance to Lobito Corridor	Disclosure
Coordinate responsible critical mineral supply chain investments; promote ESG standards and transparency.	Indirectly supports the Corridor by fostering responsible mining in Angola, DRC and Zambia, enhancing supply chains.	
Provide funding for the Corridor's infrastructure, including Benguela railway; support Angola as a trade hub.	Funds railway upgrades for efficient mineral transport, aligning with US goals.	
Creates framework for cooperation and financing related to the development of rail, port, renewable energy, and value addition.	Enhances the Corridor's infrastructure and green industrialisation, aligning with EU Global Gateway.	
Develop the Corridor and 800 km Zambia-Lobito rail line; mobilise financing for infrastructure, energy and agriculture; conduct feasibility studies.	Supports the Corridor's infrastructure (rail, port) for trade and CRM exports.	
Leverage EUR 1bn in EU grants to mobilise EUR 10bn for African infrastructure, including Lobito Corridor; support transport, energy and connectivity.	Provides financial backing for the Corridor's infrastructure, complementing AfDB's commitment.	
Pledge USD 500m for 830 km Zambia-Lobito greenfield rail line (270 km Angola, 460 km Zambia).	Funds critical greenfield rail line, enhancing the Corridor's viability for mineral exports.	
Provide EUR 76.5m for trade, investment, ecotourism, and vocational training to create jobs and promote sustainable growth. Not strictly related to the Lobito Corridor project.	Supports economic diversification and local development along the Corridor, with tenuous links due to early-stage discussions.	
Award 30-year concession to operate 1,344 km Benguela railway and Port of Lobito; invest USD 455m in Angola, USD 100m in the DRC; explore 259 km Zambia extension.	Grants operational control of core infrastructure for mineral exports and trade.	
Provide USD 553m to rehabilitate 1,344 km Benguela railway; support 30-year concession.	Enhances core infrastructure for mineral and trade transport.	
Transport up to 10,000 t of copper concentrate in 2024; secure 120,000–240,000 tpa of blister-anode or concentrate for 2025–30; reduce costs and emissions.	Establishes the Corridor as a viable copper export route, reducing transit times and emissions compared to trucking.	
Anchor commercial viability of 830 km Zambia-Lobito rail line with 300,000 t of copper annually from Mingomba mine; collaborate with AFC on funding.	Ensures freight commitments for greenfield rail line, supporting mineral exports.	
Plan Africa's first cobalt sulphate refinery in Chingola, Zambia, with USD 100m from AFC; target production by late 2025 would add 6,000 t of cargo.	Strengthens economic case for Zambia-Lobito rail line by adding value to cobalt exports.	

Annexe 3: Overview of major transport projects related to the Lobito Corridor

Component	Status
Lobito Port (Mineral Terminal)	The mineral export hub of the Corridor, directly integrated with the Benguela Railway. Operated by LAR alongside the rail concession. In July 2024, it received its first bulk vessel (40,500 t of sulphur), marking the start of integrated port-rail freight operations. Investments include modernising mineral-handling facilities, expanding container capacity, and upgrading logistics to handle large-scale copper and cobalt exports.
Lobito Multipurpose Terminal	Concessioned to AGL in December 2023. Under the agreement, AGL is investing approximately USD 100 million to modernise port infrastructure, deepen quays, expand storage capacity, and upgrade cargo-handling facilities.
Angola line (Lobito-Luau, ~1,290 km)	Built in the early 20th century and rehabilitated 2006–2014 with Chinese support. Concession for cargo granted to LAR (Trafigura, Mota-Engil, Vecturis) in July 2023 for 30 years (extendable by 20). Cargo operations started in January 2024. Investments under way: 275 container wagons delivered in late 2024 (further deliveries planned throughout 2026); new workshops, freight terminals and safety upgrades backed by MIGA guarantees and a pending USD 533 million DFC loan. CFB operates passenger services on the LAR line under a track access agreement with LAR, including a well-used commuter service between Benguela and Lobito. Partially related, along the Lobito Corridor, Sonangol is developing the Lobito Oil Refinery, a multi-billion-dollar project currently at the development stage. The refinery will produce petrol, diesel, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas and other petroleum products for export to Zambia via the proposed AZOP.
DRC line (Dilolo-Kolwezi, ~450 km, under SNCC)	Operational under a track access agreement with LAR but requires rehabilitation, with a required investment of USD 200 to 700 million. The EIB, DFC and World Bank have expressed interest in financing the project. Feasibility studies are ongoing to determine investability and funding options. In December 2023, Ivanhoe Mines completed the first trial shipment (1,110 t of copper concentrate) from Kamoa-Kakula to Lobito in 8 days. In 2024, Trafigura and Ivanhoe signed long-term contracts: • Trafigura: up to 450,000 tpa from 2025 • Ivanhoe (Kamoa-Kakula): 10,000 t in 2024, scaling to 120,000–240,000 tpa from 2025
Zambia extension (~830 km, Solwezi-Chingola-Luacano line)	Planned greenfield link to Zambia's Copperbelt. Estimated cost: ~USD 5 billion. Feasibility study financed by AFC and partners; ongoing since 2023. Would ultimately connect to the TAZARA railway at Kapiri Mposhi, creating a full trans-African east-west corridor. Financial commitments by potential partners to be confirmed.

