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The Board agreed that Iraq has made inadequate progress overall in implementing the 2016 EITI Standard.

Decision on the outcome of Iraq's Validation

Decision reference
2017-55 / BM-38
Decision basis
2016 EITI Standard, Requirement 8.3 EITI Validation deadlines and consequences

Board decision

The Board came to the following decision regarding Iraq's status:

The Board agreed that Iraq has made inadequate progress overall in implementing the 2016 EITI Standard. In accordance with Requirement 8.3c(iii), Iraq will be temporarily suspended until it demonstrates meaningful progress in a new Validation. The Board’s determination of Iraq’s progress with the EITI’s requirements is outlined in the assessment card below.

The EITI Board agreed that Iraq has gone beyond the requirement in the EITI Standard on Requirement 4.2 and made satisfactory progress in meeting the requirements in the EITI Standard on Requirements 1.3, 3.1, 3.3, and 4.8. The Board further agreed that Iraq has made meaningful progress in meeting requirements 1.5, 3.2, 4.5, 4.7, 6.3, 7.1 and 7.3, inadequate progress in meeting requirements 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 4.1, 4.9, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1 and 7.4, and no progress in meeting requirement 4.6. The areas of concern relate to government and company engagement (requirements 1.1 and 1.2), MSG governance (1.4), EITI work plan (1.5), legal framework, license allocations and register (2.1, 2.2 and 2.3), the government’s policy on contract disclosure (2.4), state participation (2.6), production data (3.2), comprehensiveness of revenue disclosures (4.1), transactions by state-owned enterprises (4.5), direct subnational payments (4.6), level of disaggregation (4.7), data quality (4.9), distribution of revenues (5.1), sub-national transfers (5.2), mandatory social expenditures, economic contribution of the extractive sector (6.3), public debate (7.1) and follow-up on recommendations (7.3).

Accordingly, the EITI Board agreed that Iraq is suspended and will need to take corrective actions outlined below. Progress with the corrective actions will be assessed in a second Validation commencing on 25 April 2019. Failure to achieve meaningful progress with considerable improvements across several individual requirements in the second Validation will result in delisting in accordance with Requirement 8.3c in the EITI Standard. In accordance with the EITI Standard, Iraq’s multi-stakeholder group may request an extension of this timeframe, or request that Validation commences earlier than scheduled.

The Board’s decision followed a Validation that commenced on 1 January 2017. In accordance with the 2016 EITI Standard, an initial assessment was undertaken by the International Secretariat. The findings were reviewed by an Independent Validator, who submitted a draft Validation report to the MSG for comment. The MSG’s comments on the report were taken into consideration by the independent Validator in finalising the Validation report and the independent Validator responded to the MSG’s comments. The final decision was taken by the EITI Board.

Corrective actions and strategic recommendations

The EITI Board agreed the following corrective actions to be undertaken by Iraq. Progress in addressing these corrective actions will be assessed in a second Validation commencing on 25 April 2019:

  1. In accordance with requirement 1.1, the government should demonstrate that it is fully, actively and effectively engaged in the EITI process. The government should demonstrate its commitment to the EITI by appointing a government lead to chair the process and ensure that senior government officials are represented and engaged in the multi-stakeholder group. The government should also ensure that links are made between Iraq’s EITI’s objectives and ongoing work within their respective agencies. In accordance with requirement 8.3.c.i, the government is required to develop and disclose an action plan for addressing the deficiencies in government engagement documented in the initial assessment and Validator’s report within three months of the Board’s decision, i.e. by 26 January 2018.
     
  2. In line with Requirement 1.2, the MSG should develop a plan to engage more actively with the industry constituency, for instance through the Iraq Oil Company Forum. To galvanise industry’s attention, the MSG should ensure extensive consultations with industry are undertaken to ensure EITI implementation objectives are consistent with priorities of the industry constituency. In accordance with requirement 8.3.c.i, the company constituency is required to develop and disclose an action plan for addressing the deficiencies in company engagement documented in the initial assessment and Validator’s report within three months of the Board’s decision, i.e. by 26 January 2018.
     