Annexe 4: Railway component of selected transport corridors

Corridor (Authority)	Railway Status	Operational Start	Route/Main Stops	Type/Notes
Central Corridor (TAZARA)	Operational	1975	Dar es Salaam → Morogoro → Dodoma → Mbeya → Kapiri Mposhi (Zambia)	Regional, Cape gauge; key rail backbone for Central Corridor connecting Tanzania and Zambia to DSM port
Central Corridor (standard gauge railway, Tanzania)	Partially operational	August 2024	Dar es Salaam → Morogoro → Makutupora (Dodoma); planned extension to Tabora/Mwanza	National, standard gauge; modern freight and passenger rail; potential future integration with Central Corridor
Northern Corridor (NCTTCA)	Operational	Kenya SGR: 2017	Mombasa → Nairobi → Malaba → Uganda	Regional, standard gauge (Kenya SGR), legacy lines in Uganda; core corridor for Great Lakes trade
Maputo Corridor (MCLI)	Operational	1996	Gauteng (South Africa) → Maputo	Regional, Cape gauge; freight and passenger rail, fully operational
Walvis Bay Corridor	Partially operational	Various segments (late 1990s–2000s)	Walvis Bay → Otavi → Botswana/South Africa	Regional, Cape gauge; limited operational rail mostly truck-based freight
Trans-Kalahari Corridor (TKCMC)	Not operational	N/A	Walvis Bay → Botswana → Gauteng	Primarily road-based; rail exists in Namibia but not used for corridor freight
Beira Corridor (Mozambique)	Partially operational	1898, rehabilitation ongoing	Beira → Dondo → Zimbabwe/Malawi	Regional, Cape gauge; partially operational rail, limited capacity
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT)	Planned	N/A	Southern highlands → Dar es Salaam (planned)	National/project-specific; mostly road-based, some planned rail improvements

Annexe 5: Institutional setting of comparative corridors

Model/Legal basis	Authority	Corridor	Established	Operational railway
Treaty-based	LCTTFA	Lobito Corridor (Angola-DRC-Zambia)	2023 (agreement), Interim Secretariat 2025	Yes; Benguela Railway, concessioned to LAR (2023)
Private, Nonprofit (US-registered)	Lobito Corridor Investment Promotion Authority (LCIPA)	Lobito Corridor (Angola-DRC-Zambia, investment promotion angle)	2023	Yes, but indirect role focused on investment, not operations
Treaty-based	Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Coordination Authority (NCTTCA)	Northern Corridor (Mombasa-Great Lakes)	1985 (revamped 2007)	Yes
	CCTTFA	Central Corridor (Dar es Salaam-Great Lakes)	2006	Yes
MoU-based	Trans-Kalahari Corridor Management Committee (TKCMC)	Trans-Kalahari Corridor (Walvis Bay-Botswana-Gauteng)	2003	No
Company/PPP	MCLI	Maputo Development Corridor (Gauteng-Maputo)	2004	Yes
	WBCG	Walvis Bay Corridor (Namibia-Botswana-South Africa)	2000	Partial
Project-specific/PPP or Donor-led	SAGCOT Corridor Management/Secretariat	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania	2010	No
	Beira Corridor Secretariat/Project Office	Beira Development Corridor (Mozambique-landlocked neighbours)	1990s (various initiatives)	Partial

- 12 Southern African Development Community (SADC) (2023). Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency Agreement to Accelerate Cross-Border Trade. Retrieved from <https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/lobito-corridor-transit-transport-facilitation-agency-agreement-accelerate-cross-border>.
- 13 Lobito Corridor Investment Promotion Authority (nd). About the Lobito Corridor Investment Promotion Authority. Retrieved from <https://www.lobitocorridor.org/about>.
- 14 United States Government (2024). Fact Sheet: Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment in the Lobito Trans-Africa Corridor. Retrieved from <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/12/03/fact-sheet-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-in-the-lobito-trans-africa-corridor/>.
- 15 Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Coordination Authority (nd). Institutional Framework of the NCTTCA. Retrieved from <https://www.ttcanc.org/institutional-framework>.
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- 17 Walvis Bay Corridor Group (nd). Official Website of the Walvis Bay Corridor Group. Retrieved from <https://www.wbcg.com.na>.
- 18 European Centre for Development Policy Management (2012). The Maputo Corridor — Regional Integration that Works. Retrieved from <https://ecdpm.org/work/africa-at-a-turning-point-the-case-of-mozambique-volume-1-issue-10-december-2012/the-maputo-corridor-regional-integration-that-works>.
- 19 Walvis Bay Corridor Group (nd). Official Website of the Walvis Bay Corridor Group. Retrieved from <https://www.wbcg.com.na>.
- 20 World Bank (nd). Strategic Regional Environmental Assessment (SREA): Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Retrieved from <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/462601468311407035/pdf/E30750v20EA0P10120AFR0EA0P1257280v2.pdf>.
- 21 European Centre for Development Policy Management (2020). A Political Economy Analysis of the Nacala and Beira Corridors. Retrieved from <https://ecdpm.org/application/files/4916/5546/8623/A-Political-Economy-Analysis-Nacala-Beira-Corridors-Discussion-Paper-277-July-2020-ECDPM.pdf>.
- 22 African Development Bank (nd). MapAfrica Project Database: Beira Search Results. Retrieved from <https://mapafrica.afdb.org/en/projects?search=beira>.

Governance structure	Strengths	Weaknesses	Source
Interstate Ministerial Committee, Interim Secretariat (SADC-supported)	Strong legitimacy, harmonisation across three countries, backed by SADC	Still early-stage, limited institutional capacity	SADC ¹²
Nonprofit board, private-sector and donor-led (PGII/US Export-Import Bank-backed)	Mobilises FDI, PPPs, donor/private engagement	Not government-backed; limited formal authority in Corridor states	LCIPA, ¹³ White House ¹⁴
Council of Ministers (policy), Executive Committee, Secretariat	Strong legitimacy, binding agreements across countries	Bureaucratic, slow operational response	NCTTCA ¹⁵
Interstate Council of Ministers, Executive Board, Stakeholders Consultative Committee, Permanent Secretariat	Broad membership, policy harmonisation	Early-stage capacity, donor-dependent	CCTTFA ¹⁶
Committee of government representatives	Flexible, faster operational response	Weak legal enforcement, limited private sector input	Walvis Bay Corridor Group (WBCG) ¹⁷
Board (public and private), Secretariat	Agile, strong private sector engagement	Limited legal authority over governments, donor dependent	European Centre for Development Policy Management ¹⁸
Board (private-led), Secretariat	Private sector driven, highly responsive	Limited government enforcement power	WBCG ¹⁹
Project office, donor and private sector coordination	Focused on agriculture and logistics integration	Narrow scope, short- to medium-term focus	World Bank ²⁰
Project office, regional government coordination	Technical expertise, focused infrastructure rehab	Limited mandate, short-term	European Centre for Policy Management ²¹ ; AfDB ²²

Annexe 6: Producing mines in the DRC (2023)