  3. In line with Requirement 1.3, to strengthen implementation, civil society members of the MSG may wish to consider formalising and strengthening their mechanisms for canvassing the broader constituency on key EITI documents, in order to broaden public oversight of EITI reporting and implementation. Basic improvements in MSG governance such as the use of Arabic as the working language should encourage more active civil society participation (see Requirement 1.4).
     
  4. In line with Requirement 1.4, to strengthen implementation, the MSG should update its internal governance rules to cover all provisions of Requirement 1.4, develop a language policy that is conducive to achieving the goals of implementation in Iraq and publish procedures for nominating and changing MSG representatives, including the duration of mandates. The MSG should revisit its internal decision-making procedures to ensure statutory MSG rules are in line with current practice and treat each of the constituencies as equal. The MSG should also clarify whether there is a practice of per diems for attending EITI meetings or other payments to MSG members, consider keeping public attendance records and consider posting MSG minutes online.
     
  5. In line with Requirement 1.5, MSG members should in the future consult with stakeholders from all constituencies and ensure that national priorities are adequately reflected in the work plan in order to continue building on the recent efforts to bring the work plan in line with the EITI’s requirements.
     
  6. In line with Requirement 2.1, the MSG should ensure that future IEITI Reports provide descriptions of the main laws and fiscal terms related to the mining, oil and gas sectors, including an overview of the roles of the main government entities involved in overseeing the sectors and of recent or ongoing reforms. The MSG could consider using the IEITI website as a repository of the regularly-updated information on fiscal terms and the legal environment for the mining, oil and gas industry.
     
  7. In line with Requirement 2.2, the MSG should ensure that future IEITI Reports clearly define the number of licenses (including Technical Service Contracts) awarded and transferred in the year(s) under review in both mining and oil and gas, describe the actual process and highlight any non-trivial deviations in practice. The MSG should clarify the technical and financial criteria (and their weightings) used for assessing allocations and transfers of licenses and equity in TSC consortia, both for any discretionary oil and gas contracts (including in the KRG) and for mining license awards and transfers. The MSG may also wish to comment on the efficiency of the current contract allocation and transfer system as a means of clarifying procedures and curbing non-trivial deviations.
     
  8. The MSG should ensure that future IEITI Reports provide all information covered under Requirement 2.3 for all licenses held by material companies (including both oil and gas and mining) or provide a link to where such license information is available to the public. The MSG may also wish to work with the MoO and MIM to disclose license information for all material companies through a publicly-accessible cadastral system and provide free access to such a register online.
     
  9. In line with Requirement 2.4, the MSG should work with government representatives to clarify the Federal Government’s policy on contract disclosure and document any instances of contract disclosure either through future IEITI Reports or through other channels such as the IEITI website. The MSG is also encouraged to undertake a detailed review of which PSCs have been published by the KRG, with a view to clarifying the practice of contract disclosure in the KRG.
     
  10. In line with Requirement 2.5, the MSG should clarify the government’s policy on beneficial ownership disclosure in future IEITI Reports and provide the legal ownership of all material companies. The MSG may wish to consider how reporting of transfers of equity in TSC consortia and mining licenses under Requirement 2.2 may help support work on beneficial ownership disclosure.
     
  11. The MSG should ensure that all aspects of Requirement 2.6 are adequately addressed during the scoping for future IEITI Reports. It should clearly establish its definition of SOEs to delineate the SOEs within the scope of EITI reporting. The MSG should include a comprehensive list of SOEs and their subsidiaries in the next IEITI Report, clarifying the financial relations in practice between SOEs and government as well as any loans and loan guarantees from the government or SOEs to upstream mining, oil and gas companies. The MSG may wish to work closely with MoO and the NOCs to shape the structure of routine disclosures as a means of publishing information required under the EITI Standard on a timelier basis.
     