Company	Copper (t)	Cobalt (t)	Description	Main Owner(s)	Third Country Involvement
Kamoa-Kakula (Kamoa JV)	437,314	–	A JV of Ivanhoe Mines (39.6%), Zijin (39.6%), Crystal River (0.8%), and the DRC (20%). One of the world's highest-grade tier-1 copper operations, low-emissions, operating since 2021, with capacity ~600 ktpa	Ivanhoe Mines/ Zijin Mining (39.6% each)	China, Canada
Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM)	360,586	22,813	CMOC's 80%-owned open-pit copper-cobalt mine. Fifth-largest copper and second-largest cobalt mine globally; capacity ~450 kt Cu, ~37 kt Co annually.	CMOC Group (80%)	China
Sicomines	206,612	5,950	Integrated mine-to-smelter JV including acid plant, producing copper-cobalt concentrates in Katanga.	China Railway/ PowerChina (68%), Gécamines (32%)	China
Kamoto Copper Company (KCC)	200,292	15,955	KCC, Glencore's JV underground copper-cobalt complex with Kamoto, Mashamba East, and others; major cobalt and copper output.	Glencore (75%), Gécamines (25%)	UK, Switzerland
CMOC portfolio (incl. TFM/ Kisanfu Mining (KFM))	144,589	29,492	CMOC Group Ltd, a top global cobalt and copper metals producer. Holds TFM (80%) and Kisanfu (71.25% CMOC, 23.75% Contemporary Amperex Technology Limited, 5% DRC).	CMOC Group (80% TFM, 71.25% KFM)	China
Compagnie Minière de Musonoie	129,151	2,180	Compagnie Minière de Musonoie Global SAS, active in Katanga copper-cobalt operations.	Zijin Mining (72%), Gécamines	China
Metalkol Roan Tailings Reclamation	99,688	14,713	Operates Metalkol Roan Tailings Reclamation project, processing cobalt from tailings; high-value cobalt output.	ERG	Kazakhstan
Société Minière de Deziwa	83,508	6,787	Société Minière de Deziwa – CNMC/ Gécamines JV producing ~80 ktpa copper and cobalt as byproducts.	CNMC (51%), Gécamines (49%)	China
Lualaba Copper Smelter	78,468	–	Lualaba Copper Smelter – processing concentrates, producing copper and cobalt alloys.	CNMC (60%), Yunnan Copper (40%)	China
Central Copper Resources (CCR)	60,144	2,542	JV exploring and mining copper and cobalt in Katanga.	CCR	Mixed/ Luxembourg
Chemaf/Congo Dongfang International Mining	49,577	1,861	Part of Chemaf's copper-cobalt operations, including Etoile and other sites.	Chemaf	UAE
Kaipeng Mining Co., Ltd (Kaipeng)	48,723	10	Chinese-owned exploration and production company focused on copper in Haut-Katanga.	Kaipeng Mining (Chinese-owned)	China
Lamikal Resources SARL (Lamikal)	48,258	4,802	Operated by La Minière de Kalukundi (LAMIKAL), a copper-cobalt producer in Kolwezi region.	Norinco/ Wanbao (JV with Gécamines)	China

Company	Copper (t)	Cobalt (t)	Description	Main Owner(s)	Third Country Involvement
Tengyuan Cobalt and Copper Resources	47,241	1,611	Tiger Resources JV (Kipoi operation) involved in Katanga copper and cobalt operations.	YYT	China
Kinsevere Mine (MMG)	43,138	–	Subsidiary of MMG Ltd – operates Kinsevere copper mine in the DRC.	MMG (China Minmetals Corporation)/Gécamines	China
Luilu Resources – Luilu Metallurgical Plant	43,129	2,150	Operates Luilu metallurgical complex (Kolwezi) processing copper-cobalt concentrates.	Glencore/Gécamines (Glencore majority via KCC)	UK, Switzerland
Comika Mining (Pumpi)	40,283	3,143	Chinese-Congolese JV mining copper-cobalt in Katanga.	Wanbao Mining (75%)	China
Société Minière du Katanga (Somika)	38,310	50	Copper miner in Kolwezi.	Somika Group	India/unclear
CNMC-Huachin Mabende Mining	37,413	–	CNMC subsidiary operating Mabende copper project.	CNMC	China
Kalongwe Mine	35,809	2,929	Kalongwe mine producing copper and cobalt concentrate.	Chengtun Mining (majority)	China
Excellen Minerals SARL	35,300	482	Copper-cobalt explorer and producer in Katanga region.	Hong Kong Excellen Mining (with Gécamines)	China
Mutanda Mining SARL	33,764	7,416	Mining for copper-cobalt mineralisation.	Glencore (100%)	UK, Switzerland
Société d'Exploitation de Kipoi	33,055	–	Medium-scale copper operations.	YYT	China
Shituru Mining Corporation	33,028	–	Copper operations in Katanga.	Pengxin Mining (with Gécamines)	China
Kambove Mining SAS	32,862	901	Copper-cobalt operations (ex-Gécamines assets).	CNMC/Gécamines (CNMC majority)	China
Compagnie Minière de Luisha	31,946	497	Copper producer in Haut-Katanga.	China Railway	China
Huachin Metal Leach	31,909	1,646	CNMC-led operations in the copper-cobalt zone.	CNMC	China
New Minerals Investments SARL	30,341	109	Junior copper-cobalt mining company active in Katanga.	Unknown (likely private investor)	China
Thomas Mining SARL	29,037	2,811	Local copper and cobalt producer.	MMG (majority-owned by China Minmetals Corporation)	China

Company	Copper (t)	Cobalt (t)	Description	Main Owner(s)	Third Country Involvement
Katanga Investment & Commerce Corp	28,138	–	Copper mining JV operating Kinsenda Mine.	Metorex (77%)/Sodimico	China
Minière de Kasombo	28,103	765	Integrated copper-cobalt operator.	Unknown (likely Gécamines JV)	China
Ruashi Mining	26,791	2,205	Open-pit copper-cobalt mine, managed by Jinchuan Group.	Jinchuan Group (75%)	China
Kisanfu Mining	26,296	–	Regional copper mining player.	Somika Group	India/unclear
CNMC Metal Leach	21,176	335	Processing operations in Katanga.	CNMC	China
MKM Mining SARL	18,519	266	Copper production in Haut-Katanga.	China Railway/ Gécamines (likely China Railway majority)	China
Congo Jin Ju JV	17,704	–	Chinese-Congolese copper mining JV.	Unknown (likely Chinese- Gécamines JV)	China
Metal Mines	17,051	1,197	Copper-cobalt producer.	Hanrui Cobalt	China
CNMC Congo Compagnie Minière	17,028	–	CNMC's copper operations in the DRC.	CNMC	China
Rubamin Group	15,942	–	Rubber mines serving the copper-cobalt sector.	Rubamin Group	India
MMT Mining SARL	15,902	81	Small-scale copper miner.	Unknown (likely Gécamines JV)	Unknown
Chemaf (local subsidiary)	15,140	1,537	Major copper-cobalt producer (Etoile, Mutoshi).	Chemaf	UAE
MJM Mining	13,242	–	Katanga copper producer.	Unknown (likely Gécamines JV)	Unknown
Divine Land Mining SARL	12,019	–	Copper exploration and mining in Katanga.	Luo Guangchen (90%)	China
Golden African Resources SARL	8,360	–	Junior copper mining firm.	Golden African Resources SARL	Unclear
Everbright Mining SARL	6,778	–	Everbright Group JV for copper projects.	Everbright Group	China
GCM	6,319	–		Unknown (likely Gécamines JV)	Unknown
OM Metal Resources SARL	4,567	–	Minor Congolese copper contractor.	Unknown (likely Indian firm)	Unknown
Congo Moon Mining SARL	3,411	–	Emerging copper miner.	Unknown (likely local Congolese firm)	Unknown
Anvil Mining Ltd	2,906	–	Formerly tin-focused, now copper-focused.	MMG Ltd	China

Company	Copper (t)	Cobalt (t)	Description	Main Owner(s)	Third Country Involvement
Société pour le Traitement du Terril de Lubumbashi	2,720	2,357	Local copper-cobalt processor.	Gécamines (100%)	NA
Boss Mining	2,649	–	Artisanal copper producer.	ERG (51%), Gécamines (49%)	Kazakhstan
Frontier Mines	2,339	–	Small copper concession.	ERG	Kazakhstan
Jin Xun Congo Mining SARL	1,966	–	Junior copper player.	Unknown (likely Chinese JV)	Unknown
Chemaf SA	1,700	239	Chemaf's local SA entity.	Chemaf	UAE
Sabwe Mining SARL	1,500	–	Minor copper issuer.	Unknown (likely Chinese JV)	China
Mining Processing Company	50	–	Minimal copper producer.	Unknown (likely local Congolese firm)	Unknown
Kastro SARL/ SEK (Vente Locale)	–	–	No 2023 sales reported.	Unknown (no production data; likely local traders)	Unknown

Annexe 7: Operational copper mines in Zambia (2025)

Mine/Complex	Status	Primary company/operator	Nationality of major owner	Copper production (t) (2023)
Kansanshi	Operational/ Expansion	FQM	Canada	~134,800
Sentinel (Kalumbila)	Operational	FQM Trident	Canada	~214,000
Lumwana	Operational/ Expansion	Barrick Gold	Canada	~100,000–120,000* (not separately reported)
Konkola	Operational	Vedanta Resources (KCM)	India/UK	~50,000–70,000* (disrupted, limited data)
Nchanga	Operational	Vedanta Resources (KCM)	India/UK	~20,000–30,000* (disrupted, limited data)
Nampundwe	Operational	Vedanta Resources (KCM)	India/UK	~5,000–10,000* (limited data)
Mopani (Mufulira, Nkana)	Operational	Mopani Copper Mines (IRH majority, ZCCM-IH minority)	UAE/Zambia	~50,000–80,000* (disrupted, limited data)
Lubambe	Operational	JCHX Mining (80%) and ZCCM-IH (20%)	China/Zambia	~20,000–30,000* (estimated)
Chibuluma South	Operational	Jinchuan Group (Metorex)	China	~10,000–15,000* (estimated)
Chambishi (NFCA)	Operational	CNMC	China	~20,000–40,000* (estimated)
Muliashi	Operational	CNMC	China	~15,000–25,000* (estimated)
Mwambashi	Operational	Sino-Metals Leach Zambia	China	~5,000–15,000* (limited data)
Mimbula	Operational	Moxico Resources	Zambia (junior)	~5,000–10,000* (limited data, recent startup)
Munali (Ni with Cu byproduct)	Operational	Mabiza/Consolidated Nickel Mines	Zambia/UK (minor)	~1,000–5,000* (Cu as byproduct, estimated)