  12. In line with Requirement 3.2, the MSG should ensure that future IEITI Reports disclose the production volumes and values for all every extractives commodity produced, including crude oil, natural gas and every mineral produced. To continue improving under Requirement 3.1, the MSG may wish to expand its coverage of the mining sector by including more specific updates on current production, primarily in quarrying.
     
  13. In line with Requirement 4.1, the MSG should consider undertaking a comprehensive scoping study to consider options for defining materiality thresholds ahead of agreeing the ToR for its next EITI Report. The MSG should ensure that all material revenue flows (in both petroleum and mining) listed under Requirement 4.1.b are included in the scope of reconciliation and that the materiality threshold for selecting companies ensures that all payments that could affect the comprehensiveness of EITI reporting be included in the scope of reconciliation. The list of material companies should also clearly be defined. The MSG is invited to consider whether setting a quantitative materiality threshold for selecting companies would ensure these aims are met. The MSG should ensure that Iraq’s next IEITI Report includes the IA’s assessment of the materiality of omissions, its statement on the comprehensiveness of the IEITI Report and that full unilateral government disclosure of material revenues from non-material companies is included. In accordance with requirement 8.3.c.i, the MSG is required to develop and disclose an action plan for addressing weaknesses in data comprehensiveness documented in the initial assessment and Validator’s report within three months of the Board’s decision, i.e. by 26 January 2018.
     
  14. To continuing making progress under Requirement 4.2, the MSG is encouraged to consider publishing the reconciled oil sales data disaggregated by cargo (and associated information) it already collects. The MSG may also wish to use SOMO’s regular online disclosures as a means of embedding EITI reporting of oil sales within routine government systems. The MSG could consider joining the EITI targeted effort on commodity trading to provide a framework for ensuring that disclosures of the state’s sales of its in-kind revenues are in line with international best practice.
     
  15. While there is no evidence of barters or infrastructure agreements in the KRG, the MSG is encouraged to examine all of the published KRG PSCs to assess the potential for infrastructure provisions or barter components of these PSCs in line with Requirement 4.3.
     
  16. In line with Requirement 4.4, the MSG is strongly encouraged to review the financial statements of the six SOEs engaged in transportation, distribution and marketing of oil and gas to assess the materiality of any potential revenues to government, through transfers to the MoF.
     
  17. In line with Requirement 4.5, the MSG should clarify the scope of transactions between SOEs and other government agencies as well as between SOEs and companies in the mining, oil and gas sector. Drawing upon the MSG’s definition of SOEs under Requirement 2.6, the MSG should ensure future IEITI Reports disclose the disaggregated value of such financial transactions for the year under review. Given the lack of clarity surrounding financial relations between oil and gas SOEs and the government, the MSG is encouraged to consider whether reconciliation of such financial transactions (both statutory and ad hoc) would further the broader objective of transparency in transactions between SOEs and government.
     
  18. The MSG should secure the KRG's active participation in scoping and shaping Iraqi EITI disclosures of direct subnational payments under Requirement 4.6. The MSG is encouraged to consider whether working with the MoO and the KRG to establish its own regional-level structure for EITI implementation could ensure more efficient coverage of subnational direct payments. The KRG’s EITI MSG could publish its own reports, which could then be included in the national IEITI Reports.
     
  19. In line with Requirement 4.7, the MSG should ensure that all reconciled financial data is disaggregated by company, revenue stream and government entity. The MSG is also encouraged to agree a definition of project to ensure consistency in its project-level reporting.
     
  20. To further strengthen implementation of Requirement 4.8, the MSG may wish to work with the General Commission on Taxes, the General Customs Authority, SOMO, the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of Iraq and the Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit to assess the potential for mainstreaming key EITI disclosures and ensuring even timelier publication of EITI information.
     