Annexe 8: Summary overview of local content policies in Angola, the DRC and Zambia

Dimension	Angola (Mining)	DRC (Mining)	Zambia (Mining)
Local procurement	Mining Code 2011 (Law 31/11) – National market protection: Where the price is within 10% and delivery is within eight business days, mining right-holders must prefer Angolan suppliers (for goods and services). ²³	Subcontracting Law 17/001 (2017): Subcontracted goods and services must be at least 51% Congolese-owned; enforced by ARSP. The 2018 Mining Code ties mining operations to this regime. ²⁴	Minerals Regulation Commission Act, 2024 (the “New Mines Act”) and the Geological and Minerals Development (Preference for Zambian Goods and Services) Regulations, 2025: Mining rights-holders and processing license-holders are required to prioritise the procurement of Zambian goods and services, supported by a progressive set of mandatory local-procurement thresholds. The 2025 Regulations require companies to allocate at least 20% of their annual procurement expenditure to Zambian suppliers within six months of the regulations coming into force, rising to 25% after one year, 35% after two years, and a minimum of 40% within five years.
Local recruitment	Mining Code 2011: Duty to employ and train Angolan technicians and workers, with priority given to residents of the concession area. ²⁵	2018 Mining Code and labour framework: Preference for Congolese nationals and training or localisation; enforced in practice via work permits and compliance. ²⁶	Act 2025 s.10(2) cross-references the Employment Code Act 2019: Preference for citizens and training programmes for skills transfer. (Work-permit practice enforces localisation and succession.)
Local ownership (Participation)	Mining Code 2011: The State is entitled to a participation of not less than 10% in the operating company (often via Endiama or Ferrangol, depending on mineral). ²⁷	Mining Code 2018: 10% free, non-dilutable state interest plus 5% at each renewal, and at least 10% share capital held by Congolese nationals; often structured through Gécamines JVs. ²⁸	State participation is typically via ZCCM-IH stakes (for instance, Mopani, Kansanshi structures). ASM is reserved for citizens (under the new framework); no statutory local equity quota applies for large-scale operations.

23 Government of Angola (2011). Mining Code (Law 31/11), English version. Retrieved from https://c2a.portais.gov.ao/uploads/Angolan_Mining_Code_2011_English_version_75c67939e1.pdf.

24 ARSP (nd). Official Website of the Regulatory Authority for Subcontracting in the Private Sector (ARSP). Retrieved from <https://arsp.cd/en/accueil-english>.

25 Government of Angola (2011). Mining Code (Law 31/11), English version.

26 HSF Kramer (2018). The Democratic Republic of Congo's Revised Mining Code. Retrieved from <https://www.hsfkramer.com/insights/2018-04/the-democratic-republic-of-congos-revised-mining-code>.

27 Clifford Chance (2011). New Angolan Mining Code. Retrieved from <https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2011/10/new-angolan-mining-code.pdf>.

28 Norton Rose Fulbright (2018). Major Changes to the Mining Code of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved from <https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-sg/knowledge/publications/07ca4707/major-changes-to-the-mining-code-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo>.

Dimension	Angola (Mining)	DRC (Mining)	Zambia (Mining)
Vertical linkages	The Code focuses on preference and participation; no general beneficiation quota exists for local content. ²⁹	The 2018 Code introduces strategic minerals (such as cobalt) with a higher royalty (up to 10%) and super-profits tax – fiscal incentives towards in-country processing. Vertical linkages are pursued through the development of the battery value chain (including a precursor plant) as defined in the DRC-Zambia Bilateral Cooperation Agreement on the Battery and Clean Energy Value Chain and the feasibility study mandate to ARISE Investment.	No beneficiation quotas in Act 2025; instead, preference measures, licensing and fiscal tools (outside the local content framework) are used. Vertical linkages are pursued through the development of the battery value chain (including a precursor plant) as defined in the DRC-Zambia Bilateral Cooperation Agreement on the Battery and Clean Energy Value Chain and the feasibility study mandate to ARISE Investment.
Horizontal linkages	Community and social obligations are typically embedded in mineral investment contracts (community development agreements) rather than imposed through a fixed LC levy. ³⁰	The 2018 Code mandates 0.3% of turnover for community development and sub-national royalty transfers. ³¹	Act 2025 empowers the ministry to issue local content guidelines and set thresholds by Statutory Instrument; separate economy-wide measures (for instance, SI 35/2021 on transport) remain relevant but are outside the scope of this Act's local content clause.