  21. In line with Requirement 4.9, the MSG should ensure that a review of actual auditing practices by reporting companies and government entities be conducted before agreeing procedures to ensure the reliability of EITI information. The MSG should also ensure that the ToR for the IA is in line with the standard ToR approved by the EITI Board and that its agreement on any deviations from the ToR in the final EITI Reports be properly documented. The MSG should also ensure that the IA include an assessment of whether the payments and revenues disclosed in the EITI Reports were subject to credible, independent audit, applying international auditing standards as well as a description of follow-up on past EITI recommendations. In accordance with requirement 8.3.c.i, the MSG is required to develop and disclose an action plan for addressing weaknesses in data reliability documented in the initial assessment and Validator’s report within three months of the Board’s decision, i.e. by 26 January 2018.
     
  22. In line with Requirement 5.1, the MSG should work with the IA in preparing the next IEITI Report to clearly trace any mining, oil and gas revenues that are not recorded in the national budget and clearly explain the allocation of any off-budget revenues. To further strengthen implementation under Requirement 5.3, the MSG could consider tracking more comprehensively the spending of extractive industry revenues earmarked for specific purposes. This form of annual diagnostic of public financial management would be of particular relevance to the IMF’s standby agreement with Iraq.[1]
     
  23. In line with Requirement 5.2, the MSG should assess the materiality of subnational transfers and ensure that future IEITI Reports provide the specific formula for calculating subnational transfers linked to extractives revenues to individual governorates, disclose any material subnational transfers and any discrepancies between the transfer amount calculated in accordance with the relevant revenue sharing formula and the actual amount that was transferred between the central government and each relevant subnational entity.
     
  24. In line with Requirement 5.3, the MSG could consider working with relevant stakeholders including parliamentarians to ensure that future EITI Reports provide additional information on budgetary oil price and production assumptions as well as revenue forecasts.
     
  25. In line with Requirement 6.1, the MSG should clarify ensure that reporting of mandatory social expenditures be disaggregated by type of payment and beneficiary, clarifying the name and function of any non-government (third-party) beneficiaries of mandatory social expenditures. The MSG may also wish to consider the feasibility of reconciling mandatory social expenditures.
     
  26. In line with Requirement 6.3, the MSG should ensure that future IEITI Reports provide the extractive industries, in oil and gas as well as mining in Iraq (including Kurdistan), share of GDP, government revenues, exports and employment in absolute and relative terms. It should also ensure that the location of all significant production is clearly delineated.
     
  27. In line with Requirement 7.1, IEITI should ensure that future reports are comprehensible, actively promoted, publicly accessible and contribute to public debate. IETI should consider developing a communications strategy that looks beyond building brand recognition to addressing the national priorities identified in the work plan. IEITI should also agree a clear policy on the access, release and re-use of EITI data and make EITI Reports available in an open data format online.
     
  28. In line with Requirement 7.3, the MSG should consider how to act upon lessons learned with regards to the KRG and identify opportunities to increase engagement with stakeholders there. The MSG could also take a proactive role in formulating its own recommendations.
     
  29. In line with Requirement 7.4, the MSG should ensure that annual progress reports reflect activities in the year under review clearly and that progress against the work plan is clear. The MSG should also ensure that all stakeholders are given an opportunity to provide input to the annual progress report and that their views are adequately reflected. As secretariat staff participating in meetings makes up a large part of the annual progress report’s listed activities, the MSG may wish to consider what kind of activities the report should include. The MSG should also consider drafting and publishing annual progress reports in Arabic to improve the dialogue between stakeholders and ensure that there is a common understanding of the activities carried out by the MSG in the year under review.

The MSG is encouraged to consider the other recommendations in the Validator’s Report and the International Secretariat’s initial assessment, and to document the MSG’s responses to these recommendations in the next annual progress report.

Background

The Government of Iraq initially committed to implement the EITI in July 2007 and publicly announced its commitment to work with all stakeholder groups at the 4th EITI Global Conference in Doha, Qatar, in February 2009. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared Iraq’s formal commitment to EITI at the Iraq EITI (IEITI) launch conference on 10-11 January 2010. The country was accepted as an EITI Candidate on 10 January 2010. The multi-stakeholder group, the Iraqi Stakeholders Committee (ISC), held its first meeting on 22-23 September 2010. The EITI International Board designated Iraq Compliant under the EITI Rules on 12 December 2012.

The Validation process commenced on 1 January 2017. In accordance with the Validation procedures, an initial assessment was prepared by the International Secretariat. The Independent Validator reviewed the findings and wrote a draft Validation report. Comments to the initial assessment and the draft Validation report were received from the MSG. The Independent Validator reviewed the comments and responded to the MSG, before finalising the Validation report.

The Validation Committee reviewed the case on 4 October 2017. Based on the findings above, the Validation Committee agreed to recommend the assessment card and corrective actions outlined below.

The Committee also agreed to recommend an overall assessment of “inadequate progress” in implementing the 2016 EITI Standard. Requirement 8.3.c. of the EITI Standard states that:

ii.    Overall assessments. Pursuant to the Validation Process, the EITI Board will make an assessment of overall compliance with all requirements in the EITI Standard.

iii.   Inadequate progress. The country will be suspended and requested to undertake corrective actions until the second Validation. For the suspension to be lifted, the country must in its second Validation demonstrate at least meaningful progress.

The Validation Committee agreed to recommend a period of 18 months to undertake the corrective actions. This recommendation takes into account that the challenges identified are relatively significant and seeks to align the Validation deadline with the deadline for the 2017 EITI Report.

Scorecard for Iraq: 2017

Assessment of EITI requirements

  • Not met
  • Partly met
  • Mostly met
  • Fully met
  • Exceeded
Scorecard by requirement View more Assessment View more

Overall Progress

MSG oversight

1.1Government engagement

The extent of senior government officials’ support for the EITI appears to have slowed markedly after Iraq was accepted as an EITI compliant country in 2012. Demonstrations of government engagement are limited to government representatives' semi-regular participation in the MSG and partiicpation in EITI data collection upon request. To strengthen implementation, the MSG should seek to engage more closely with the government and in particular with the Ministry of Oil.

1.2Company engagement

Although national oil companies are engaged in the EITI, industry engagement has dropped since Iraq first began implementing the EITI in 2012. The constituency has never refreshed its representatives despite the fact that two of the representatives have moved on from their positions. To galvanise industry's attention, the MSG should ensure extensive consultations are undertaken to ensure EITI implementation objectives are consistent with priorities of the industry constituency.

1.3Civil society engagement

Despite the general constraints inherent in Iraq's security situation, civil society is able to engage in public debate related to the EITI proess and expresss opinions about the EITI process without restraint, coercion or reprisal. Civil society representatives are able to engage in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the EITI process.

1.4MSG governance

The statutory rules for the multi-stakeholder group's structure and membership are not clear and indeed contradictory, making it impossible to assess deviations in practice. The length of MSG members’ tenure, aside from civil society representatives, is unclear. It was evident during stakeholder consultations that there are widespread concerns about an imbalanced relation between the national secretariat and the MSG that hampers the MSG’s effective oversight of EITI reporting.

1.5Work plan

Iraq EITI maintains a current EITI work plan, that is fully costed and aligned with the reporting and Validation deadlines established by the EITI Board. The 2017-2018 work plan is an important improvement on previous work plans but stakeholders expressed concern that it does not reflect consultations with key stakeholders or serve as a tool to support implementation but is instead perceived as a re-packaging of previous work plans to conform with the requirements of the Standard.