29 Government of Angola (2011). Mining Code (Law 31/11), English version.

30 Chambers and Partners (2025). Mining 2025: Angola. Retrieved from <https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/mining-2025/angola>.

31 Sida Helpdesk for Environment and Climate Change (2021). Overview and Mapping of the Mining Sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Retrieved from https://sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.se/sites/default/files/2024-11/DRC%20mining%20overview%20and%20mapping_web%20report%202021.pdf.

Annexe 9: Implementation status of EITI Standards in Angola, the DRC and Zambia

EITI requirements	Angola (2024 Validation)	DRC (2022 Validation)	Zambia (2021 Validation)
1. Oversight by the MSG	Score: 72/100 Angola has established a functioning MSG that brings together government, industry and civil society. Engagement by government and companies is generally constructive, but civil society participation remains cautious and limited, with weak representation outside Luanda. The MSG's internal governance and communication processes are still developing, and capacity constraints are slowing down decision-making. Strengthening civil society independence and diversifying participation are key priorities for the next phase.	Score: 84/100 The DRC has demonstrated strong government and company commitment to the EITI process, and civil society remains active in oversight. However, coordination within the MSG remains uneven, and internal governance issues have limited its effectiveness. Engagement beyond Kinshasa is weak, and communication of EITI findings to the wider public and subnational actors is limited. Strengthening MSG management and deepening civil society participation at provincial levels remain priorities.	Score: 92/100 High government political commitment through partial EITI funding. Companies show active participation and disclosure, although comprehensiveness is not reviewed. Vibrant civil society. The MSG functions transparently and inclusively, earning an "Exceeded" rating for governance effectiveness. The main challenge lies in ensuring continuity of engagement at subnational levels and maintaining institutional capacity as leadership changes.
2. Legal and institutional framework; licenses, contracts and ownership	Score: 50/100 Angola has made initial progress in disclosing elements of its legal and fiscal framework, but contract transparency and beneficial ownership reporting remain minimal. While the Ministry of Mineral Resources, Petroleum and Gas manages the licensing process, the absence of a comprehensive, publicly accessible petroleum and diamond cadastre limits oversight. Contracts are rarely published in full, and beneficial ownership data is not yet systematically collected or verified. Stronger legal provisions for disclosure and an open cadastre are needed.	Score: 82/100 The DRC has a robust legal and fiscal framework for the extractive sector, and most mining and oil contracts are publicly available. Nonetheless, beneficial ownership disclosure remains incomplete, and the relationship between SOEs and the treasury lacks full transparency. Information on license allocations and transfers is improving but still fragmented, underscoring the need for a more comprehensive and regularly updated cadastre system.	Score: 87/100 Zambia has established a clear and transparent legal and fiscal regime for extractive industries. The online mining cadastre and publication of contracts demonstrate a commitment to openness, but ample scope remains to improve systematic disclosures. Progress on beneficial ownership disclosure is notable, with a public register operational, though data completeness and regular updates remain uneven. Continued legal integration of ownership transparency will strengthen accountability.