Licenses and contracts

2.1Legal framework

The 2015 IEITI Report provides a cursory overview of the legal framework for the oil and gas sector (including the Kurdish Regioal Government or KRG), but no description of the relevant clauses. Fiscal terms are only provided for production sharing contracts (PSCs) in the KRG, not for technical service contracts (TSCs) in the rest of Iraq. The degree of fiscal devolution is explained briefly, although the description is unclear. In mining, several laws are listed but not described, the fiscal regime is not described, and the Ministry's role in regulating the sector is cursorily described.

2.2License allocations

Although no oil and gas licenses changed hands in 2015, a description of the process for transferring or awarding the licenses is absent. It is also unclear whether any mining licenses were allocated or transferred in 2015, and it is unclear whether production sharing contracts were awarded by the Kurdish Regional Government. There is no description of the statutory procedures for transferring equity in a technical service contract.

2.3License register

The 2015 IEITI Report provides the names of the operator, partners, dates of contract signing, effectiveness and approval of all 18 oil blocks awarded as of 2015, but no dates of application, license coordinates, or the identity of license-holders. No information is provided about national production fields or fields in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) The 2015 IEITI Report does not refer to any licenses in the mining sector, nor any mining, oil and gas cadastre, either public or private.

2.4Policy on contract disclosure

The 2015 IEITI Report does not detail the government’s policy on contract disclosure in mining or oil and gas, nor the actual practice of contract disclosure aside from general reference to the publication by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of its Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs). There is evidence of at least one publicly-accessible technical service contract available online and at least six PSCs that have not been published by the KRG.

2.5Beneficial ownership

Not assessed

Implementing countries are not yet required to address beneficial ownership and progress with this requirement does not yet have any implications for a country’s EITI status. The multi-stakeholder group published its roadmap by the deadline of 1 January 2017 as required, but it is not clear what beneficial ownership information will be disclosed in Iraq’s state-dominated oil and gas sector. The 2015 IEITI Report does not clarify the government’s policy on beneficial ownership disclosure and does not provide the legal ownership of companies operating under technical service contracts. It is furthermore not clear whether Iraq wishes to extend beneficial ownership disclosure to the mining sector, where it could perhaps be more relevant.

2.6State participation

While the multi-stakeholder group does not seem to have agreed its own definition of SOE for EITI reporting purposes, the 2015 IEITI Report provides a list of the major upstream companies in oil and gas, but not in mining. There is little information on the statutory financial relations between SOEs and the government, including any deviations in practice.

Monitoring production

3.1Exploration data

The 2015 IEITI Report provides an overview of the extractive sector, including information on significant exploration activities.

3.2Production data

The 2015 IEITI Report provides the volumes of production of oil, gas and four minerals, but only provides the production value for crude oil and natural gas, not the minerals. Volumes and values are not provided for natural gas production in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).

3.3Export data

The 2015 IEITI Report provides the volumes and values of crude oil exports. There is no evidence of any Iraqi exports of natural gas or minerals in 2015.

Revenue collection

4.1Comprehensiveness

The multi-stakeholder group does not appear to have set an explicit materiality threshold for selecting companies or revenue streams in the mining, oil and gas sectors for the 2015 IEITI Report. Several companies making material payments to government appear not to have reported and the materiality of these omissions has not been assessed. The government does not appear to have made full unilateral disclosure of all extractives revenues.

4.2In-kind revenues

Iraq EITI has made efforts to go beyond the minimum requirement through its cargo-by-cargo reconciliation of crude oil sales and additional information on the sales process. The 2015 IEITI Report provides the volumes of crude oil collected by the government, the volumes sold and the value of oil sales disaggregated by buyer.

4.3Barter agreements

Not applicable

EITI Requirement 4.3 on barter and infrastructure transactions is not applicable to Iraq.

4.4Transportation revenues

Not applicable

EITI Requirement 4.4 on transport revenues is not applicable to Iraq.

4.5SOE transactions

The 2015 IEITI Report discloses some transactions between the government and state owned enterprises but not all.