EITI requirements	Angola (2024 Validation)	DRC (2022 Validation)	Zambia (2021 Validation)
3. Exploration and production	Score: 70/100 Angola discloses annual data on oil and diamond production and exports, providing a solid baseline of information for public understanding of the sector. However, the completeness of exploration data remains limited, particularly regarding new offshore blocks and artisanal diamond mining. While production data is reliable, there is scope to better integrate reporting systems and increase consistency across different government agencies.	Score: 90/100 The DRC publishes comprehensive data on production and exports for key commodities such as copper, cobalt and gold. This strengthens accountability in the mining sector. However, information on ASM activities, which employ millions of Congolese, remains insufficient. Moreover, environmental and emissions reporting is not yet incorporated, limiting a full understanding of the sector's broader impacts.	Score: 70/100 Data on mining production and exports is publicly available and reliable for large operators, especially copper and cobalt producers. Nevertheless, there is scope to expand reporting to other minerals.
4. Revenue collection	Score: 45/100 Angola's disclosures on payments and revenues remain partial and fragmented. The EITI process has yet to achieve comprehensive reconciliation of company payments with government receipts, and information on transport revenues, barter arrangements and SOE transactions is incomplete. Data assurance mechanisms are weak, and reporting lacks disaggregation by project. Improved auditing, SOE transparency and systematic publication of fiscal data are needed to raise credibility.	Score: 84/100 The DRC's reconciliation of company payments and government revenues is extensive, covering most major operators. Data quality and timeliness have improved markedly. Still, disaggregation and data assurance remain weak points, and the reconciliation process occasionally reveals unexplained discrepancies between company and government figures. Stronger auditing standards and timelier SOE reporting would enhance data credibility.	Score: 85/100 Zambia discloses comprehensive information on payments by companies and revenues received by government agencies, including SOE transactions and subnational payments. Audit and assurance mechanisms are functioning well. Remaining gaps relate to incomplete project-level disaggregation and limited publication of some non-tax revenues. Integration of EITI reporting with digital fiscal systems would improve efficiency and reliability.
5. Revenue management and distribution	Score: 45/100 Limited information is available on how extractive revenues are allocated or spent once transferred to the treasury. The national budget does not clearly distinguish between petroleum, diamond and other resource revenues, and subnational transfer mechanisms remain underdeveloped. There is little evidence of how extractive income contributes to public investment or local development, leaving a major transparency gap in Angola's resource governance chain.	Score: 60/100 Transparency in how extractive revenues are allocated and spent remains limited. Although the DRC's legal framework provides for subnational transfers, the amounts actually disbursed and their timing are often unclear. While Gécamines's audited financial statements are available, those of the other eight SOEs are not. No systematic reporting exists on how extractive income is integrated into the national budget or used for development spending. This dimension is the weakest link in the DRC's EITI implementation.	Score: 90/100 EITI reporting clearly shows how revenues are recorded in the national budget and transferred to subnational levels, supporting fiscal transparency. Yet, information on how these funds are actually spent is not systematically available. Expanding reporting to include revenue use and impacts on local development would close this accountability gap.

EITI requirements	Angola (2024 Validation)	DRC (2022 Validation)	Zambia (2021 Validation)
6. Social and economic spending	Score: 50/100 Angola provides some data on the extractive sector's contribution to GDP, exports and employment, as well as partial disclosure of SOEs' quasi-fiscal activities. However, information on social and environmental expenditures, community projects and environmental rehabilitation is very limited. Greater disclosure of Sonangol's social spending and environmental liabilities is needed to align with the EITI Standard.	Score: 70/100 The DRC discloses some social and quasi-fiscal expenditures by SOEs and provides data on the sector's economic contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) and employment. However, disclosures on community projects, SOEs' quasi-fiscal operations and environmental impacts remain incomplete. Greater transparency in how extractive companies contribute to local development and environmental rehabilitation is needed.	Score: 90/100 The extractive sector's contribution to GDP, exports and employment is well documented, and companies disclose mandatory social expenditures. However, reporting on voluntary social projects, quasi-fiscal activities and environmental management remains limited. Zambia could strengthen its leadership by incorporating environmental and transition-related disclosures under the new 2023 EITI Standard.
7. Outcomes and impact	Score: 68/100 Angola's EITI process is beginning to foster dialogue around transparency and governance. EITI data is increasingly available online, and recommendations from previous reports are being considered by authorities. However, public awareness remains low, and the use of EITI data by civil society and parliament to influence policy remains limited. Strengthening dissemination, feedback loops and impact monitoring will be crucial to consolidate progress.	Score: 93/100 The DRC stands out for its commitment to using EITI data to foster public debate and policy learning. Information is publicly accessible, recommendations are systematically tracked and follow-up mechanisms exist. Nonetheless, the use of EITI findings to inform government decision-making and provincial policy processes could be deepened to strengthen impact at all levels of governance.	Score: 90/100 Zambia consistently uses EITI data to inform policy discussions, particularly on mining taxation and fiscal reforms. Reports are timely, open and used in public debate. Follow-up on recommendations is systematic. The next step is deepening engagement with provincial authorities and community groups to translate national transparency into local accountability.

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Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative

We believe that a country's natural resources belong to its citizens. Our mission is to promote understanding of natural resource management, strengthen public and corporate governance and provide the data to inform greater transparency and accountability in the extractives sector.

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