4.6Direct subnational payments

The 2015 IEITI Report provides a cursory description of direct payments to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). There is no evidence that the multi-stakeholder group has made every attempt at including publicly-available information on material oil and gas revenues collected by the KRG or followed up with the KRG in preparing the 2015 IEITI Report.

4.7Disaggregation

The 2015 IEITI Reports present reconciled oil sales data disaggregated by company, but only presents reconciled tax payments disaggregated by oilfield, not by company. This does not allow readers to calculate each company’s share of payments to government.

4.8Data timeliness

Iraq now publishes EITI Reports within one year of the close of the fiscal period under review.

4.9Data quality

The independent administrator (IA) did not undertake a review of auditing practices in 2015 nor agreed robust quality assurance procedures with the multi-stakeholder group. The 2015 IEITI Report does not provide an estimate of reconciliation coverage, nor assessments of the comprehensiveness and reliability of financial data. While the IA has formulated several recommendations on the basis of the 2015 IEITI Report, it has not assessed specific follow-up on past EITI recommendations

Revenue allocation

5.1Distribution of revenues

The 2015 IEITI Report does not address off-budget oil and gas revenues earmarked for the UN Compensation Fund or explain the allocation of any mining, oil or gas revenues that are not recorded in the national budget.

5.2Subnational transfers

The 2015 IEITI Report provides only a cursory description of statutory allocations and subational transfers to the Kurdish Regional Government. There is insufficient information to identify any discrepancies between amounts that should have beentransferred and actual transfers.

5.3Revenue management and expenditures

Not assessed

Reporting on revenue management and expenditures is encouraged but not required by the EITI Standard and progress with this requirement will not have any implications for a country’s EITI status. Iraq EITI has sought to include information on the budget-making process and certain budget assumptions and projections in the 2015 IEITI Report.

Socio-economic contribution

6.1Mandatory social expenditures

The 2015 IEITI Report provides a general description of some types of mandatory social expenditures and discloses some of these expenditures, but not all. The categorisation of social spending is unclear and any nongovernment beneficiaries of mandatory social expenditures are not clearly identified.

6.2Quasi-fiscal expenditures

Not applicable

This requirement is not applicable in Iraq.

6.3Economic contribution

The 2015 IEITI Report provides, in absolute and relative terms, the oil and gas sector’s share of gross domestic product of government revenues, of exports and of employment. However, none of this information is provided for the mining sector, or for the oil and gas sector in Iraqi Kurdistan. The report also does not include exports from the extractive industries as a percentage of total exports.

Outcomes and impact

7.1Public debate

Stakeholders consulted expressed strong concerns that the 2015 IEITI Report was confusing and difficult to read, and that promotion efforts have not actually contributed to the public debate. Iraq has not agreed a clear policy on the access, release and re-use of EITI data and EITI Reports are not available in open data format online.

7.2Data accessibility

Not assessed

Requirement 7.2 encourages the countries to make EITI reports accessible to public in open data formats. Such efforts are encouraged but not required and are not assessed in determining compliance with the EITI Standard. Iraq’s EITI data is available in machine readable format through the EITI global website, drawing on summary data tables completed by the national secretariat. IEITI has also published summaries of past EITI Reports in local languages.

7.3Follow up on recommendations

The multi-stakeholder group (MSG) has made attempts to act upon lessons learnt and to consider the recommendations for improvements. The MSG has also made attempts at engaging influential political figures and parliamentarians in order to implement reforms in the sector. Additional work needs to be undertaken to ensure that recommendations are meaningful, that they address the wider challenges in the sector, that they are structured and that they are actionable.

7.4Outcomes and impact of implementation

Annual progress reports are published, but only perfunctorily. Text is largely incomprehensible and there is no indication that the MSG uses the annual progress report as a tool for benchmarking its strategic decisions or providing an assessment of implementation as a basis for formulating future work plan.

Countries
Iraq